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

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After a long twilight, the era of Leonid Brezhnev has come to an end. It is an event long anticipated, and the issue of succession has figured in all recent discussion of Soviet policy.

In our case, it seems appropriate to note three earlier articles in particular. In April 1975, Robert Conquest examined the issue from a standpoint probably close to that of one school of thought in the Reagan Administration today. In the fall of 1979, William Hyland both reviewed the Brezhnev era to that point and offered a somewhat different view of how the United States might respond to the succession when it came. And in the spring of 1981, Robert C. Tucker presented a scholarly analysis of the degree to which the Stalinist legacy, under Brezhnev, has permeated the Soviet power structure and policies. All three focus on underlying trends and possible American responses, and are well worth re-reading today.

Our lead article in this issue, by Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, is in the same vein, drawing on a careful current reading of the Soviet appraisal of the Reagan Administration. His policy recommendations are in significant contrast to those of Louis Walinsky, while Charles Gati on Poland, Michael Howard and Eliot Cohen on the problems of the Western Alliance, and Karen Dawisha on Soviet policy in the Middle East, address three key areas the United States must take deeply into account as it frames its approach to the new rulers of the Soviet Union.

For the rest, we commend our readers' attention particularly to Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski's lucid analysis of the Latin American debt crisis, which is both important in itself and an indicator of the wider problems that beset all developing countries in the present world economic situation.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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Seweryn Bialer
and Joan Afferica

REAGAN AND RUSSIA

President Reagan won his office in part because he convinced the electorate that the Soviets had hoodwinked all Administrations of the last decade. He proposed to reverse the unfavorable trend of U.S.-Soviet power relations and, quite simply, to "stand up to the Russians." For the last two years, the Reagan Administration has been trying to translate into policy the basic ideas its members brought into office. To an unprecedented degree, these basic ideas have remained unchanged despite pressures that inevitably drive every President facing the realities of domestic and international politics toward the pragmatic center. Despite various adjustments and adaptations, both the domestic and foreign policies of the Reagan Administration, like the Reagan campaign, continue to display the characteristics of an ideological crusade.

In foreign policy President Reagan has subordinated almost all decisions to the East-West conflict as the central axis of American international concerns. Yet after almost two years in office, his conduct toward the Soviet Union is guided less by a comprehensive and consistent long-range policy than by a general ideological orientation tied to several concrete and controversial elements of policy. The result of this approach, at least in the near term, has been a sharp worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations to a level of serious new confrontation and mutual suspicion.

If the patently deteriorating relations between the two superpowers are not to continue their drift toward a new cold war, their premises and priorities must be subjected to a clear and thoroughgoing reconsideration. Such a reexamination is particularly timely not only because the death of Leonid Brezhnev presents new uncertainties about the direction of Soviet foreign policy, but, even more important, because circumstances today generate pressures both internally and externally for the two nations to alter their present course.

As a contribution, then, to the general discussion that engages the political community in both the United States and the Soviet

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Union, this article will pursue four themes: how the Soviets perceive American policy toward the Soviet Union; what main factors affect the nature of current Soviet foreign policy; what assumptions underlie American policy toward the Soviet Union and how valid they are; and what alternatives are open to American policymakers in dealing with the Soviet Union.

II

President Reagan's concentration on the Russian danger as the fundamental issue in world politics is matched in intensity by Russia's preoccupation with Reaganism as a clear menace to its internal stability and international authority. If anything, this attention to America's words and actions will become even more acute during the present passage of power to new leaders. In deciding the future course of Soviet policy toward the United States, those leaders will build upon the views of Russia's U.S.-affairs analysts—analysts whose assessments of the Reagan Administration, with due allowances for differences of language and approach, are strikingly similar to those of some Western observers.

In their publications and conversations, both official and private, Soviet analysts reveal a broad range of agreement on key issues, even if a generous discount is applied to compensate for the influence of official viewpoints. Like American commentators on international problems, they regard as the key aspects of policy the direction of military decisions, the use of economic power, the climate of relations, and the approach to negotiations and to regional conflicts. (They are also prone, much like American specialists on the Soviet Union, to attribute to their adversary's policies greater order, consistency, and comprehensiveness than exists in fact.)

In Soviet eyes the most significant element of the Reagan approach is its attempt to alter the balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Particularly striking in this regard, many Russians feel, is Reagan's willingness to sacrifice social welfare spending to support the cost of the nation's increased military budget—something which would have seemed unthinkable only a few years ago. Reagan, they believe, has shown the will and the political capacity to begin the process of rearming America.

Like their American counterparts, of course, the Soviets appreciate the difficulties involved in the Reagan program. The Administration's military commitments—to the MX strategic mis-

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sile, the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, the Rapid Deployment Force, improved command and communications structure—read like a shopping list with no clear priorities. It is clear that many years will elapse before these programs actually affect the military balance, and ultimate success will also depend upon the President's ability to deliver similar military budgets in the future. While unconvinced that the U.S. military budget seriously threatens them as yet, however, the Russians are convinced that the United States aims in the next few years to change the present strategic balance, which, in their view, is one of parity. What they fear most is any effort to realize one repeated theme of Reagan's election campaign—strategic superiority over the U.S.S.R.

If in material terms the Reagan military program remains far from affecting the actual Soviet-American power balance, the Soviets recognize that its psychological and political effects are immediate and important. The Soviets have been warned that their unceasing military buildup will at least be matched should President Reagan have his way. Although the President may not yet have persuaded them he will succeed, the prospect that American resolve to engage in a military buildup will continue through Reagan's first term and perhaps even into a second term brings home to Soviet leaders the unintended consequences of their military buildup and expansionist policies during the second half of the 1970s. It also promises them a new arms race, the relative cost of which would far exceed that of the past two decades.

The second key element of Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union, the Russians feel, is his effort to shape an effective campaign of economic warfare which exploits their growing dependency on Western imports. If, in the early days of détente, Soviet economic relations with the United States failed to expand as expected, Soviet economic relations with Western Europe have exceeded estimates. Even in good harvest years the Soviets import grain, and in bad harvest years—and 1982 marks the unprecedented fourth in a row—they import as much as 25 percent of total needs. As for advanced technology, the modest share of these imports in the gross national product masks the reality of their importance. Directly or indirectly, Western technology influences to a high degree the Soviet ability to continue modernizing their military forces, and the impact of these imports is maximized by being concentrated on key projects of the five-year plans. But since Soviet-American trade in industrial items scarcely exists, Reagan's attempt at economic warfare against the Soviets consists primarily of pressing U.S. allies in the West to limit their trade

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and especially to abolish their highly favorable credit arrangements, which Reagan views as subsidizing Soviet military and economic growth.

The third key element of the Reagan Administration's policies toward the Soviet Union, in the Soviet analysis, concerns the effort to redefine the very atmosphere of Soviet-Western relations and, particularly, the public mood in the United States with regard to those relations. The strident anti-Soviet rhetoric of the early Reagan Administration, which occasionally surfaces even today, is addressed primarily to the American public, in order to ensure its acceptance of reduced social programs together with substantial growth in military spending. The rhetoric also aims to persuade West European allies that American attitudes toward the Soviet Union differ markedly from the period of détente and that if the Europeans want to retain American guarantees and confidence, they should be more in step with the American mood. Only finally is the rhetoric addressed to the Russians themselves, who are advised that in light of the Soviet military buildup and expansionist moves of the last decade, President Reagan does not intend to engage in "business as usual" with the Soviet Union. In this regard, President Reagan's declining to attend the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, and in particular the deliberately casual manner in which he announced that decision, must be regarded by the new Soviet leaders as yet another effort to diminish the stature of their country. From the American perspective, it may well stand as an occasion lost in preparing the ground for future constructive negotiations.

From the Soviet perspective, the fourth element of current American policy toward the Soviet Union concerns the timing of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The Soviets recognize that in U.S.-Soviet relations former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used carrots and sticks, incentives and disincentives, simultaneously, while now they are used sequentially. Sticks come first. Serious negotiations on arms limitations and reductions, on commercial relations and credits, on compromise solutions to regional conflicts and imbalances, can be undertaken only when Soviet leaders understand that the mood of the American people and the American Administration has really changed and that the trend of Soviet-American military power has been reversed. This position was clear from the speeches of former Secretary of State Alexander Haig even with his pro-European orientation; it is too early to know whether it will hold under Secretary George Shultz.

The fifth key element of Reagan's policy toward the Soviet

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Union discussed by Soviet analysts is the Administration's approach to regional conflicts and civil wars in the Third World and to regional security arrangements. The Reagan Administration appears to look at Third World issues primarily through the prism of American-Soviet relations. It regards Soviet attitudes and actions as either the direct cause of instability in the Third World or at least as the decisive obstacle to the resolution of regional problems in line with American preferences and interests. There is, for example, the intransigent American position toward Cuba, a country which, in the view of the Reagan Administration, shares with its Soviet patron the blame for the civil war in El Salvador, or the American attempt (since abandoned) to arrange a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East expressly in order to neutralize the threat of Soviet expansionism.

On all these five points, the current dismay of Soviet specialists has replaced the complacency with which they first received Reagan. During the election campaign of 1980, it appeared that the overwhelming majority of Soviet leaders and commentators on the American political scene preferred the election of Reagan, his anti-Soviet rhetoric notwithstanding, to what they saw as the unpredictability, ambiguity and indecisiveness of the Carter Administration. Even after Reagan chose the members of the new Administration, the Soviets were not unhappy about Carter's defeat. They expected that the very process of governing would inevitably drive Reagan's policies toward the center, and they remembered that conservative Republicans find it easier than liberal Democrats to make agreements with the Soviet Union. To put it simply, the hope of Soviet leaders was to see another Nixon in the White House. Today they hold no such view.

During Reagan's first year, many Soviet specialists on the United States regarded the Reagan Administration as "Carterism without Carter," that is, as a continuation and intensification of policies pursued during Carter's last year in office. Today one finds scarcely a Soviet official or expert who still subscribes to this view. Almost everyone in the Soviet political community sees Reaganism as a major break with the past despite the persistence of important policy tendencies. It is a major break, first, because different people serving different constituencies are in charge and will in crisis situations behave differently (and, it is thought, more decisively); second, because the Reagan Administration still appears to enjoy more support than its predecessor for its stern line toward the Soviet Union; and, third, because whatever the elements of continuity, the Soviets suspect that President Reagan

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pursues different, more ambitious, and—for the Soviet Union—more dangerous aims in his policies toward the Soviet Union than did his predecessor.

Soviet analysts do see differences and divisions within the Reagan Administration, although they ascribe little importance to them. They distinguish, for example, what may be termed the anti-Soviet position of former Secretary Haig and more generally of the State Department from the anti-Soviet and anti-communist position of the Defense Department and White House. The former espouse policies designed to counteract the expansion of Soviet power by means of Realpolitik. The latter absorb the anti-Soviet position and go beyond it to call for a crusade against the Soviet Union, its clients, and communism in general, through the rhetoric and instruments of the cold war. The former, Soviet analysts argue, would make American policy dependent on Soviet behavior with regard to specific issues, such as Poland or Afghanistan. The latter would pursue an intransigent "cold war" policy against the Soviet Union regardless of any adjustments, compromises, or changes in Soviet policy on specific issues, in the belief that any accommodation would prove an illusion because the Soviet Union is systemically incapable of altering its behavior.

Whereas Soviet specialists broadly agree on the key elements of Reagan's policies toward the Soviet Union, they disagree over the nature and sources of Reaganism. The two main views have important implications for Soviet policy planning.

According to one school of thought, Reaganism represents a significant if temporary departure from the long-range thrust of American policy in the direction of accommodation with the Soviet Union. In this view Reagan, his associates, and his principal supporters constitute only one tendency within America's "ruling circles." They are primarily responsible for the present harsh anti-Soviet direction of American policy and mood of American opinion. For this group of Soviet analysts, the United States bears the overwhelming responsibility for the failure of détente, although it is admitted that certain Soviet actions, such as the invasion of Afghanistan ("forced" on the Soviet Union by circumstances), did contribute through an action-reaction cycle to the progressive deterioration of Soviet-American relations.

According to this view, there are other forces in America, distinct from Reagan, who are more realistic and pragmatic, and whose time will come. Reaganism will pass, it is thought, perhaps as early as the 1984 elections. Soviet patience will eventually find its reward in a changed American political climate, and in a new

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Administration that will once again choose regulated competition and compromise solutions over the confrontational stance of the present incumbents.

This new Administration, supporters of this view believe, will not go so far as to restore détente of the 1972-75 vintage. Such an outcome, according to one proponent, will probably not be feasible in this generation—which might, he added, be all to the good so that neither side harbors unwarranted illusions or exaggerated expectations of what détente can accomplish. Yet sooner or later, the United States will recognize that Soviet-American relations must be regulated in ways which acknowledge the vital interests of both parties and avert potentially dangerous conflicts.

The second school of Soviet thought argues that the change in American direction came not with Reagan but with détente. The situation in the early 1970s, this view holds, was highly unusual. The United States found itself deeply enmeshed in an unpopular war which was tearing apart society and polity. President Nixon looked to better relations with the Soviet Union both in order to preclude a Soviet challenge to an overextended America and in order to secure Soviet help in ending the Vietnamese war "with honor." According to this group, the ascendancy of Reaganism in foreign policy has deep systemic roots and derives from secular changes in American politics and social policies.

The perceived systemic roots of Reagan's orientation in foreign policy, and particularly in Soviet-American relations, concern, first, the malleability of the American public and the extent to which anti-Sovietism and anti-communism have become deeply rooted in American popular attitudes; second, the expression and exploitation of frustration among America's "ruling circles" and public over the decline of U.S. power; and, third, the traditionally moralistic character of American foreign policy, with its aversion to a Kissinger-style Realpolitik. The failure of détente, according to this perspective, was entirely the fault of the Americans, who wish to deny the Soviet Union the equal role in international relations which it deserves thanks to military parity with the United States.

Unlike the first school, this view argues that the tendency represented by Reaganism will not pass quickly from the American scene. Even should the Democrats achieve victory in the 1984 elections, the entire spectrum of American politics and policies has moved toward the Right, and the pendulum may not swing back during the present generation. In any case, these analysts contend, the Soviet leadership cannot design its long-range plans

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on the basis of a simple assumption that the present trend of American policy toward the Soviet Union is a passing phenomenon.

Crucially important as the differences between these two schools are, their limits should also be recognized. It is often asserted in the United States that two distinct orientations regarding Soviet policy toward the West divide the Soviet foreign policy establishment. "America-firsters" are said to maintain the absolute centrality of Soviet-American relations and hope for major improvement in these relations. "Europe-firsters" are thought to see the greatest opportunities in Soviet relations with Western Europe and to promote such relations as the main axis of Soviet policy toward the West. Such a distinction, however, exaggerates the differences within the Soviet foreign policy establishment. That establishment as a whole, it would seem, attaches central importance to Soviet-American relations—even more so today, if that is possible, than in the immediate past. It believes that the United States alone stands between the Soviet Union and the satisfaction of its international appetites and ambitions.

The Soviet foreign policy elite does tend to divide on strategic and tactical objectives concerning Western Europe, especially in periods like the present when relations with the United States are unlikely to improve. In such a situation the entire Soviet foreign policy establishment advocates a very active policy toward Western Europe as the most promising alternative. Here the two Soviet evaluations of Reaganism suggest two distinct lines of foreign policy. The first school of thought would court Western Europe mainly in order to realize the potential for influencing through European pressure American policies toward the Soviet Union. The second would advocate improving relations with Western Europe primarily to weaken the Western Alliance and increase for the United States the cost of confrontational policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Despite these differences, however, it would seem that neither group in the Soviet foreign policy establishment has any illusions about how much can be gained from the West Europeans and how far differences between the United States and its West European allies can be exploited in the near future, especially on crucial questions of military policy.

All the Soviet foreign policy elite are hardliners publicly with regard to Soviet-American relations. For some, these hardline views no doubt express real convictions; for others, especially those

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who in the past advocated a policy centered on America, they express insurance and compensation for the earlier "soft line" toward the United States. What is perhaps most striking for an observer of Soviet thinking on foreign policy is the Soviets' refusal to accept the view that Reagan's foreign policies have moved somewhat toward the center in the last year. Few Soviet experts seem to note that, except for a high defense budget, Reagan's harsh rhetoric has so far been followed by very little decisive action.

III

The Soviet Union remains in an ascendant phase of great-power ambitions to which the messianic traditions of Russian nationalism and revolutionary Marxism-Leninism add virulence. The achievement of strategic parity with the United States, the ability to project the Soviet Navy and proxy or Soviet military forces far from Soviet borders, and the unceasing determination to ensure Soviet participation in the regulation and resolution of every major international issue and regional conflict—all are signs that proclaim Soviet commitment to an active and expansionist global policy. The new leaders are not likely to abandon this commitment.

While the general tendency of Soviet foreign policy makes it dynamic, assertive and ambitious in the long run, however, its tactics in the short run oscillate between expansion and retrenchment. At the present juncture, Soviet foreign policy can best be described as a holding operation. Characterized by great caution, it displays neither major initiatives nor attempts to shape a new general line following the collapse of détente with the United States.

The reasons for the conservative nature of Soviet foreign policy today stem from both international and domestic circumstances. One reason follows from dilemmas over the behavior of the United States. To the extent that the Soviets have abandoned any hope of doing business with Reagan and are waiting for his replacement in 1984, expecting that the pendulum in American politics as many times in the past will swing to the center or Left, these attitudes reinforce the holding pattern of Soviet foreign policy. To the extent that Soviet leaders take Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric and policy gestures seriously, they have shown themselves unwilling to test the Administration's resolve—thus also reinforcing the existing holding pattern in Soviet foreign policy.

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To stress this particular explanation for current Soviet retrenchment strengthens the arguments of those Reagan advisers who insist on the correctness of the present course. It would be wrong to draw such conclusions, however, since not only do numerous other factors work in a similar direction, but, even when taken together, all these factors fail to challenge seriously the general proposition that the present phase of Soviet policy is likely to be a transitory phenomenon.

Another important reason for the cautiousness of current Soviet policy today is Soviet fear of overextension. The seemingly endless war in Afghanistan, the continuing investment in Africa, the burden of subsidies to Eastern Europe and Cuba, and especially the situation in Poland—all of these considerations dictate retrenchment rather than extension of commitment.

In Poland, the policies of martial law and the crackdown on Solidarity for which the Soviets pressed were acts of desperation rather than of long-range planning. This gamble, which has so far spared the Soviets the incalculably greater costs of an invasion, paid off in the short run far better than expected. Yet despite the immediate benefits derived from abolishing the dual power system in Poland, the situation there is a stalemate. Martial law remains in effect; the embarrassing replacement of the Communist Party by a military regime, far from being a temporary "solution," persists; passive defiance of the Polish population continues unabated; the catastrophic economic situation, according to official Polish estimates, will endure for a number of years before pre-Solidarity levels can be regained. Most important, Polish Communists and Soviet leaders have proved helpless in devising a realistic plan to restore political and economic stability.

Of equal significance are the military consequences of the continuing Polish turmoil. Poland today and for the foreseeable future constitutes a power vacuum in Soviet military plans regarding Europe. The events in Poland have reduced to nil the intended place of this country in Soviet plans for deployment, communications and supply. All in all, the Polish situation bears a stamp of provisionality where one false move, one provocation, can still provoke an explosion.

Yet another reason for the holding pattern in Soviet foreign policy derives from the direction of Soviet-West European relations. While détente with the United States has unraveled, détente with Western Europe continues to prosper as it did in the early 1970s. Commercial relations flourish. Points of conflict like Berlin remain dormant. A West European commitment to increased military expenditures has been postponed. Both inside and espe-

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cially outside government circles there has been an immense growth in West European opposition to the agreed deployment of new, American-controlled theater nuclear forces (TNF), an issue of central importance to the Soviet Union. In this situation Soviet policy has tried to avoid any development that will disrupt good relations and tilt the delicate balance in favor of the proposed TNF deployment.

But the aims of Soviet policy toward Western Europe are not confined to credit and trading arrangements and the hope of stiffening West European, particularly German, opposition to TNF on European soil. As discussed earlier, Soviet policymakers hope that the mutually beneficial and benign Soviet-West European relations will induce West European governments to become intermediaries in Soviet-American relations, to act as a pressure group in tempering the extremes of American policy toward the Soviets, and to serve as a catalyst in propelling the United States toward a resumption of serious dialogue with the Soviets. Even if actual events fall short of this goal, the Soviets hope at least to achieve a further widening of the split in the NATO Alliance. Given the present state of East-West relations, with its bifurcated détente and a bellicose United States, the Soviet script calls for peace offensives, a posture of injured innocence, and an image of good sense and reasonableness displayed to the outside world.

A fourth reason for the relatively quiescent Soviet policy today reflects the onset of the period of succession in the Soviet Union. Not only was the old leader loath in his last years to inaugurate seriously needed domestic reforms, but, unlike his predecessors, he could not prevent public signs of the struggle for his mantle. The expeditious appointment of Yuri Andropov to succeed Brezhnev in the top post of General Secretary of the Party is the most dramatic event in a process that will inevitably involve far-reaching replacement of leading elites in all governing hierarchies within a relatively brief time. The unprecedented scale of leadership turnover will coincide with the unprecedented magnitude of domestic woes which exert tremendous pressures for change in the Soviet society and empire.

To face this challenge, the Politburo has chosen a leader whose experience supremely qualifies him to act in certain major areas of actual and projected difficulty while offering no evidence of serious competence in others. Andropov's professional biography may indicate, in part at least, how the Politburo assesses its priorities. Following his tenure as Central Committee official in charge of supervising Eastern Europe, Andropov served a good part of his career in the KGB, with responsibilities for the domestic

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secret police and the foreign intelligence services. Indeed, he headed that organization longer than any of his forerunners, including Lavrenti Beria. He has extensive knowledge of the affairs of the Soviet Union abroad as well as those of his country's foreign adversaries. Of all members of the Politburo, he is best trained to conduct domestic policies stressing law and order, social and labor discipline; to contain the potentially explosive non-Russian republics within the Soviet Union; and to handle the troubled and troublesome East European empire. But he has very little visible experience in management of the economy and can probably be expected to rely on old and new subordinate specialists.

With justification Andropov is regarded both inside and outside Russia as potentially a very strong leader, a man whose intelligence and experience prepare him well for his considerable burdens. If his office of General Secretary carries with it extraordinary power potential, however, in the final analysis how powerful the office becomes will depend on the skill, the vision, and the will of the incumbent. It would seem that Andropov possesses these attributes. At the same time, it is impossible to predict, solely on the basis of past performance, how he will conduct himself as a leader and which policies he will espouse. The combination of a highly centralized and bureaucratized system together with the premium placed on personal loyalty does not encourage subordinates like Andropov to dispute superiors like Brezhnev. Indeed, it is too early to anticipate the direction of Soviet policy that will proceed from continuing debates and struggles behind the screen of a smooth passage of authority.

If the past can be taken as a guide to the present and future, however, succession periods have an impact on Soviet foreign policies. During a succession period, the key goals of Soviet leaders are to insulate domestic politics and policies from foreign crises and challenges and to minimize the potential vulnerability of an unconsolidated leadership; to defend against foreign incursions and stabilize vital Soviet international positions; and—as happened after both Stalin and Khrushchev—to reverse as quickly as possible the corrosive damage of dubious foreign ventures inherited from the old leadership. It is likely that the new leaders will initially display considerable caution in their expansionist drive and in many respects continue the holding pattern of their predecessors. In an effort to avoid more international confrontation, they are likely to combine greater pliability in arms control negotiations and new proposals on arms reductions with concerted efforts to fan the growth of peace movements in the West and to

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launch a major peace offensive in Western Europe and the United States. At the same time, however, it must be realized that in the initial period of a succession the new leader cannot afford to appear weak and must therefore respond forcefully to any challenges from abroad.

It should be repeated that the holding pattern in Soviet foreign policy in no way affects the basic directions of Soviet interest. The Soviets are determined that both the overall and regional military balance remain unchanged. They continue directly or through surrogates their clandestine material support for revolutionary or anti-status quo forces everywhere. They expect only gain from a low profile. They wait for the deepening of crisis in the Western Alliance. They hope that conflict and civil war in Central and South America will distract and weaken the United States. They hope that small investments will enhance Soviet influence on the potentially dominant Middle Eastern power, revolutionary Iran. In short, at the present moment, for Soviet policymakers the tendency to profit from the troubles of others takes precedence over the tendency to make troubles for others.

IV

If against this background the key elements of Reagan policy toward the Soviet Union are clear, the Administration's priorities and long-term purposes are not. From the remarks of the President and members of his Administration, one may suppose that the purposes are various. For some people in the Reagan entourage, the long-range objective is nothing less than to effect a gradual transformation or a collapse of the Soviet system of government—to sweep it into the "dustbin of history." For others, the main aim of policy would appear to be to magnify Soviet difficulties at home and to make Soviet military growth as costly as possible.

Yet another intention, it seems, is to convince Soviet leaders that the dangers and costs of foreign expansion are too high to contemplate, so as to redirect their attention and energies to domestic goals. Finally, the least ambitious purpose of Reagan's foreign policy toward the Soviets is the more traditional one of trying to influence Soviet international behavior in the direction of greater moderation and accommodation with the West by raising dramatically the dangers and costs of an alternate course. (One begins to doubt, however, that President Reagan's central goal is simply to moderate Soviet behavior. For the Reagan Administration the "means" of the policy toward the Soviets may well have displaced the "ends" of that policy.)

These aims, and especially the more ambitious among them,

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rest on assumptions that may not always be explicitly formulated but nevertheless shape the mood of the Reagan establishment. One such assumption identifies the Soviet system and leadership with the Nazi experience. Such an identification leads to an almost fatalistic belief in the inevitability of war with the Soviets should their system not change radically in the coming decade. It leads also to the return of the vocabulary and symbols of the 1930s, such as the predilection for the word and symbol of "appeasement" and the emotional atmosphere of a crusade. This is not the place to compare Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, or the decade of the 1930s with that of the 1980s. Suffice it to state one crucial difference. The Nazi leaders wanted war; their entire system of beliefs in German racial superiority pushed them inexorably to war as the crowning experience on their road to the thousand-year Reich. Soviet leaders do not want war with the West; they fear war as much as we, and are inclined to engage in relatively low-risk adventures to further their expansionist ambitions.

Beyond this broad initial perspective, the logic of the Reagan Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union is based on one key underlying assumption: that Western policy generally and American policy specifically has the capacity seriously to affect Soviet international behavior principally by exerting influence on internal Soviet developments. This assumption is simply fallacious and spawns maximalist and unrealistic objectives. It depends on the truism that the deepest sources of the foreign policy of any nation-state are rooted in domestic determinants. In this respect the Soviet Union is no different from other states; in its case, the determinants of its international conduct derive from the imperial ambitions of Soviet leaders and elites, their great-power and expansionist impulses, and their messianic Marxist-Leninist ideology which encourages them arrogantly to perceive the international role of Soviet power as the instrument of "historical will."

From this truism, the logic of the Reagan Administration's argument moves with some justification to the observation that during the entire post-World War II period, American policy toward the Soviet Union could significantly modify neither Soviet foreign policy nor Soviet tendencies toward expansion, regardless of whether it used "sticks" or "carrots." From here, some policymakers and ideologues of Reaganism draw the conclusion that the only way open, short of an all-out war, for Western policies to shape Soviet international behavior is to speed up the process of change and decline of the Soviet system. In this sense Reaganism marks an attempt to affect the domestic roots of Soviet interna-

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tional behavior rather than to deal with the fact of Soviet policy as the consequence of domestic pressures and tendencies. This argument is profoundly erroneous for at least five reasons.

First, while it is true that the roots of Soviet international behavior lie in the domestic system, the ability of the West to effect change within the Soviet system, let alone rapid change, is severely limited. Even were the West able to impose extreme economic choices on the Soviet Union, the system would not crumble, the political structures would not disintegrate, the economy would not go bankrupt, the elites and leadership would not lose their will and power to rule internally and to aspire externally to the status of a global power.

The origins of the Administration's belief in U.S. leverage over domestic Russian affairs—particularly economic affairs—are not difficult to identify. They lie in the patent deterioration of the Soviet economy, and the expectation that political disintegration and economic bankruptcy are imminent if only Western policy can be geared to accelerate the process. There is no shortage of literature about the "coming revolution in Russia," the "revolt of the nationalities," the widening dissident movement that will "engulf the Soviet intelligentsia," and, in an ironic reversion to dogmatic Marxist analysis, the expectation of an economic collapse leading to a political collapse. All of these expectations rely on a worst-case interpretation of abundant evidence that in the 1980s the political and social stability of the Soviet Union will be severely tried; that the Soviet economic situation will be more critical than at any time since Stalin's death; that the Soviet empire has probably peaked and already slipped into a period of decline.

That severe economic stress will provoke political collapse may be a possible outcome in the next decade, but it is nonetheless an unlikely one. What generations have wrought with so much sacrifice, cruelty and conviction will not change radically under pressures of economic decline or leadership instability. The Soviet Union is not now nor will it be during the next decade in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability that suffice to endure the deepest difficulties. The Soviet economy, like any gigantic economy administered by intelligent and trained professionals, will not go bankrupt. It may become less effective, it may stagnate, it may even experience an absolute decline for a year or two; but, like the political system, it will not collapse.

As for the related goal of inhibiting Soviet military growth by ensuring that the drastic escalation of costs in a new arms race

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will exert intolerable pressures on the Soviet economy, this too is unrealistic. Aside from the fact that the United States alone does not dispose of sufficient leverage to impose such costs on the Soviet Union without the committed cooperation of Western Europe and Japan, the United States cannot influence in any significant way the decision of Soviet leaders to engage in a military buildup should those leaders deem it essential to the security of their country, their empire, and their global influence. If threatened by the prospect of a radical shift in the present balance of military—especially strategic nuclear—power, Soviet leaders will certainly undertake to redeploy their economic resources, to restrict civilian consumption, to enforce harsh internal discipline, and, under the slogans of an artificially stimulated siege mentality and unbridled nationalism, to arm and arm and arm, regardless of the cost. This much is confirmed by Brezhnev's last speech, now echoed in Andropov's first.

It is unrealistic to believe that American policies can achieve a fundamental reorientation of Soviet policymaking that would concentrate the attention of Soviet leaders on domestic priorities. Not only does the entire direction of Soviet military and foreign policy over the very successful Brezhnev decades militate against such an eventuality, but the bleak prospects for internal developments could well compel Soviet leaders to seek more accessible and durable successes in the international arena. Moreover, during the next few years, foreign policy will certainly become more significant as a legitimizing element of Soviet rule in general and of Party rule within the establishment in particular.

The second major flaw in the Reagan Administration's effort to affect Soviet foreign policy through manipulation of internal Soviet affairs stems from the weakness of Western coercive options, given the political and economic realities in the United States and the Western Alliance. While lecturing the West Europeans on the need for severe economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration is unable for political reasons to impose a grain embargo on the Soviet Union. And, given the objective circumstances of their individual situations, and their different perception of the overall East-West relationship, the Western allies will surely not agree, as the pipeline affair has shown, to accede to Reagan's demand for curtailment of trade with the Russians.

The costs and limits of efforts to influence Soviet policy pose questions of acute importance for American policy. There is, without doubt, a general recognition in the United States among both mainstream Republicans and Democrats that the United States requires greater military strength to counter the Soviet

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challenge. There is, further, a general recognition that the detente of the early 1970s which permitted the Russians a military buildup at home and expansion abroad was a fool's paradise. Yet each new day exposes the vulnerability of the American economy and the perplexity of those who are called upon to restore it. Without the resources a healthy economic base provides, the United States may well be unable effectively to bear the kind of foreign policy burdens which the current Administration has set out for it.

The third central objection to the Administration's focus on Soviet internal affairs is that while the roots of Soviet foreign policy are to be found in the Soviet domestic system, the extent to which Soviet foreign policy is able to be expansionist depends very largely upon international factors: on the temptations and opportunities which the international environment offers, on the risks and costs of exploiting those opportunities. Here the potential ability of the West to increase the risks and costs of Soviet expansion has a significant influence on Soviet behavior. It is not within the West's power to effect a significant change in the Soviet system or to redirect the Soviet leadership's preoccupations from international to domestic concerns. It *is* within the West's power to frustrate those Soviet global ambitions which are most threatening to the West.

The fourth argument against the assumptions behind Reagan policy toward the Soviet Union is that, again, although the essential outlines of the Soviet global drive are defined by systemic factors, the range of Soviet foreign policies which can fit within those outlines is very broad. Soviet foreign policy may involve military engagement in regional conflict and civil war or outright Soviet invasion of neighboring countries; at the other extreme, it may involve ideological and political attempts to gain influence over the policies of other countries. From the point of view of the Western powers, the difference between various points along the broad spectrum of Soviet international activity is a difference between vastly disparate forms of Soviet expansionism, between competition with dangerous confrontation and without it, between a Western policy of containment that increases the danger of war, and one that can succeed at a lower level of intensity.

By making clear that the direct objective of American policies is not to work for the radical change of the Soviet system or its collapse, the Reagan Administration could be much more effective in mobilizing the West, influencing the course of specific Soviet policies, and diminishing the aggressiveness of Soviet international behavior. Those objectives fall far short of what any team of American policymakers may wish, but it describes what is realistic

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and attainable in dealing with the Soviet Union. The Soviets can hardly be expected to respond to policy overtures of an Administration whose avowed goals are the destruction of the Soviet system or at best the renunciation by Soviet leaders of their aspirations for international influence.

Fifth and finally, the assumptions underlying the Reagan approach are erroneous because they sustain a preoccupation with Soviet behavior that diverts energies from the resolution of other critical problems in the world to which the Soviets may contribute but which they do not cause. The Soviet Union does exploit and will continue to exploit every difficulty the United States encounters in the international arena. For American policy to be effective, it must deal not only with the complicating factor of Soviet involvement in these problem areas but also with the indigenous conditions that generate them.

Moreover, competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the international arena is not always a zero-sum game where the interests of one side are diametrically opposed to the interests of the other side. In some instances the interests of both sides coincide. Both sides share an interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, upholding the nuclear test ban, and achieving equitable arms control and reduction. Even while engaged in worldwide competition with the Soviet Union, the United States should strive to work actively for the resolution of any issue where the interests of both sides at least partly overlap.

However surprising and paradoxical it may appear, the two extremes of American policy with regard to East-West relations—that is, the détente of 1972 vintage and President Reagan's approach—exhibit crucial common characteristics. Both are optimistic that changes in Soviet behavior can be achieved in a relatively short span of time: détente would influence Soviet internal and international behavior through the net of positive and negative linkages, Reagan's policies through irresistible coercive inducements. Both anticipate an easy way out to avoid facing the long-term Soviet challenge: détente overestimates the effects of combining incentives and disincentives on Soviet behavior, and Reagan's policies exaggerate the political consequences of Soviet economic and social difficulties.

Both extremes of policy display a lack of realism in assessing America's capacity to influence the Russians: the makers of détente, through no fault of their own, were approaching the Soviets from a position of weakness initially created by the Vietnam War and later sustained by the post-Vietnam syndrome and the Watergate affair; the drafters of Reagan's policies confuse

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escalated rhetoric with strength and ignore the realities of the American and West European economic situation, the state of the alliance with Western Europe, and the tenor of public opinion at home and in Western Europe.

Détente failed not only because it approached the Soviet Union from a position of internal and external weakness that could not prevent the Soviet expansion and military buildup in the 1970s. It failed also because it created in the American public exaggerated hopes and expectations. Reagan's policies have been successful initially because, as we noted, they coincide with Soviet overextension, with leadership succession, and with a retrenchment phase of Soviet foreign policy. Yet, in the longer run, they too will fail unless their goals and expectations regarding the evolution of the Soviet system are significantly readjusted and the policy instruments used to influence Soviet foreign policy appreciably broadened. Should they fail, moreover, the consequences will prove even more detrimental to American interests than the failure of détente, for they will entail the destruction in Western Europe, China and the Soviet Union of the credibility of the American claim to possess the will and strength to oppose Soviet expansionism with success.

V

Quite apart from the current transitory stage of retrenchment in Soviet foreign policy, we face a long-term situation where Soviet external expansion will accompany internal decline. If the new General Secretary will certainly try to arrest the latter, he will just as certainly try to pursue the former.

We must have the will, the strength, and, most of all, the patience to wait out this phase of Soviet development. However difficult it is for American politicians and the American public to accept, there are no shortcuts and easy ways out of the historical conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. This conflict between two superpowers, two ways of life, two value systems will continue to dominate international politics to the end of this century if not beyond. Neither side can or will withdraw from the international arena in favor of domestic preoccupations, and neither side will be able alone or in concert with other forces to dominate the scene in the manner of the United States during the first 15 years after World War II. In this situation the United States must look for a *long-range* alternative to domination or withdrawal.

The long-range alternative may sound simple, but it is the most difficult to achieve in democratic societies, especially in a society

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like the American with its wild swings of public opinion, its sensationalist media, and its moralistic approach to foreign policy. Put simply, this alternative is neither total hostility nor total cooperation with the Soviet Union. It is not, as some American liberal leaders insist, the restoration of détente as we knew it in the early 1970s. A sound long-range U.S. policy requires a multidimensional approach which, while placing obstacles in the way of Soviet global aims, would attempt to regulate the competition and conflict. It is a policy of arresting Soviet expansion and perhaps of effecting discreet rollbacks, even at the expense of heightened tension. In some cases such a policy would require tough and determined U.S. opposition to Soviet moves, at other times serious efforts at compromise. The policy would aim for containment while minimizing the danger of actual confrontation.

The pursuit of such a long-range policy would start from the positive elements in Reagan's current positions toward the Soviet Union. Of course the United States must increase its military preparedness. *But*, the military buildup begun by Reagan has to be given clear priorities. The military thinking of the Reagan Administration should be directed away from the morbid preoccupation with fighting a "winnable" nuclear war and from the tantalizing chimera of attaining strategic superiority. Strategic superiority as a notion is meaningless, given the size of existing nuclear arsenals and the fact of strategic parity; nothing that either side does with regard to strategic weapons can have any rational *military* significance.

The Reagan Administration should concentrate instead on exploiting the superior potential of the United States and Western Europe to build up conventional regional forces, and to establish a credible deterrence in theater nuclear weapons by supporting NATO's 1979 two-track decision, which approved the deployment of new theater-level forces while committing the Alliance to negotiations aimed at limiting such weapons on an equitable basis. Along the lines of that decision, the U.S. military buildup as a whole should be accompanied—not followed—by negotiations undertaken with the Soviet Union. It should be made clear to American allies and to the American public that this is being done not for the sake of publicity but with the serious intention to achieve results on arms reduction and control, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear test ban treaties.

Of course the American government should convince the American public to accept and bear the burdens created by the Soviet challenge. *But*, the public can be mobilized without shrill, incendiary rhetoric. The exaggerations and crudeness of this rhetoric

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do particular harm among America's allies who recoil from it as evidence of warmongering. Of most importance, however, Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric is risky and unwise because friends and foes cannot know whether he is able to deliver on it. Indeed, one wonders which would be worse—"success" or failure to deliver on the objectives enunciated by an escalated anti-Soviet rhetoric. "Success" would bring confrontation with the U.S.S.R. where it cannot be predicted which side will blink first or whether either side will blink at all. Failure would bring a far-reaching and long-lasting destruction of U.S. leadership of the Western Alliance and U.S. credibility as the main force opposing Soviet expansionism.

Of course the United States should press its European allies to appreciate the dangers of Soviet expansionism and to bear a fair share in defending our common interests both inside and outside Europe, for today's bifurcated détente only enhances Soviet flexibility of action and undermines radically the impact of both economic and military leverage applied to influence Soviet behavior. *But*, given the depth of European official and popular hostility to U.S. pressures at the same time, any decision to exert pressure should be made on a case-by-case basis, after carefully weighing the advantage of European compliance on any specific issue against the disadvantage of further straining the Alliance. Reagan should press hard only in cases where the chance of success is good or the issue is crucial; this was clearly not the case with the gas pipeline deal, but it is the case, in our opinion, with the proposed deployment of theater nuclear forces in Europe.

Of course the United States should act to minimize and counteract the consequences of Soviet intervention in regional conflicts and civil wars. *But*, as mentioned earlier, even while the Soviet interest dictates policies which upset the status quo and aggravate and escalate regional conflicts, they do not cause them. The United States should not simply consider them as one dimension of East-West relations. American policy should attend to the indigenous sources of instability in the Third World and, by supporting *evolutionary* changes, work to deny the Soviet Union opportunities for exploiting *revolutionary* changes.

Finally, a more concentrated and constructive approach should be taken to the judicious pairing of incentives and disincentives, an instrument of American policy which remains valid despite the failure of détente. A well-crafted policy of American and Western incentives and disincentives can, however, be mutually reinforcing and effective only when three conditions are met.

First, disincentives must be credible and constant, as they were not in the 1970s. That is to say, the Soviets must not doubt the

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long-range determination and ability of American and West European power to face the Soviet challenge whenever vital Western interests are threatened. The United States and the Western Alliance should never again face the Russians from anything but a position of strength—something that depends as much on the will of Western and particularly American leadership as on the necessary material conditions. There are, of course, situations where only America's strength and the depth of its determination to halt Soviet expansionist moves will decide the outcome of a particular stage in the worldwide competition between the two systems. (In this sense, the last year of the Carter Administration and the first two years of the Reagan Administration are useful and even necessary correctives to the 1970s when the Soviets had good reason to suspect American will and ability to oppose their expansion.)

A second condition is essential for the effective use of linkage, however. In both the short and long terms, the makers of American policy should be prepared to reward Soviet foreign policy choices with a broad range of inducements. Trade, credit and exchanges cannot substitute for military strength and political determination, and they alone do not suffice as means to compel substantial change in Soviet behavior. They are very useful but must be joined with serious negotiations on matters of overlapping interest, consultations on regional conflicts, and summit meetings. These last cannot be abandoned as the Reagan Administration appears to have done. *Only when disincentives are credible, strong, and continuous can incentives have any effect. But only when incentives are offered will disincentives have major effects.*

Third, the combination of incentives and disincentives can work only if the aims of American and Western policies toward the Soviet Union are realistic. If some members of the Reagan Administration persist in priding themselves on the fact that they differ from their predecessors in seeking the radical change or disintegration of the Soviet system, they will create a psychological atmosphere in Soviet-American relations that is counter-conducive to compromise and mutually acceptable agreement and, in the process, they will erode American relations with Western Europe even further.

Moral revulsion at the practices of Soviet leaders and denunciation of Soviet expansionist aspirations cannot substitute for realistic and attainable goals with regard to Soviet foreign policy. The argument has been made that changes *in* or *of* the Soviet system and Soviet renunciation of the rewards of their great-power status can only result from internal processes, and the effects of

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Western policies on these processes can at best be a marginal by-product of the West's key aim—the moderation of Soviet international behavior. Considering that war and peace in the last decades of the century depend on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the attainment of even this least ambitious goal of U.S. policymakers is of unparalleled importance. The maximalist approach of the Reagan Administration is based on illusions about the weakness of the Soviet system, on rhetorical exaggeration of the strength of the United States and the Western Alliance, and on superoptimistic expectations of what U.S. policies can achieve.

To declare to the Soviets "We will bury you," as the Administration has in effect done, will induce the same reaction among Soviet leaders, elites, and public as did the famous remark of Khrushchev among Americans. It is difficult to exaggerate the seriousness with which a very influential part of the Reagan Administration takes the professed goals of Reagan's policies toward the Soviet Union. Very recently, a high official of this Administration declared that he would not be satisfied with Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Angola as a precondition for altering American policy; he would require as well a major cut in Soviet military spending.

As now formulated, Reagan's policies offer the new Soviet leaders only confrontation or capitulation. If, as sometimes appears, the Reagan Administration believes that, owing to the nature of the Soviet system, Soviet foreign policies cannot be modified in the direction of a modicum of coexistence with the West, then American foreign policy is nothing other than an instrument for creating the best possible conditions for inevitable war between East and West. There is one question that must be forthrightly posed by American policymakers. Are peace and regulated competition with the Soviet Union possible without substantial change in the Soviet system? Most American specialists on the Soviet Union would answer with a clear "Yes, it is possible." Would President Reagan and his advisers agree?

It is not clear whether a carefully managed policy with limited aims, along the lines suggested here, can be conducted over time under the American system with the required steadiness and patience, or whether the shifting moods of the electorate and the media will again lurch from one extreme to another. It is clear, however, that the American political leadership in both parties has a duty to present to the public the grim reality of the prolonged conflict we face and the need for flexibility in the use of our foreign policy resources by American policymakers who will manage this conflict in the decades to come.

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Louis J. Walinsky

A COHERENT DEFENSE STRATEGY: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DENIAL

One vital benefit which is struggling to emerge from the prolonged debate about President Reagan's military budget proposals is a recognition that this country and its NATO allies have until now, incredibly, lacked a meaningful and coherent strategy of defense against the Soviet Union. Appreciation of this fact may not yet fully have penetrated the Pentagon or been recognized by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. But it does appear to have reached the White House. The first indication of this came in a little noticed but potentially vastly important statement made by William P. Clark, the President's National Security Adviser, at Georgetown University last May 20. Our new strategy, he declared, would include "diplomatic, political, economic and informational components built on a foundation of military strength." In a limited application of this concept, he noted that "We must force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings."

In this context, President Reagan's attempt at the Versailles Summit shortly thereafter to persuade our European allies to impose strict limits on new credits extended to the Soviet bloc, and his subsequent ban on the use of U.S. high technology components or licenses to help build the planned Soviet-West European natural gas pipeline, should logically be viewed as significant initial efforts to develop and implement the new, more comprehensive defense strategy projected by Mr. Clark. Unfortunately, they were neither presented nor received as such.

The stiff opposition and criticism the Reagan initiatives encountered, both abroad and at home, were based on quite other grounds. European leaders, at the Summit, agreed only to a toothless statement on the matter of credits. They later flatly

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refused to honor President Reagan's pipeline-related ban, calling it an invasion of sovereignty and incompatible with the continued supply of U.S. grains to the Soviet Union. Domestic critics faulted the initiatives as bungling efforts to wage economic warfare or to gain political leverage, which could not succeed, and which were creating a serious rift within the Western Alliance.

In mid-November, the Administration dropped its sanctions, in the context of what appears to be only a general statement of principles little more forceful than the Versailles Summit communiqué. Apparently the hope is that a further series of studies within the Alliance, now agreed, will in time produce a new common approach to East-West trade and credit. But the obstacles both at home and abroad remain formidable.

The debate therefore, while vigorous, has not yet heightened awareness of the serious inadequacies of U.S. and Western defense strategy or of the core requirements of a truly coherent strategy of defense. A review of what has until now passed as our defense strategy, and an analysis of why previously missing major elements need to be built into existing strategy, are therefore in order. They will show that these non-military paths along which President Reagan is trying to move—albeit gropingly—are indeed headed in the right direction, and therefore merit constructive, sympathetic criticism and support, and allied cooperation.

II

Most critics of President Reagan's proposed military budgets maintain that substantial reductions must be made to help reduce the horrendous fiscal deficits with which the country is confronted. Some of them see specific weapons programs like the B-1 bomber, the two costly nuclear-powered aircraft carriers or the as yet unbased MX missile as dispensable. Others simply assume that within so greatly enlarged a military program as that proposed ($1,600 billion for five years), there must be a good deal of "fat" that can and should be trimmed.

But a much smaller number of more discerning critics contend that these military spending proposals have not clearly been related to specific threats to our national security or to a coherent defense strategy, and thus lack substantiation. They state, in effect, "If the Administration has not identified clearly the national interests that are threatened, formulated a strategy to counter those threats, or shown why the weapons and forces requested are necessary to effectuate such a strategy, it is impossible to judge whether these requests are indeed essential."

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The array of those who are troubled by these questions, and who have challenged or urged the Administration to formulate a strategy that will help to answer them, is quite formidable. In the Congress, it includes Representative James Jones, Chairman of the House Budget Committee; Representative Robert Michel, the House Republican Leader; Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin; and Senator Gary Hart of Colorado. Outside the Congress, it includes General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Edward Luttwak, professional defense consultant and Senior Fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Walter Laqueur, political scientist and Chairman of the Research Council at the same Center.[1]

Of these critics, Walter Laqueur came closest to specifying the essential characteristics of the defense strategy we lack. "A strategy," he observed, "is not yet in sight . . . . In fact, it does not seem to be fully realized that such a strategy is needed, *that defense, foreign policy, and international economics have to be coordinated and integrated.*" (Italics added.) We may well wonder whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever consulted Webster's dictionary for a definition of "strategy." It reads: "*strategy: the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.*"

It is of course inconceivable that our Presidents, the Armed Forces Committees of the Congress, and the Pentagon have operated all these years without some notions of how to defend the security of the United States which in their minds constituted a strategy of defense. "The main strands of the Administration's military strategy," as Richard Halloran has written, "run through the congressional testimony and speeches by senior officials and are summed up in the annual report, called the posture statement, that accompanied the 1983 military budget to Capitol Hill." The

[1] An excellent report by Richard Halloran in *The New York Times*, March 22, provided a number of cogent illustrations of this growing tide of criticism. Rep. Jones contended that "the Administration has not related plans for military forces to worldwide commitments." Rep. Michel "asked the President to define his national security policy and how military spending relates to it." Rep. Aspin stated: "I don't have any idea what this Administration's defense policy is. I have read the posture statement (the military budget justification) and I still don't know." Senator Hart observed: "Once again, the wrong questions are being asked. The debate is focusing on how much to spend, rather than on what it should be spent for. It is missing the point; the best defense money can buy is not necessarily the best defense." General Taylor "urged Congress in a recent article to insist that the Administration identify the threats to national security, and then to 'review the size, composition, and the readiness of the forces that the President and his advisors consider necessary to cope with these threats.'" Mr. Kissinger, somewhat more broadly, "urged the President to 'design a longer term, fully-rounded concept of our strategy, our resources, and our broader objectives in the world.'"

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core declarations he cited from this statement read as follows:

> The United States remains committed to a defensive use of its military strength . . . . Our objective is to deter aggression or to respond to it if deterrence fails, not to initiate warfare or pre-emptive attacks. From this premise it follows that our military forces must be prepared to react after the enemy has seized the first initiative and react so strongly that our counterattacks will inflict unacceptably high cost on the enemy.

And, as regards nuclear warfare policy:

> The United States will maintain a strategic nuclear force posture such that, in a crisis, the Soviet Union will have no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack on the United States or our allies . . . . The United States will be capable under all conditions of war initiation to survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate in a way that permits the United States to achieve its objectives.

These statements obviously are not strategy. They are a combination rather of policy and posture. To contain, to deter and, if deterrence fails, to counterattack—this is policy. To be prepared to react so strongly as to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy—this is posture. The "posture statement" is thus well named.

But how are these objectives to be accomplished? The Pentagon's answer, it would seem, is by building up our armed strength in every category and variety to whatever levels may be necessary to implement this policy and posture. As Edward Luttwak has described it, this is nothing more than "the simple, straightforward 'logistical' approach followed since 1941, whereby all threats were to be defeated by mustering a sheer superiority in materiel and firepower." But such an approach, he warns, "can only now guarantee defeat in the face of an opponent who can outgun us in all areas of the world adjacent to its territory . . . the time has come when we can no longer get by unless we can devise truly strategical solutions . . . ."[2] There are people, one cannot help recalling, who have been insisting that we cannot solve our social and welfare problems in this country simply by "throwing money at them." It seems we have also been trying to solve our national security problem by doing just that.

III

Chess, according to an old Chinese saying, is "the play of the science of war." The encyclopedia tells us that "Two chess players fighting over the board may fitly be compared to two famous

[2] Edward N. Luttwak, "Why We Need More Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement in the Pentagon," *Commentary*, February 1982, p. 25.

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generals encountering each other on the battlefield, the strategy and the tactics being not dissimilar in spirit." Significantly, the Russians take chess much more seriously than we do. Since the mid-1950s, with a brief interruption only in 1972-74, the world's chess championship has been held by Russians, and chess is reported to be an important course of study in the training of their military officers. They are better chess players than we are.

At any given stage in the course of a chess match against a formidable opponent, the grand master will base his strategy on his assessment of his opponent's strategy, and on his analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of his opponent's and his own positions. In like manner, the formulation of a defense strategy requires a perceptive assessment of the intentions and strategy of one's adversary and a realistic analysis of his strengths and weaknesses, as well as of one's own.

What is it the Soviets are after? How do these intentions and objectives threaten us? What strategy are they pursuing to effectuate these purposes? What are the Soviet strengths we must evade or counter? What are the Soviet weaknesses we can exploit? How can we best utilize our own strengths, and best reduce our own vulnerabilities, as we seek to ensure our own national security?

If we begin, as we should, with the *ultimate* aim of the Soviet Union, we cannot avoid restatement of the banal. The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union, from its inception, has been the overthrow of capitalist societies everywhere, and the creation of a communist world. (In such a world, although Marxism-Leninism is silent on this score, the Soviet Union would surely expect to play a leading, central and even dominant role.) The ideology, moreover, is quite explicit in defining how this objective is to be achieved. Capitalist societies, it holds, will be overturned by revolutions from *within*, in conditions of class conflict exacerbated by imperialist rivalries and wars—*not* by conquest from without.

Thus, the Soviet Union has naturally sought to provide leadership, encouragement and all feasible assistance to "progressive elements" in capitalist and formerly colonial nations to expedite the "inevitable" victory of the "working classes." In other words, it has tried to foment, guide, assist and exploit revolutionary or potentially revolutionary movements and situations, wherever these were considered to exist. The major Soviet threat, ideologically guided, has thus been one of subversion, rather than of direct aggression.

Times and conditions change, however, and with them, aims. Revolutionary and ideological ardor burned bright in the Soviet Union, despite great internal difficulties, in the early years after

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the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Hopes there rose perhaps even higher in the decade of the Great Depression, and Soviet leaders undoubtedly anticipated that great opportunities for the spread of communism would follow in the wake of the cataclysm of World War II. They surely were elated when, with their armies astride Eastern Europe and well into Germany at the end of that war, they found it easy to engineer communist takeovers throughout the occupied countries on their western border.

But this was really their high water mark, soon to be followed by a series of major defeats. Communist movements in Western Europe, especially threatening in postwar France and Italy, were overcome with the help of the Marshall Plan. The communist thrusts at Greece and Turkey were successfully parried. Newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, one after another, rejected Soviet blandishments and quelled local communist attempts to seize power. Communist Yugoslavia and China threw off the Soviet yoke. Workers' and youth rebellions broke out in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and could be suppressed only by Soviet tanks.

Confronted by a rapidly reviving and dramatically strengthened Western Europe, the NATO Alliance, and the obvious appeal of the democratic idea to most of the newly independent countries, and plagued increasingly by internal economic difficulties and dissent within their satellite allies, as well as at home, the Soviet leaders were compelled to accommodate their aims to the new realities. They continued to give lip service, to be sure, to the ultimate goal of a communist world which remains the official faith, whether believed in or not, and to meddle, where they could, in troubled waters. But during the 1950s and for much of the 1960s, their real aim of necessity was reduced basically to an effort *to make the world safe for communism*. This could be paraphrased as: to safeguard the continued control of the Soviet leaders over the Soviet Union and its increasingly reluctant satellite allies, together, of course, with the continuation of their own privileged status and perquisites of power.

Starting shortly after the mid-1950s, a series of major developments favorable to the Soviet Union reversed the ebb in its international fortunes and led to the evolution of new aims and a new strategy. Sputnik gave a big boost to Soviet prestige. By the end of the 1960s, the accelerated buildup of its nuclear weaponry and power, on which the Soviet Union had embarked after its humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, had reached a stage with which the Soviets felt much more secure. At the same

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time, the United States had been greatly weakened by its interminable war in Vietnam. It had lost prestige, status and respect in the international community, and its self-confidence and resolution had been eroded by internal divisiveness and civil disorder. These found their own counterparts in Europe and Japan. The failure of the West to react vigorously to the wave of Palestine Liberation Organization terrorism in the late 1960s—to the repeated hijacking of passenger planes, the taking of innocent hostages, the death toll of bombing outrages and, even worse, the unchallenged granting of asylum to the terrorists by Arab countries—all these were indicative of a loss of nerve by the Western democracies. This was confirmed by, and probably helped to encourage, the imposition of the oil embargo and the outrageous economic rape by quadrupled Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil prices in 1973—an unparalleled act of aggression to which the United States and the West supinely submitted.

That oil price hike, and the even larger ones which followed, threw the economies of the industrialized democracies into a state of shock from which they have not yet been able to recover. Low economic growth, high unemployment and inflation have plagued the United States and its European allies ever since. Social fragmentation, intergroup discord, cultural rebellion and an attitude of "me-firstism" flourished in an atmosphere of national irresolution. Widespread feelings of guilt among Western intellectuals and liberals for the poverty of the so-called Third World, aggravated by the Vietnam War, persuaded them that the major world problem was the issue of equitable North-South relations, rather than the issue of freedom versus slavery inherent in the East-West rivalry.

In combination, these and companion developments far outweighed the effects of others unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Encouraged and emboldened, the Soviet leaders progressively shifted during these years, from their basically defensive posture of the 1950s and much of the 1960s, in the direction of their earlier ultimate aims. But there was a significant difference in the position at which they arrived.

For the earlier goal of a communist world, they substituted the aim of a world dominated by communism or, at the very least, a world in which the Soviet Union would be the dominant power. Their strategy for achieving this also changed, correspondingly, in a most significant way. Abandoning hope that class conflict and revolutions within capitalist societies would seize power for

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communism, the new strategy would rely chiefly on a combination of intimidation by the armed might of the Soviet Union *and* subversion aimed at the destruction of morale and the erosion of the will of peoples in the democratic societies to resist, opening the door to Soviet domination. This new aim and this new strategy emerge unmistakably from an examination of Soviet strengths and weaknesses, and from a consideration of how skillfully the Soviet leaders have exploited U.S. and Western weaknesses to negate our strengths, and used Western strengths to compensate for their own glaring weaknesses.

IV

The greatest and most obvious of the Soviet strengths vis-à-vis the United States and the West is its awesome military power both in men under arms and in weaponry. This holds for its land, sea and air forces, whether conventional or nuclear, in both offensive and defensive deployments. Not only are its armed forces highly disciplined; their pay is low, permitting the Soviet Union to spend roughly two-thirds of its military budget on weaponry, while the relatively high pay of U.S. military personnel has consumed perhaps two-thirds of our military budgets, leaving only one-third for weaponry. The Soviet leaders also have the advantage of being able to allocate to the military as large a share of their total resources as they wish, without accountability to an electorate. (The actual military burden on the Soviet gross national product is, however, not as great as is implied by U.S. estimates of their military spending, because these are estimated in terms of what such materiel and services would cost in the United States, rather than in their actual cost to the Soviets.)

This enormous military strength is complemented by very important strategic locational advantages. The Soviet forces enjoy proximity to the major areas of U.S. vital interest and of potential conflict. They stand at the borders of Western Europe and the Middle East, from which the United States is separated by thousands of miles, so that it would have to deploy and supply its armed forces over seas infested by Soviet submarines. Moreover, the basic locational advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union are enhanced by the Soviet presence, whether direct or by virtue of Cuban and East German proxies, in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and Afghanistan. Indeed, the ability of the Soviet Union to use proxies to advance its position and power while avoiding direct

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confrontation with the United States must be accounted as yet another significant element in its favor.

A third major strength of the Soviet Union, the importance of which cannot be overestimated, is the mastery of its leaders of the art of manipulating social groups and forces, especially in the Western democracies, toward beliefs and in directions the Soviets desire. Marxist analysis has provided the Soviet leaders with an incomparable tool for selecting key groups and assessing their economic interests, ideas and value systems, as well as their disaffections, rivalries, suspicions and fears. Many decades of experience in the use of agitative propaganda have enabled the Soviets to play on these with the skill of a master programmer at a computer keyboard and with almost equal control. They have used this ability to confuse, obfuscate and mislead, all in the service of their own interests.

Thus, they have portrayed their own expansionary and aggressive actions as essentially defensive responses to capitalist-imperialist encirclement and aggression. They have encouraged poor Third World countries to believe that their poverty and backwardness was the result of capitalist-colonialist exploitation. They encouraged the outrageous oil price and embargo actions of OPEC as acts of long overdue justice, to sabotage and weaken the economies of the West and to terrorize them by the fear that the oil lifeline might be cut off. During a decade of economic slowdown in the West, they exploited the appetites of Western producers and banks for profitable exports and loans, persuading them to work for governmental policies which made it possible for the Soviet Union and its satellites to obtain goods, technology and credits they desperately needed. They used post-Vietnam War disillusionment to foster mistrust of Western governments and institutions by their own citizens.

Above all, the Soviet Union has played upon universal desires for peace and fears of war, especially nuclear war. Indeed, they have been able to persuade literally millions of innocent people of goodwill throughout the West that it is their own governments, rather than the Soviet Union, whose policies threaten to lead the world to a nuclear holocaust. The effect of all this has been to develop politically significant constituencies who seriously misperceive the nature of the real struggle between the totalitarian and democratic ways of life, and to undermine their support of their governments' resolve to safeguard democracy.

Finally, we must acknowledge as an important strength of the Soviet Union that, in pursuing its strategy vis-à-vis the West—on

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which we shall shortly elaborate—the Soviet leadership is unhampered by sentiment or scruple, is ruthlessly objective, and is infinitely patient in its cautious pursuit of its long-term objectives. This combination of persistence, determination and caution makes it a more, not less, dangerous adversary.

V

Our respect for these great strengths of the Soviet Union must not, however, be permitted to cloud our eyes to its equally significant weaknesses and vulnerabilities. These concentrate heavily in economic and morale factors which must be taken importantly into account in any U.S. and Western strategy of defense.

Despite its massive manpower, rich natural resources and substantial industrial development, the economic strength of the Soviet Union is gravely flawed. First, except possibly for the military sector, the economy of the Soviet Union operates at very low levels of efficiency and productivity. (So, in general, do those of its satellites.) This results chiefly from a combination of bureaucratic rigidities, the inescapable inefficiencies of a completely controlled non-market system and low worker morale. These same factors apply to Soviet agriculture, where they are further aggravated by the utilization for crops of a vast acreage subject to the vagaries of uncertain rains and weather.

In consequence, the once rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union has slowed, in recent years, to a very low rate which is not cyclical but persistent. Moreover, low population growth rates mean correspondingly slow growth in the labor force, further inhibiting future economic growth. On the resource side, the natural resources of European Russia are already fully utilized. Large additional resources, chiefly oil, gas and minerals, are available only in far-off Siberia. Due to extreme cold, the depth of the permafrost, the need to move and settle large numbers of reluctant workers to exploit these resources, and the high cost of transportation facilities and operations, huge investments far beyond the financial and technological means of the Soviet Union are required to bring these additional resources into full production and use.

This combination of low economic efficiency and productivity, inadequate technology, and inability to self-finance essential additional development has made the Soviet Union in recent years increasingly and heavily dependent on capital goods, technology and credits from the West, while recurring major shortages in the

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production of food grains have required their large-scale importation, chiefly from the United States. A final element to be noted in this economic picture is the heavy drain on Soviet economic capabilities imposed by the need to subsidize client states like Cuba and Vietnam, and to provide assistance to avert economic and possibly political collapse in allied states like Poland, Hungary and Romania.

The poor morale which is so destructive of productivity in Soviet factories and farms is pervasive throughout Soviet society. It is a long time since Party slogans and exhortations have been able to inspire or move the working people of the Soviet Union. Continuing shortages of essential consumer goods, endless queues and resentment against the special privileges and access reserved for Party insiders—to cushy jobs, special shops amply stocked with imported goodies, preferred housing, automobiles, and university and career opportunities for their children—have long since created a disillusioned, sullen, apathetic populace.

Among technicians, professionals, intellectuals and artists, morale is also poor. Most of them, of course, continue to play the game because they are unwilling to risk or surrender their status and material benefits. But seeing through the make-believe, they can scarcely have been able to retain their self-respect. And of course, while the number of outspoken dissidents is limited, and there can be only a few Solzhenitsyns, Sakharovs, Mandelstams and Medvedevs, their views have gained wide currency, and their effectiveness cannot be undone. Within this overall picture, a number of ethnic minority groups nurse their own special dissatisfactions. And increasing numbers of Soviet youth are captivated by the fashions, music and diversions enjoyed by young people in the West, and envy their freedoms.

By and large, these morale factors are also operative in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. But in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and probably in East Germany and Bulgaria as well, these are aggravated by the spirit of nationalism. Resentment against Soviet domination and exploitation is widespread among their populations and must also be present, to some extent at least, among their leaders.

In the face of such widespread disillusionment, apathy, cynicism, dissidence and resentment, the Soviet leaders have little choice but to propagandize the image of a beleaguered Motherland surrounded by capitalist-imperialist nations intent on her destruction. In the absence of a common fear of the external enemy, their control would be seriously jeopardized, and might

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not be able to survive.

To these weaknesses of the Soviet economy and its people's morale must be added the enmity of the People's Republic of China, seemingly unaffected by recent Soviet propitiatory gestures. China, to be sure, is still relatively backward and weak. But with nearly four times the population of the Soviet Union (one-fourth the population of the entire planet), with a leadership which claims that it, rather than the Soviets, follows the true Marxist path and threatens increasingly to challenge the Soviet Union as their country grows in development and strength, the strategic role and potential of China cannot be ignored by either the Soviet Union or the West.

Of a lesser but not negligible order of importance in assessing the weaknesses of the Soviet Union is the fact that most Third World countries have learned to see through the sophistry and shams practiced by the Soviet Union. Even though they make use of its resources and pretensions when they can and when it serves their own purposes to do so, and while they undoubtedly respect its raw power, they clearly lack friendship or affection for it, and are unlikely to display either of these should the Soviet Union ever need them.

Lastly, we may note as a final element of significant weakness that, while the Soviet leadership may no longer really believe in the Marxist-Leninist credo, they are involuntary prisoners of it. This severely limits their flexibility in policy and action and makes their future behavior, at least in its broad patterns, quite predictable.

VI

If we consider the recent actions and current posture of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States and the West in the light of this assessment, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Soviet leaders have carefully taken all these strengths and weaknesses into account in designing a strategy which could be capable, with a minimum of risk to themselves, of defeating the United States and the West and of gaining the world dominance they seek.

Given the awesome strength of the Soviets' massive conventional forces on the borders of Western Europe, the reluctance of the NATO allies to attempt to match that strength, and the stalemate of the nuclear weapons counted upon for so long to offset the Soviets' superior land forces, the European democracies have been increasingly intimidated.

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But Western Europe has fears not only of being overrun, or of serving as a theater for nuclear warfare—for almost a decade now it has also had to fear that the Soviet Union might, alternatively, cut off the oil supplies of the Middle East which constitute its economic lifeline. This additional threat the Soviet Union has been able to mount with little risk to itself in a combination of ways—by helping to keep the Middle East in turmoil, by encouraging the Arab nations to impose an oil embargo and raise oil prices to levels which have debilitated the Western economies, and by employing Cuban and East German forces as proxies in strategic locations like Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen, which could serve as bases for cutting the shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe or for military action in the oil producing areas. The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, placing its troops closer to Iranian oil fields than before, gravely heightened this threat.

Complementing these uses of the Soviet Union's military and locational strengths has been the application of its great manipulative and propaganda powers to erode the will of the West to resist the expansion of Soviet power, and to utilize the great economic and technological strengths of the West to offset the Soviets' major economic weaknesses. The basic good will, innocence, credulity, desire for peace and fear of nuclear holocaust of peoples in the West have not been difficult to play upon, and large constituencies have developed in all Western countries in favor of détente, peace, disarmament and a freeze of nuclear weapons. They have also been encouraged to believe that the really critical issue of our time is the North–South issue, not the East-West issue. These tactics have played an important role in restraining Western governments from matching the Soviet arms buildup.

At the same time, the Soviet leaders, starting in the early 1970s, initiated a policy of greatly expanded trade with the West. Supported by extremely liberal supplier and government-guaranteed and -subsidized credits, the volume of East-West trade multiplied rapidly. Western governments viewed this trade as an important aspect of détente, and as a potentially significant lever in persuading the Soviet Union to pursue moderation in its foreign policies. But the Soviet Union saw this trade as an unprecedented opportunity to obtain from the West high-technology capital goods which would spark its own lagging, low-productivity industrial economy, help relieve the embarrassing shortages to which it was condemned by its inherent inefficiencies, and at least partially assuage the discontents of its own people.

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In addition to the support of gullible, guilt-ridden, pro-peace-détente-disarmament groups, this Western policy had the support of two powerful institutional forces. The economic slowdowns imposed by OPEC's oil price extortions had brought Western capital-goods-producing industries to persistently low levels of operation and made them eager for new markets and orders. And major Western banks, swollen with deposits of excess earnings from the oil-producing countries, and faced with low levels of domestic demand for loans, were equally desirous of extending profitable credits to new customers. Economic self-interest and political naïveté thus provided support for those political leaders who believed that the potential threat to curtail such benefits in the future, once the Soviets and their allies had become dependent on them, could be a potent influence in ensuring moderate Soviet behavior. Within a decade, the volume of two-way East-West trade had exploded to some $80 billion annually, and the volume of credits to the Soviet bloc had grown to a similar figure.

In supplying huge volumes of Western goods (and, in turn, taking in exchange increasingly large volumes of Eastern goods on essentially a barter basis), the West of course endeavored to prohibit the sale of goods and technology which would contribute directly to the Soviets' military strength. In implementing this policy, however, the criteria were necessarily cloudy, especially in the case of goods which could readily be converted to military purposes—e.g. plants and equipment for manufacturing civilian trucks which could readily be converted to the production of military personnel carriers.

But the policy was in any case essentially naïve. Even purely civilian supplies, and especially machinery and equipment embodying advanced technology, contribute indirectly to Soviet military power in a number of significant ways:

—By improving the productivity, output and quality of goods for the domestic market, they reduce the proportionate burden of resources allocated to the military sector, and help to appease workers' demands for more and better consumer goods, thus reducing potentially troublesome tides of discontent. (U.S. grain sales, mainly for animal fodder, both ease the pressure for more agricultural investment and help to eke out the scanty supply of meat products available to Soviet workers, another important factor in containing their discontents.)

—They enable the Soviets to shift their very best technicians and research talent to the military sector and still avoid the collapse of their civilian industries.

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—They help the Eastern bloc to produce improved goods which could compete with Western manufacturers in Third World and even some European markets.

—They enable the Soviets to save huge sums which would otherwise have to be spent on civilian research and development, again increasing the resources available to the military sector.

—Currently, they are supplying the credits, goods and technology without which the Soviets would be unable to develop the great, virtually untapped natural resources of far-off Siberia essential to their future growth and economic strength.

Best of all, the Soviets and their allies have been able to finance their investment needs and balance their increasing trade deficits with the West with generous, often subsidized, Western credits. Lenin once said that capitalists would supply to the Soviet Union the rope with which they themselves would one day be hanged. He might well have added, "They will even supply us with the rope on credit."

These key components of the Soviet strategy, and the underlying strengths and weaknesses to which they have so ingeniously been adapted, suggest with a near certainty that the Soviets do not intend or seek an armed conflict with the West, whether of conventional arms, nuclear weapons, or both. Such a conflict would impose upon them not only very great, but quite unnecessary costs and risks—risks which could bring the entire Soviet empire, and communism itself, tumbling down. It would expose the Soviet Union to serious internal dissent, strains and possibly rebellion within the civilian population. It would expose it to the danger that its missiles, tanks and airplanes, as suggested by recent combat experience in the Beka'a valley of Lebanon, might be ineffectual in the face of superior Western military technology. It would expose it to the danger of loss of control over its Warsaw Pact allies, or of their internal collapse. Such a conflict would also bring to an abrupt halt the flow of Western goods, technology and credits on which the bloc depends so much. Moreover, even if the Soviets were finally to triumph in such a conflict, a devastated West would scarcely be able to continue to supply them with golden eggs. It is clearly in the Soviet interest to be in a position to *exploit* Western wealth and productivity, not to *destroy* them.

It is therefore in the Soviet interest to rely not on armed conflict, but on the low-cost, low-risk exploitation of Western weaknesses. These encompass credulity, political innocence, short memories,

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cupidity, differences and strains within the Western Alliance, and above all, a fear of nuclear war. Combined with huge armed forces, massive weaponry and well-timed military bluster and threats, the Soviet strategy in recent years has been very successful indeed. The Soviet leaders have in fact made important strides on their desired path to world domination.

VII

The single most important conclusion which emerges from this analysis is that a U.S. and Western defense strategy cannot be based on military considerations alone. These must indeed lie at the core of such a strategy; but they must be complemented and reinforced, wherever appropriate, by economic, political and social factors. Indeed, judgments concerning the strength, composition, deployment and utilization of military forces may be influenced in significant degree by these complementary aspects of an integrated, coherent strategy.

Above all, U.S. and Western defense strategy must avoid or severely limit any actions and policies which contribute significantly to the strength of the Soviet Union and its allies or help them to overcome their weaknesses. In the first instance, this means curtailing in significant degree the flow of Western high-technology industrial goods and food grains, and the credits which facilitate and increase the volume of this flow. Such curtailment should embrace not only military technology, but civilian technology which contributes significantly, albeit indirectly, to Soviet economic and military strength as well. Such limitations, and the hardships they will inevitably impose on the Soviet Union and its allies, will reduce the volume of resources the Soviets can allocate to their military machine. At the same time, they will remove the props that have helped the Soviet leaders to maintain at least a very low level of morale among their peoples, and expose them to increasingly outspoken dissent and unrest.

There are of course other, more direct, ways, both overt and covert, to address and exploit the low morale which is so rife throughout the Soviet Empire. The substance of our message to the peoples of the Soviet Empire should be, "We are your friends. We recognize and sympathize with your plight, we appreciate your desire for freedom. Till now, we have extended help to your governments in the form of goods and credits in the hope that this would conduce to a peaceful coexistence. We see this has been an error on our part. Peace as we understand it is not what your

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rulers desire. So, we shall curtail the aid that has helped your rulers to maintain their control, so inept and inefficient in everything except the ways of tyranny. But although we wish you well, we cannot win for you your freedom. This only you can win."

This simplified presentation of the major components seriously lacking in Western defense strategy is not intended to suggest that the formulation and implementation of the policy measures advocated would be either simple or painless. Significant limitations on the supply of industrial goods to the Soviet Union would impose severe hardships on many capital-goods industries and firms already operating at low or unprofitable levels of capacity, especially in Western Europe. Comparable limitations on shipments of U.S. food grains would impose similar hardships on many American farmers. Limitations on Western credits, even if restricted to the denial of government guarantees and interest subsidies to supplier credits and bank loans, would not only affect the flow of goods: they would discourage international banks from rolling over existing credits the East European allies of the Soviet Union can no longer service without fresh capital inflows, and might thus plunge them into default. Such defaults, in the scores of billions of dollars, could hurtle the entire international financial structure into disarray.

There are many plausible arguments which can and have been made in opposition to such seemingly Draconian policies. Western unemployment, already severe, would be increased. The hopes of many that an ever increasing web of economic ties and benefits might induce the Soviet Union to moderate its actions, or wean its satellites away from it, would be discarded as unrealistic. Our European allies, whose trade with and loans to the Soviet bloc are much larger, both absolutely and in relative terms, than are those of the United States, would feel the impact much more severely. As European reactions to President Reagan's recent sanctions have demonstrated, the danger of a serious rift in the Western Alliance would be great.

But even if this difference were bridged, and even if we and our allies were sufficiently resolute to adopt such measures, there would still remain very difficult questions of how far and how fast they should be applied, partly to cushion and equitably share the burdens of the economic shocks they would impose on us, but even more importantly because, if their effect was such as to threaten the continued control of communist governments over their own peoples, the Soviet leaders might be tempted or impelled to risk a heightened adventurism.

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All of these questions therefore require the most careful consideration. What can be said about such measures, however, is that in some degree, sooner or later, they are essential. Plainly stated, we need them if we are to stop undermining our own defenses by strengthening our adversary. No matter how painful and costly they might be in the short run, they would surely be less painful, costly and hazardous than would be the military forces, measures and risks that would otherwise be required. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they would be politically acceptable.

VIII

The strengthening of our own economy, and of the morale in our own society, are also therefore essential components of—perhaps even prerequisites for—a comprehensive and improved defense strategy and capability. For unless we and our allies succeed in restoring healthy economic growth, our peoples are not likely to accept the burdens of a denial policy, even if the costs to the Soviet Union of such a policy exceed its costs to us.

The mishmash of internally contradictory Reagan economics policies which have, irrationally and unnecessarily, plunged this country into deep and prolonged recession, are inimical to our strength, morale and defense. For more than a year, contrary to the obvious realities and to warnings from virtually all sides, the President has held tenaciously to his stated positions and called upon the country to "stay the course." The Soviet leaders are stuck with their discredited ideologies: there is no excuse for leadership in a democracy to be similarly hidebound.

If a strong and sustainable economic recovery here and in Europe is a prerequisite for public acceptance of an effective economic denial policy, what can be said about the near-term prospects for achieving such a recovery? The inflation rate, to be sure, has come down considerably. This has made it possible for the Federal Reserve Board to loosen its stifling grip on the money supply and spark a substantial decline in nominal interest rates. Almost surely, this will stimulate important interest-rate-sensitive activities like residential construction and automobile production, and the beginning of a more general economic recovery.

As yet, however, few forecasters believe the recovery will be more than weak and short-lived. Significant additional declines in interest rates are essential to a strong economic recovery, but until prospective federal deficits are reduced substantially in size, the Fed will not venture to loosen its monetary controls, or ease interest rates, much further, for fear of rekindling inflation. In-

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deed, rapidly growing credit demands from the private sector, generated in the initial phases of a recovery, might soon force it to reverse its most recent policy course and tighten its controls once again, aborting the recovery. The key to a strong economic recovery without renewed inflation would thus appear to be a significant reduction in the deficits we now anticipate.

To this end the strengthened Democratic majority in the House will be in a position to bring great pressure on President Reagan to compromise both on tax increases, including the cancellation of the third scheduled step of his cherished tax reduction program, and on his military budget. The tax cut might be reduced or stretched out or deferred, in a hard fight. Resistance to cuts in the military budget might well be less strong. Since budget figures for the planned multi-year military buildup assumed continuation of the very high inflation rate prevailing at the time, recalculation based on lower current and prospective rates would itself reduce forward military budget requirements significantly without affecting the real program at all. In addition, it seems very likely that some extremely costly new weapons systems, seriously challenged from the time they were first put forward, will have to go. In the end, if proper priority is given to the economic component in our overall defensive strength, the military component may be reduced without weakening our overall defensive capabilities.

Opportunities significantly to reduce anticipated budget deficits are thus at hand. This realized, the Fed could continue to moderate its monetary controls, lower real interest rates and turn the economy around. Substantially lower interest rates here would permit our European allies to lower their rates as well, lifting the constraints which have depressed their economic activities. The stage could thus be set for acceptance of an economic denial program.

IX

As has been the case with Reaganomics, attempts by the Administration to generate public support for huge military budgets and ever more sophisticated and destructive nuclear weaponry by alleging that the Soviet Union has gained "nuclear superiority" have also been counterproductive. They have undermined the ability and resolve of our peoples in the United States and Western Europe to think calmly and act firmly in support of an adequate defense. They have created among millions of political innocents a near hysteria about the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. And the popular support for a nuclear freeze, as expressed in recent referenda, appears to be strong.

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Instead of less than persuasive claims that the Soviet Union has achieved a position of nuclear superiority, it would be more useful for our leaders now to affirm that they do not believe the Soviet Union desires or plans or would dare to risk direct military confrontation. But they should also make it very clear to all Western peace lovers that the Soviet leaders do not understand by peace what we understand the term to mean. The venerated dogma from which they cannot escape tells them that wars are caused, inevitably, by clashing capitalist-imperialist rivalries. Peace, in their lexicon, cannot therefore be achieved until such governments are overthrown. Lenin said it very succinctly. "As an ultimate objective peace simply means communist world control." This is why, when the Soviet leaders speak of the road to peace, they refer to it always as a struggle. We must understand and make plain to all what they mean by this.

Real peace, as we understand it, cannot be made with Soviet leaders who adhere to such beliefs. Failing fundamental political change in the Soviet Union, the war of ideologies, between democracy and totalitarianism, between freedom and enslavement, will go on. The challenge to us is to ensure that it remains a war of ideologies only. This we can do, if we pursue policies of moderation, calm and resolve, and improve our relative strength, chiefly by restoring our economy to vigorous health and growth, and by cutting back on the economic aid and comfort we have accorded to the Soviet Union and its allies.

The Soviet Union, with our assistance, could match our military buildup, whatever its size, and maintain its military power relative to ours. But it will not be able to compensate, without serious sacrifices, for progressive withdrawals of Western goods, technology and credit. In the last analysis, we shall triumph when the peoples of the Soviet Empire decide they have lived in subjection and misery long enough, and take steps to achieve the freedom to which they too aspire. The Polish people have already taken the first giant step.

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Charles Gati

POLISH FUTURES, WESTERN OPTIONS

Try to imagine, as Western specialists in communist affairs often do, a Politburo meeting in the Kremlin. It is the spring of 1981, the topic is Poland.[1] Comrade A is impatient: "I thought Kania was one of us. He used to be in charge of their security forces. How is it he doesn't know what to do?" Comrade B is philosophical: "These Poles, they've never liked us, they never will. We liberate them from the Germans, we sell them cheap oil, we give them credit, we buy everything they can't sell in the West. What do we get? Why aren't they grateful?" Comrade C is bitter: "I'm sick and tired of all these East Europeans, but especially of the Poles. They want to be the 'bridge' between us and the West. (Laughter in the room.) Don't they know we want the West Germans to be the 'bridge'?" (More laughter.) Comrade D is business-like: "We have better things to do than to worry about Poland all the time. I move that we give this Kania fellow another chance. If he doesn't have everything under control by the end of the year, we'll move in. We'll call it 'fraternal assistance.' Enough is enough. What will the Americans and the Chinese think of us if we let this thing go on indefinitely? We're patient, of course. We're always patient, but we're not a paper tiger!" The motion carries.

It is now early 1983. Same location, same subject, the new leadership in place. Comrade A is still impatient: "This Jaruzelski, we made him a general, didn't we? Why did he release Walesa? Did he think we weren't paying attention to Poland in November? Jaruzelski should know that 'conciliation' and 'reform' can come only after everyone in Poland understands we're in charge." Comrade B is still philosophical: "Yes, when they're down, they'll appreciate anything. Let them be grateful for the reform! Let

[1] For a pioneering reconstruction of another session, see Walter Laqueur, "Eavesdropping on the Politburo, November 27, 1980—Poland on the Table," *The New Republic*, December 27, 1980, pp. 20–3.

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Poland be Poland!" (Laughter in the room.) Comrade C is still bitter: "We could afford to bail out the Hungarians in '56 and the Czechs in '68, but we simply can't do it now. As it is, they have more to eat than we do. Don't they understand that?" Having taken D's place in the chair, Comrade E is also business-like: "We have better things to do than to worry about Poland all the time. I move that we give this Jaruzelski fellow another chance. If he doesn't have everything under control by the end of the year, we'll move in. We'll call it 'fraternal assistance.' Enough is enough. What will the Americans and the Chinese think of us if we let this thing go on indefinitely? We're patient, of course. We're always patient, but we're not a paper tiger!" The motion carries.

II

Although the Polish crisis of 1980–81 was the third major eruption of the post-Stalin era in Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders did not seem ready to respond to it.

During the course of the first crisis, in 1956, they crushed the Hungarian uprising, installed János Kádár as Party leader, provided emergency food and easy credit to the new regime in order to allay popular discontent, and spoke vaguely of change—but then pressed for severe punishment of those who could not be appeased. A decade or so later, however, they allowed Kádár to institute the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) and build the foundations for his "goulash communism." Today, Kádár can claim to have achieved a unique feat for a communist leader: he is trusted by Moscow, respected by the West, envied by other East Europeans, and cheered by his compatriots.

In their second major crisis in Eastern Europe, the Russians intervened in 1968 in Czechoslovakia to put an end to Alexander Dubĉek's reform movement. They selected Gustav Husak—who, like Kádár, had spent several years in Stalinist prisons—to head the new regime, proffered reconciliation, and gave the new government enough food and credit to mollify the population. Like Kádár, Husak has since earned the backing of the Soviet Union—but his path, unlike Kádár's, has been the path of orthodoxy and repression. Thus, although the same sequence of events developed in Czechoslovakia as in Hungary—Soviet intervention, followed by aid and solemn pledges of reconciliation and reform, followed by a period of harsh repression—present-day reality in the two countries is altogether different.

In 1980–81, during the course of Poland's "socialist renewal," what options did the Soviet leaders consider to resolve their third

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major crisis in Eastern Europe? Did they envisage a Hungarian or a Czechoslovak solution for Poland, or would it be something else this time?

Then, as always, the goals of stability and conformity were at the top of the Soviet Union's wish list for Poland and, indeed, for all of Eastern Europe. Regional stability would obviate the need to bail out unpopular and incompetent regimes or to save them through military intervention. A stable Eastern Europe could make a more substantial contribution to the Warsaw Pact and permit the Soviet Union to deploy its resources and energies more profitably in order to attain its objectives at home and abroad. To obtain stability, however, the Soviet Union would have to grant the East European parties a larger measure of independence, encourage reforms, and allow for a more liberal scheme of political participation.

The other aim—conformity—would require Eastern Europe to be ideologically attuned to the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would demonstrate the legitimacy of the Soviet presence in the region and hence the appeal of the Soviet version of socialism. To obtain conformity, however, the Soviet Union has to demand strict adherence to its domestic and foreign policy norms—surely a conflict-producing proposition.

The problem for the Soviet leaders, then, is how to reconcile such incompatible needs and preferences. As they know, policies aimed at achieving stability jeopardize Soviet control over the region, while policies aimed at achieving conformity result in widespread apathy at best and popular uprisings at worst. Confronted with this dilemma, Moscow has deferred the choice by adopting a position toward Eastern Europe that combines traditional hegemonical habits and attitudes with an uneven and grudging pragmatism.

The Soviet Union's handling of the Polish challenge of 1980–81 demonstrated its dilemma. In a campaign of increasingly ominous words, which began immediately after Solidarity was born, Moscow charged "anti-socialist" elements with instigating the unrest, criticized the Gdansk agreement between the workers and the government, and issued daily reminders to "healthy forces" of Poland's obligations under the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). The substance and tone of its gradually escalating rhetoric, combined with preparations for intervention, recalled the carefully orchestrated Soviet response to the 1968 Czech crisis, one that ranged from early expressions of concern to subsequent warnings, threats and military intimidation. In the case of Poland, the Soviet leaders appear once again

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to have decided, from the beginning, to somehow "reverse the course of events" and thus "eliminate the peril looming over the socialist achievements of Poland."[2] The main question was not whether they would tolerate a pluralist Poland or help reestablish one-party rule—old-fashioned or liberalized; the choice they kept deferring was whether they could mobilize their Polish supporters to reconstitute one-party rule or whether Soviet intervention would more effectively accomplish that objective.

Yet this was not simply a squabble over the least damaging way to proceed. After all, the Soviet leaders made and then cancelled two preliminary decisions for direct military interventions—in December 1980 and March 1981—and they waited 16 long months to bring Poland under control. Their hesitation and vacillation suggest both indecisiveness at the top and a serious debate over the possibility of finding a *political solution* to the crisis. The Soviet leadership's search for such a political solution was apparent in almost all public statements during 1980–81, including those delivered at the important forum of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

In his main address to the Congress, in February 1981, the late Leonid Brezhnev viewed the Polish situation most darkly: "opponents of socialism supported by outside forces, by stirring up anarchy, are seeking to channel events in a counterrevolutionary course"; hence, "the pillars of the socialist state in Poland are in jeopardy." In a passage widely quoted at the time, Brezhnev added an ominous message to "Polish communists, the Polish working class and the working people of that country" who, he said, "can firmly rely on their friends and allies; we will not abandon fraternal, socialist Poland in its hour of need, we will stand by it." As if to counter other views, however, Brezhnev also reminded his listeners that "at present, the Polish comrades . . . are striving to enhance the Party's capacity for action" by making plans "to restore a sound Polish economy" and "to tighten links with the working class and the other working people."[3]

What Brezhnev's code words implied was that once the Polish Party succeeded in resolving its internal divisions and began to tackle the main problems of the economy, it would then be in the position to work out a modus vivendi with the industrial prole-

[2] For an interim report—written in May 1981—reaching that conclusion, see Charles Gati, "The Soviet Stake in Eastern Europe," in *Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, eds. Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 178–191.

[3] L.I. Brezhnev, *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, February 23, 1981, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1981, pp. 7–8.

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tariat. Echoing that view, Polish party chief Stanislaw Kania explicitly affirmed that "our Party chose the road of political solution to the social conflict, the road of restoring society's trust in the people's authority, and this is the fundamental direction of our activity."[4]

It seems likely that for almost a full year—perhaps until the conclusion of the Ninth Congress of the Polish United Workers' [Communist] Party in July 1981—the Soviet leaders actively considered not only two, but three, options. Concerned as they were about the costs and consequences of direct military intervention and about the possible failure of an attempted crackdown by Polish military and security forces, they kept alive the possibility of finding a political solution to the crisis. Those who argued for this option presumably believed it was the only one, in the long run, that would lead to stability in Poland—and, by implication, elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Fundamentally, this counsel was based on the belief that the Soviet Union could cope with the resulting diversity in the region. Certainly, a political solution would have been the alternative least costly to the Soviet Union, and it would have also had the advantage of enhancing prospects for increased trade with the West. Moreover, implementation of this option would have made the Soviet Union appear a self-assured and decisive great power, fully capable of taking fresh initiatives to guide the evolution of new economic and political institutions and attitudes in its sphere.

What were the broad outlines of a "political solution" acceptable to Moscow? So important is the question—so much might it reveal about the limits of Soviet tolerance for change in Eastern Europe—that it should be addressed even if the answer has to be based on conjecture and past Soviet behavior.

1. The Soviet Union could have accommodated itself to an independent trade union in Poland, provided that the union could have been persuaded to focus on economic matters and in the expectation that a revived Party would sap the union's strength—or, at least, arrest its momentum.

2. The Soviet Union could have tolerated a relatively open Polish press—one of the most striking developments of Poland's "socialist renewal"—provided that the Party retained control over television and radio stations as well as over its own dailies and weeklies, and that the press as a whole refrained from criticizing Soviet domestic institutions and foreign policy positions.

3. The Soviet Union could have lived with a Polish legislature

[4] *FBIS Daily Report* (Soviet Union), Vol. III, No. 37, Supp. 002, February 25, 1981, p. 41.

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whose members were elected in competitive, multi-slate—though not genuinely multiparty—elections, provided that the Communist Party oversaw the nominating process and that all representatives accepted both the socialist foundations of the economy and the Warsaw-Pact commitments of the Polish state.

4. The Soviet Union would have endorsed almost any combination of economic reforms within the existing socialist order, provided that the processes of reform would be under the supervision of the Communist Party.

By Western standards, a political solution along these lines may appear little more than window dressing. After all, Moscow would have insisted on reserving to the Polish Communist Party a controlling interest over both state and society. Indeed, the Soviet leaders would have allowed a more narrowly defined renewal process to continue only in the hope that the communist cause would soon revive and eventually prevail in Poland. While attesting to some flexibility in the Soviet position, such a course would have asserted that the issue of ultimate control was not negotiable: a more or less homogeneous Communist Party, however small, would have been the final arbiter of Poland's future.

By East European and especially by Soviet standards, however, such a political solution—prompted by a spontaneous, grassroots movement—would have represented a watershed in the history of communism. It would have demonstrated the wisdom of what the major autonomist or "Eurocommunist" parties of Yugoslavia and Italy had been advocating for many years: that no country could build a successful socialist order based solely on a blueprint borrowed from the Soviet model. In the past, Moscow had paid mainly lip service to the concept of "different roads to socialism." Now, by blessing a measure of experimentation instead of damning it as heretical—and by doing so in the most important country in Eastern Europe—the Soviet Union would have made itself a partner in redefining the scope of innovation in the communist world.

But, as we know, this third option was eventually discarded. The Soviet leadership preferred to impose conformity, instead of working out new arrangements for a potentially stable, yet still one-party, political order. Its old hegemonical habits prevailed over its desire to be, or to be seen as, flexible. The aging leaders of the Politburo could not make a decision substantially different from the precedent set in 1956 and 1968—they could not let Poland embark on the uncharted path of socialist renewal—because their fear that Poland would slip away overwhelmed their

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hope of gaining a measure of legitimate authority in that country. During the course of those difficult months, the concessions they made, or allowed the Polish party to make, turned out to be too little and too late—and, to make matters worse, they repeatedly tried to back out of agreements already reached. Tragically, but inevitably, the more concessions they made and then attempted to withdraw, the more they emboldened the whole Polish nation—Solidarity, the Church, even Party members—to dream of being altogether free. That is when, and how, Poland's struggle for liberalization became a struggle for liberty.

III

In this second phase of the Polish crisis, General Wojciech Jaruzelski's military government has so far followed the precedent set by *both* Kádár and Husak. Its earnest pledges of "orderly liberalization" have predictably yielded to harsh measures of repression. Having all but abandoned its own program of national reconciliation and economic reform, the government has even formally reneged on its promise of accommodation with a "reconstructed"—presumably more pliable—Solidarity movement. As tens of thousands of Party members turn in their membership cards, the Party—staffed by opportunists—tries to find a role for itself under the martial-law regime.

As the euphoria of 1980–81 gives way to an atmosphere of utter hopelessness and indeed despair, Polish society is once again divided into two nations. The people spend time looking for essentials—food, soap, clothing for the children; the rulers spend theirs blaming American imperialism for the economic mess. The people await the Pope's visit; the rulers call it provocative. The people want Solidarity and Walesa to represent their interests; the rulers want company unions. The people claim their rulers have proved they cannot manage the economy; the rulers claim the people have proved they can destroy the economy. The people would go a long way to obtain Western aid and assistance; the rulers cynically refer to their $26-billion debt as a Western problem. The people call the rulers Soviet puppets; the rulers call the people misguided victims of counterrevolutionary propaganda. The people believe Poland is their country; the rulers believe in "people's Poland."

The hopelessness of the political stalemate is surpassed only by that of the country's economic condition. The Polish economy is clearly bankrupt. It suffers from the gnawing problems of negative growth, declining productivity, unavailability of Western imports and credit, loss of foreign—Western and Eastern—markets, and

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an inflationary spiral. Against the background of an unprecedented decline in growth everywhere else in Eastern Europe and of a stagnating Soviet economy unable to assume another burden, the Polish economic collapse, according to an astute observer, is "beginning to rival the Great Depression of the 1930s."[5] In the absence of parts for machinery, scores of factories lie idle and fall into decay; indeed, not before 1990 is aggregate Polish industrial output again likely to reach its 1978 level.[6] During the decade ahead, the Polish standard of living is going to remain considerably below that of the late 1970s. Moreover, as the zloty continues to lose much of its purchasing power and as stores show their empty shelves to the Polish consumer, there is little or no incentive to make, let alone save, money. Ironically, only a black market flourishes, together with the so-called "second"—officially illegal, but gladly tolerated—economy.

Thus, as economic conditions worsen and the appeal of Solidarity persists, the Jaruzelski regime cannot claim to have acquired even a modicum of legitimacy, fulfilled deeply-held nationalist aspirations, or tempered popular discontent either by a policy of consumerism it cannot afford or by a broadly-based scheme of political participation it is frightened to adopt. Under the circumstances, Poles—and Western observers—keep asking themselves: Can it go on like this much longer? Can the Polish economy continue to "muddle through" under conditions of de facto bankruptcy? Is the time of reconciliation near, and—if so—what form will it take?

Despite the well-publicized mystery that appears to surround General Jaruzelski's politics and personality, he has given clear indications of the future he has in mind for Poland. In plain language, he aspires to be Poland's Kádár; he would like history to recall that he assumed the reins of power at a most difficult time in Polish history in order to create a humane political order under one-Party auspices. Indeed, he has repeatedly held up Hungary's example for Poland to emulate: he visited Kádár in Budapest and he secretly consulted with a high-level Hungarian delegation in Warsaw—led, significantly, by Kádár's clever alter ego, Politburo member György Aczél.

Soviet support for such a "Hungarian solution" is all the more likely now because of the prominent personal role Yuri V. Andropov played in Hungary as Soviet ambassador to that country from 1954 to 1957. Prior to the Hungarian revolution, in the

[5] Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1982, pp. 1–19.

[6] Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *Centrally Planned Economies—Longterm Projections*, Fall 1981, p. 40.

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summer of 1956, Andropov was instrumental in having Hungary's Stalinist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, removed from power. During the revolution, Andropov consulted daily with the head of the revolutionary government, Imre Nagy, assuring Nagy repeatedly—and deceitfully—that Moscow would consent to Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact if only Soviet troops were allowed to leave the country in an honorable and orderly fashion. Concurrently, however, Andropov invited János Kádár to the Soviet embassy in Budapest to inform him of the Soviet leadership's decision to overthrow the Nagy government and to replace it with one that would be sensitive to Moscow's needs and policies. As Kádár subsequently intimated, Andropov had told him to take over the reins of power—that he, Kádár, was not only Khrushchev's choice but Marshal Tito's as well—because of Kádár's reputation as a centrist between the revisionist Nagy and the Stalinist Rákosi. Thus, during his only diplomatic assignment, Andropov seems to have understood that an effective East European leader must not only protect the interests of the Soviet empire, but that he must also attempt to come to terms with his country's traditions and—to an extent—with his people's aspirations. In short, Andropov's diplomatic activity aimed at assuring the implementation of Moscow's traditional objectives in Eastern Europe—conformity *and* stability.

If Jaruzelski is to replicate the post-1956 Hungarian pattern, three major conditions—partly political, partly psychological, and partly economic—will have to obtain. First, he would have to pursue his long-term aims skillfully, without allowing potential political opponents to form a common front against him; thus, he must have in hand all the important levers of power. Second, he would have to be decisive and firm—to the point of brutality if necessary—in a concerted campaign to break the will of those who continue to resist his policies. The Polish people would have to realize that, having lost their struggle for freedom, survival is the only alternative. To put it another way, he would have to infuse Polish society not only with fear, but also with such abject defeatism that his subsequent efforts at a reconciliation, based on the promise of half a loaf, would not meet stubborn rejection. Third, he would need to extract extensive, perhaps unparalleled, economic aid from the Soviet leadership to initiate a long process of economic reconstruction. Eventually, Jaruzelski must hope, a consumption-oriented and largely depoliticized society would learn to appreciate, however grudgingly, what his regime had to offer.

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But even if one supposes that Jaruzelski has, or will have, the time to develop the necessary political skills to stay on course—to maneuver as a centrist between Left-orthodoxy and Right-revisionism—can he force a proud people to kneel obediently while he tries to raise the economy to its feet? Any answer must begin with an understanding that—despite similar historical developments and correspondent traditions prizing both "idealism" and "realism" as national traits—Poland is not Hungary. Above all, the Polish working class, unlike the Hungarian, has frequently initiated change, displayed organizational skills, and shown political discipline; what Marxists call "class-consciousness" is one of its enduring qualities.

Yet, as the Polish regime "militarizes" the factories and unleashes the security forces on the population, arguments among workers and intellectuals over to the best way to proceed are likely to intensify. While many will surely remain willing to sacrifice even their lives for the cause of Poland's freedom, others—cautioned against violence by the Pope and especially by Archbishop Jozef Glemp—will make the point that it might be better to wait for the terror to run its course. Tocqueville once wrote that "The most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways," and some Poles will conduct themselves accordingly. Others will recall, painfully, that every previous outbreak of labor unrest in communist countries—from Lenin's Russia to Ceauşescu's Romania to Gomulka's Poland—has been effectively crushed by the authorities. Given that lesson of the past and given the apparent choice between the Scylla of rebellion and the Charybdis of resignation, the Polish working class may choose to suspend its strategy of open and active resistance.

Should that choice prevail, the regime must then still try to reverse the country's economic decline. An apathetic working class will surely offer no help in improving productivity, nor will the West come to this government's rescue. It may be, however, that the Soviet Union, once there is Soviet-style order in Poland, will find it to its advantage to make that country a "socialist showcase." If so, it would not be because Moscow felt obliged to reward a faithful ally; rather, by assigning top priority to the cause of rebuilding the Polish economy, the Soviet Union would seek to demonstrate the veracity and wisdom of its course. Moscow's decision would be based on the proposition that economic aid to Poland, unlike such aid to Third World countries, would significantly enhance Soviet security interests; hence, in terms of priorities, Soviet assistance to Poland—consisting of food, industrial

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goods and, most agreeably, a hard-currency loan—should be regarded as second only to direct defense expenditures. Considering, moreover, the political benefits expected from Poland's orderly recovery—and assuming that the Soviet citizen's proverbial belt could be once again tightened—the Soviet leaders might well decide to take a chance.

With the population at once softened by a less gloomy economic outlook and effectively demoralized by repression—in some months from now, perhaps—the third phase of Poland's present saga could then begin. Having proved his reliability to Moscow by supporting its cause when others could not or would not rise to the occasion, and having consolidated his authority at home, General Jaruzelski would be poised to obtain Soviet approval either for a carefully calibrated course of controlled liberalization on the Hungarian pattern or for a course of continued orthodoxy and repression à la Czechoslovakia. Given Jaruzelski's aspiration to be seen as a Polish patriot and given the need to accelerate economic growth by improved productivity in a period of intensive development, the chances are that "Kádárization" would be the more appealing alternative.

If this were to happen, the lifting of martial law, regular consultation with the Catholic Church, and a general amnesty would set the tone for and indicate the future intentions of the regime; these measures would serve to effect at least an atmosphere of national reconciliation. In the economic realm, liberalization would entail decentralization, financial incentives, and a flexible price structure. In the political realm, the regime would authorize multi-slate elections on a national scale, allow a measure of autonomy for the company unions at the factory level, encourage a more open and critical press to serve as the regime's safety valve, and ease travel restrictions to the West. In terms of broad objectives, such a policy of controlled liberalization would signify the government's hope that it could obtain stability without sacrificing conformity.

IV

For the first time since the end of World War II, a military junta has come to power in the heart of Europe. As of this writing and for the first time since the death of Stalin, one man heads the armed forces, the state apparatus, and the Party in one of Moscow's East European dependencies. To what extent—and why—should the United States be concerned or involved in Poland and, indeed, elsewhere in Eastern Europe? Acting alone or together

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with its West European allies, what can the United States hope to accomplish?

For over 30 years, since the Soviet bloc came into being, American policy toward Eastern Europe has been caught between maximalist objectives and limited opportunities. On the one hand, the United States has repeatedly, and often loudly, proclaimed its commitment to such lofty goals as independence for the East European states and freedom and democracy for their citizens. Mainly a function of political campaigns, such goals nonetheless influenced official thinking as well. For example, the very first comprehensive statement on American policy toward the region—NSC 58, a then secret document signed by President Truman in 1949—stated that, "Our ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community."[7]

On the other hand, the United States has always and simultaneously pursued more limited objectives. Already in 1949, NSC 58 singled out Yugoslavia for U.S. aid and support despite Marshal Tito's notorious treatment of his political opponents, explaining that the United States must only "foster a heretical drifting-away process on the part of the satellite regimes." Then as now, U.S. officials were hoping to replace—"as a first step"—"Kremlin authority with any governments free of Moscow's domination, even though they be communist régimes."

While the propensity for stating apparently unattainable objectives, such as "democracy" and "independence," has derived from values inherent in American political culture, the concurrent pursuit of limited goals, such as regional "diversity," has stemmed from opportunities offered by developments in a Soviet sphere riddled with tension and conflict. Thus, even as elected officials, in particular, have found it more rewarding to feign support for the "legitimate aspirations" of East Europeans than to remind them of the very real limits on what they can hope to achieve under prevailing circumstances, Washington has tended to assert that which is desirable—an independent and democratic Eastern Europe—and actually pursue that which has seemed to have a chance to succeed—a semi-independent and diverse Eastern Europe. In short, the gap between what the United States has claimed it wishes to achieve and what it could do has been a

[7] "NSC 58: United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe (September 14, 1949)," in *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy*, eds. T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, pp. 211–23.

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striking as well as a permanent feature of the American approach to the region.

In their response to the course of "socialist renewal" in 1980–81, however, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations wisely refrained from exacerbating the crisis through excessive rhetoric; indeed, they did what they could to slow down the tempo of change. For example, when a Soviet invasion seemed imminent in December 1980, not only did Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski—the two Polish-Americans at the helm—issue almost daily reminders about the need for restraint, but the Carter Administration took the unprecedented step of warning the Polish people of intense Soviet preparations for intervention. By following that example in March 1981, the Reagan Administration signalled its own willingness to trade maximalist anti-Sovietism for actual gains. Moreover, both Administrations took the risk of releasing information about Soviet preparations, in the knowledge that such information might well allow Moscow to detect something new about American intelligence-gathering techniques.

Whether the United States could have done even more to circumvent the day of reckoning is, of course, debatable. Some argue that a massive economic aid package would have eased the prevailing atmosphere of crisis within Polish society and that the resulting atmosphere of normalcy would have so divided the Soviet and Polish leaderships as to force the cancellation or postponement of the military crackdown. Naïvely, those who believe in that possibility must also assume that the almighty dollar could have made a difference at a time when, in fact, the power and prestige—the vital interests—of the Soviet Union were at stake.

Now, after the crackdown, it is still untimely to debate the issue of offering unilateral U.S. incentives—or applying sanctions. For when the day of partial reconciliation comes, as it will, it will not happen because of the prospect of U.S. economic aid. Nor will it happen because of economic sanctions or because Western banks might find Poland in default of its huge debt.

Change will come when the Polish Communist Party will have satisfied itself and Moscow of having once again asserted full control over state and society; when it feels confident enough to believe that controlled and limited liberalization—instead of undermining its own authority—will give the regime the appearance of legitimacy and the country a measure of stability. To put the matter bluntly: U.S. economic incentives cannot hasten nor penalties compel the Soviet and Polish governments to return Poland

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to the pre-December 1981 status quo. Certainly, U.S. sanctions—especially those directed against the Soviet Union—do serve a valid diplomatic aim by registering the outrage felt by the American public, but they will not so worsen Polish conditions as to force the kind of change the United States favors in that country.

Compounding the problem of excessive confidence in what U.S. economic measures can now achieve in Poland has been the intense debate within the Reagan Administration about the lessons of the Polish crisis for the United States. For almost a year, officials at the Pentagon in particular have argued that as the 1956 Hungarian uprising proved the failure of the U.S. policy of "liberation," so the Polish crackdown proves that even the "liberalization" of communist regimes cannot take root in the face of Soviet orthodoxy. That being the case, they want the United States to treat all the East European countries alike—with the exception of Yugoslavia—irrespective of whether they depart from Soviet domestic patterns (as Hungary does) or from Soviet foreign policy positions (as Romania does). Thus, instead of the long-established U.S. policy of "differentiation"—which, by favoring some of the regimes and penalizing others, sought to *weaken* the Soviet hold over the region—they urge the United States to trade its discriminating stance for a policy that would seek to destabilize and eventually *defeat* all of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. To achieve that goal, they advocate the complete denial of U.S. trade, credit and technology to all Soviet-dominated systems.

Although President Reagan, rejecting the critics' case for such a major change, has reportedly affirmed the policy of differentiation in a recent presidential directive, it may still be useful to stress publicly that this American policy of the last three decades—characterized by the pursuit of only limited goals and by the differential treatment of each communist country—has contributed to Yugoslavia's independence, strengthened Romania's position as a maverick in the Warsaw Pact, and encouraged Kádár's moderate course in Hungary. Correctly, the United States has distinguished between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—between a colonial power which threatens the security of the West and its dependencies which do not.

As Washington has thus sought to compete peacefully for influence in Eastern Europe, it has engaged in a competition at least as legitimate as the Soviet effort to divide the Western Alliance. To do less would be to accede to the Soviet vision of the East-West contest, a vision according to which the present orientation of Eastern Europe is irreversible, while the present ori-

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entation of Western Europe is always subject to change—including change that would adversely affect vital American interests. Conversely, to aim at much more—to assume that the Soviet empire can be defeated—is to engage in wishful thinking. After all, if a far more cohesive and united West, led by a powerful and purposeful United States, could not roll back Soviet power from the heart of Europe for over three decades, how could the United States now achieve that goal when it finds itself in a situation of military parity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and prevailing discord within the Western Alliance?

To put it another way: although it is prudent to concede that Washington does not have sufficient leverage now to influence the choices facing the Jaruzelski regime, and although it is imperative to recognize that the United States can only reinforce rather than initiate the processes of liberalization elsewhere in Eastern Europe, there is still reason to be concerned about the implications of the Polish crisis for America. For one thing, the European balance of power—the foundation of stability in the postwar world—is being threatened by the growing asymmetry between a deeply divided Western Alliance on the one hand and a tightly managed and controlled Soviet bloc on the other. Worse, as the new Soviet leaders nonetheless show signs of anxiety about the lack of conformity and cohesion in Eastern Europe in the light of the Polish crisis and at a time of increased international tension, they may be tempted to stamp out diversity in the region and compel the Hungarian and Romanian regimes to repair to more orthodox Soviet patterns and policies. If this were to occur, the political balance between the two halves of Europe would become even more asymmetric.

In addition, given the massive repression of the Polish people and serious violations of human rights elsewhere, the United States is entitled not only to express its disapproval and uphold the spirit of the Helsinki accords, but also to engage in a sustained effort to promote the values of tolerance and national sovereignty in Eastern Europe.

For reasons of both power and ideals, then, U.S. interests are very much at stake in the future of Poland and the peaceful evolution of Eastern Europe—yet, as of now, even modest American objectives exceed the means available to implement them. If, as Walter Lippmann used to argue, balancing ends and means is the prerequisite of a solvent foreign policy, then the disturbing lesson of the Polish crisis is that American resources—economic, military and political—have proved inadequate to effect American objectives. Under the circumstances, the United States is left

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with two choices in its approach to Eastern Europe in the 1980s: it can either further reduce its objectives or strengthen its resources.

By adopting the first option, the United States would concede its failure to assist the processes of liberalization in Eastern Europe, signaling its consent to permanent Soviet control over the region. Moreover, an indifferent American stance would signify acceptance of the self-serving Soviet view that Western Europe is, but Eastern Europe is not, a legitimate area of peaceful competition for influence between Washington and Moscow.

To obtain solvency between ends and means, the second option would mean strengthening U.S. resources, which could be done only by having the West Europeans join the United States in the active pursuit of limited liberalization in Eastern Europe. A coherent Western policy could not only reinforce the course on which Hungary and Romania have already embarked, but it could also make a substantial difference in Poland when the time of decision for or against "Kádárization" comes. Acting together, members of the Atlantic Alliance would be in a position to offer meaningful economic incentives that could help and to apply economic penalties that could hurt, using their leverage to advance both economic and political objectives.

Given the present condition of the Western Alliance, it would be naïve to assume that different leaders, or goodwill alone, could produce a coordinated Atlantic policy—a truly new departure—toward Eastern Europe. Yet it would be equally naïve to assume that the United States would long maintain its commitment to the military balance of Europe in the absence of West European contributions to the political balance of Europe.

Conversely, Western Europe cannot be expected to support U.S. objectives toward Eastern Europe unless the limits of these objectives are clarified—i.e., unless the West Europeans appreciate the fact that, for some time to come, the United States will seek diversity rather than democracy, the "Kádárization" rather than the neutralization of Eastern Europe. After all, the goal of limited liberalization differs not at all from the stated goals of West Germany's Ostpolitik or from the French vision of a peaceful continent that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. Indeed, a broad Western consensus on long-term goals already exists.

As for specific measures intended to foster allied cooperation now, the Reagan Administration's effort to trade U.S. objections to the pipeline deal for a common Atlantic policy on credit, trade, and technology transfer represents a major step in the right direction. Moreover, if the Polish crisis should deteriorate, the United States could also reinstate a grain embargo against the

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Soviet Union, and thus demonstrate that for the common good the United States is prepared both to assume an economic burden and to absorb domestic political opposition.

In addition, Washington could provide COCOM—the Coordinating Committee of advanced industrial nations—with a new perspective on trade policy with the East and encourage the "Paris Club" of Western governments to exchange information about East European debts *before* another major crisis erupts. Most important, once Western credit is available again, a new international banking regime—one that is aimed primarily at the exchange of information among leading private banks—would help Western banks to find out in good time which East European country gets how much credit and under what conditions. Together, these measures would create the framework for a coordinated Western economic policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Finally, in the non-economic realm, American objectives would be better understood by West Europeans if the United States were to reduce its occasionally still divisive rhetoric, and if it were to appoint a non-partisan Atlantic advisory council to oversee the activities of those two immensely influential American radio stations—Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—that broadcast around the clock to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

If, by the middle of this decade, Western economies experience a new cycle of growth and prosperity and if the Soviet-type economies continue to stagnate, the economic dependence of the East on the West will be a decisive fact of life in Europe. A more purposeful and united West—its political goals prudently defined and commensurate with its economic leverage—could then significantly influence the choice between enforced cohesion and diversity, between repression and liberalization in Eastern Europe, including Poland.

The time for American and West European diplomats to prepare for that window of political opportunity is now. What is at stake is not simply the future orientation of Eastern Europe, but the balance of political power between East and West.

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Michael Howard

REASSURANCE AND DETERRENCE: WESTERN DEFENSE IN THE 1980S

Historians who attempt to look into and prescribe for the future are professionally inclined to offer as much past history as they think they can get away with, and as little prophecy and prescription as they think their readers will accept. Historians have seen too many confident prophets fall flat on their faces to lay themselves open to more humiliation than they can help. We know that all we can do is to help diagnose the problem or, better, expose false diagnoses. We also believe that in doing this it is helpful to consider how a situation has developed, in this instance in casting a backward look over the origins and development of the Western Alliance to see how we have got to where we are now. There is little point in considering where we should be going if we do not first decide where we are starting from.

Let us go back 35 years, a third of a century, to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It is one of those short-lived periods of the past that we know about from two sources. First, there are the memories of the survivors; men and women not yet in their dotage who played a significant part in the events of the time and recall, or believe they recall, them clearly. Second, those memories can now be checked against the relevant documents; and those documents can still be interpreted in the light of human recollection. It is a period fresh in the minds of many of us, but already digested into that group-memory of the past created and preserved by professional historians.

After the "Battle of the Books" between the revisionist and counterrevisionist schools, a picture has emerged over which most historians now agree. It is one of wartime understandings between the Soviet Union and its Western allies—understandings based largely on Western illusions, or at best the most fragile of hopes—

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breaking down within a few months of the end of hostilities. The Soviet Union moved in—economically, politically and militarily—to consolidate, as part of its empire, the territories already occupied by its armed forces. Simultaneously the United States was liquidating its wartime commitments to its European allies as quickly as—some might say more quickly than—it decently could. As a result Western Europe, in 1946–47, trembled on the verge of economic collapse; a collapse which its Moscow-oriented communist parties were fully prepared to exploit. In Germany, and especially in Berlin, democratic political parties fought what seemed to be a losing battle against strong, well-organized and confident communist opponents who for the past 15 years had been preparing for just such an opportunity. There was a widespread fear, not of Soviet military attack on Western Europe but of a disintegration of the whole political and economic structure that would make any such attack unnecessary.

It was to prevent such a disintegration that the United States initiated, in 1947, the European Recovery Program. This program may have had an unforeseen escalatory effect in that it was perceived by the Soviet Union as a threat to its own control of Eastern Europe, and so precipitated those actions in Prague and Berlin in 1948 that were read by many in the West as clear evidence of Soviet aggressive intentions. If the Russians were thwarted in their use of political means for attaining their objectives (so the argument went) might they not use military ones—unless they were deterred from doing so by the clear perception that any such move would bring them up against the enormous latent power of the United States?

II

This was the thinking that led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. Serious expectation of Soviet armed attack in Western Europe was still not very high. It was to increase dramatically for a few months at the time of the Korean War, but even then the Europeans were less conscious of any imminent "Soviet Threat" than they were of their own weakness, disunity and inability to cope with such a threat if one emerged. The American military presence was wanted in Western Europe, not just in the negative role of a *deterrent* to Soviet aggression, but in the positive role of a *reassurance* to the West Europeans; the kind of reassurance a child needs from its parents or an invalid from his doctors against dangers which, however remote, cannot be entirely discounted. This concept of reassurance

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has not, so far as I know, hitherto been a term of art in strategic analysis, but it should be, and so far as I am concerned it is now.

Whether the North Atlantic Treaty and the steps taken to implement it were really necessary to deter the Soviet Union from a military onslaught on Western Europe we cannot tell until the Russians are as generous with access to their official documents as we are in the West. It is, however, improbable, given both their historical record and their political philosophy, that they would have seriously contemplated such an action unless and until a recognizable "revolutionary situation" had developed in the West in which they could plausibly intervene to give fraternal support to the toiling masses and to a powerful indigenous communist party that would act as their agent in controlling the region after its conquest. These requirements seemed, in the 1940s, to be developing quite nicely. Within a decade they had disappeared. Whatever the effectiveness of deterrence, reassurance had worked.

The economy of Western Europe recovered, and with it the political self-confidence of the West Europeans. The communist parties withdrew from the center of the political stage to the periphery, and increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow. Serious fears of Soviet attack dwindled, and after Stalin's death they almost disappeared from the public consciousness. The outbreaks in Eastern Europe from 1953 onward showed that it was the Soviet Union that was now on the political defensive. Its treatment of the Hungarian rising in 1956 led to massive defections from, and splits within, the communist parties in the West. In West Germany the economic miracle sucked out of the Eastern zone, by the hundreds of thousands, precisely those well-qualified young people that the German Democratic Republic needed to reconstruct its own economy. By the end of the 1950s Western Europe was an economic powerhouse that would have dominated Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union had let it. A decade later it was beginning to rival its own protector.

During this period, the success of reassurance was, in some respects, an obstacle to deterrence. The peoples of Western Europe were so effectively reassured that they were prepared to run military risks that have given their military leaders nightmares for the past 30 years. In 1950 there may have been serious fears of Soviet attack. Three years later, when European statesmen came to consider the price which their military advisers had calculated, at the NATO Lisbon meeting in 1952, they would have to pay for a credible deterrent military posture, such fears had almost disappeared. The reestablishment of economic stability was consid-

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ered to demand overriding priority and the targets established at Lisbon for the immediate buildup of NATO forces went out of the window. In the judgment of the political leaders of Western Europe, the danger of the Soviet military attack did not appear great enough to warrant the costs involved in building up the kind of defensive forces that, on a purely military calculus, would be needed to deter it.

It was then that thermonuclear weapons came to the rescue of soldiers and politicians alike, providing a deterrent that appeared militarily credible at a socially acceptable cost. The long-term implications of depending on weapons of mass destruction for national security worried only a politically insignificant minority. Governments, and the majorities on which they relied, found in nuclear weapons so convenient a solution to their budgetary problems that they were adopted almost without question. Conventional forces, with all their heavy social costs, could be reduced to the status of tripwires, or, at most, of shields to repel an enemy assault for the brief time needed for the Strategic Air Command to strike decisively at targets within the Soviet Union. The critiques both of the moralists and of the military specialists made no impact on those real centers of power in Western governments, the treasuries, which owe their power to their capacity to reflect and enforce broadly accepted social priorities.

Whatever their defense specialists might tell them about the balance of military forces, the peoples of Western Europe, so long as they remained prosperous, saw little danger of Soviet attack and wanted defense on the cheap. They remained reassured, though whether this reassurance came from shrewdness or from self-delusion, from confidence in American nuclear supremacy or basic disbelief in the reality of any Soviet threat, it would probably be impossible to say. In any case throughout the 1950s and the 1960s deterrence and reassurance both worked. The Europeans did get defense on the cheap, as they were getting energy on the cheap, and, thanks to the benevolent Keynesianism of the ruling economic pundits, everything else on the cheap. As one European leader remarked of his own people, they had never had it so good.

Pleasant as this condition was so long as it lasted, it had two characteristics which in historical perspective emerge very clearly. One was that the credibility of the deterrent posture depended on a continuing American nuclear ascendancy over the Soviet Union. The second, and perhaps more significant, was that the peoples of Western Europe effectively abandoned responsibility for their own defense. Their own armed forces, forces which have always had

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the social role of embodying national self-consciousness and will to independent existence, became almost peripheral, part of a mechanism of nuclear deterrence the ultimate control of which lay elsewhere. The reluctance of the British and French governments to accept this situation and their development of strategic nuclear capabilities of their own have to be understood in these psychological terms, rather than those of the somewhat tortuous rationales which French and British officials now advance to justify their existence.

But even if these weapons do, however marginally, enhance national independence, they are not "popular" forces—forces, that is, with whose fortunes the nation can identify itself, as the British people identified themselves with the fortunes of their forces in the recent Falkland Islands campaign. And to show the significance of this fact, permit me a brief excursion into history.

III

Popular involvement in war, as all readers of Clausewitz will know, is a matter of comparatively recent origin. In the eighteenth century, wars in Europe were fought by specialists responsive only to the requirements of absolute governments; the less the population was involved in them the better. The role of the good citizen was to pay the taxes needed for the upkeep of these specialists, to acquiesce philosophically in any incidental hardships that their operations might cause him, and to keep his mouth shut. It was the French Revolution that (after the American Revolution) made popular involvement an intrinsic factor in war—a factor that was to become of growing importance until, in the First World War, it overshadowed everything else. In that conflict popular passion rather than military skill, much less political wisdom, determined the course of the war and ultimately its outcome.

In the Second World War popular participation was still an essential element, although the contribution of scientific and technical specialists was increasingly decisive. But in the nuclear age those specialists have again reduced peoples to the passive roles they played, or were supposed to play, in the eighteenth century. It is assumed that war, if it comes, will be fought for them by experts, over their heads.

The extent to which this has occurred can be seen by considering the debates over NATO strategy that have taken place, whether in official circles or in centers for strategic studies, during the past 20 years. Increasingly the defense of Western Europe has been considered simply as a problem of "extended deterrence" involving

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calculations of possibilities and probabilities as abstract as those of a chess game; a problem to be solved by various combinations and deployments of delivery systems, strategic, intermediate or tactical, land-based, sea-based or air-based, but all under American control. The expertise needed to make these calculations is shared only by small groups of specialists and officials in European defense ministries, who have seldom seen it as their duty to expound these calculations to a wider public. They are too abstract, too arcane. Whatever the merits of the argument, for example, that the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles had to be countered by the emplacement of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, it did not arise out of any profound and widely held anxiety among the peoples of Western Europe. It was a debate among specialists—and specialists who did not have the political antennae to foresee that such emplacement might make people feel more vulnerable rather than less.

This is not to say that the specialists are to blame for this failure in communication. In defense questions as in any other area of government—economic policy, for example, or finance—the layman does not expect to have to master the technical details. He employs the expert to handle them for him. In defense as in these other fields there is always likely to be a difference between expert and lay perceptions, and it is the job of political leadership to reconcile them. In the field of defense this difference appears nowhere more clearly than in the distinction I have made between reassurance and deterrence.

For the expert the two are indistinguishable. He will not believe his country to be safe unless he is satisfied that provision has been made to counter every option open to every likely adversary. The layman may be less demanding, but sometimes he is more. In certain moods, for example, the Congress of the United States has refused to be reassured by the deterrent posture that its military specialists have pronounced to be adequate. In Europe, on the other hand, the peoples of the Western democracies have accepted as amply reassuring a deterrent posture that their experts have repeatedly told them is dangerously inadequate, and if the events of the past 30 years are anything to go by, popular instinct has proved more reliable than expert fears. In spite of the repeated warnings of its military specialists, no threat has materialized. Instead, the prosperity of the West has reached unheard-of heights. It is the communist societies, those which 30 years ago seemed so psychologically as well as militarily menacing, that now appear to be on the verge of economic and political disintegration.

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IV

Since the system that we have adopted has proved so successful for so long, is there really anything for us to worry about? Is there any real need to reassess the requirements for defense, deterrence or reassurance for the 1980s and 1990s? I must admit once more to a historian's bias, which predisposes me to assume the obsolescence of any international structure with the passage of time. The Vienna settlement of 1814–15, for example, lasted for about 40 years. So did the Bismarckian settlement of the 1870s. The structure is bound to be transformed by the dynamics of social change, by the altered perspectives and beliefs of a new generation skeptical, and rightly so, about the settled assumptions of its predecessors. We must ask not only whether the existing solutions are still valid for the problems that evoked them, but whether the problems themselves remain unchanged, and whether attitudes stereotyped in the late 1940s will still be relevant half a century later.

There can be little doubt that since 1949 changes have occurred, both objective and subjective, on a scale comparable to those between 1815 and 1854, or 1870 and 1914: changes in the relationship between Western Europe and the United States, changes in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. These have been on a scale quite sufficient to compel a reappraisal of requirements for deterrence and reassurance established a generation ago.

The various causes and symptoms of transatlantic tension have been discussed so generally and so repeatedly that I propose to focus only on that most relevant to our problem, that is, the degree of anti-American sentiment now so evident in so many countries of Western Europe, to say nothing of the understandable resentment this has created in the United States. Opinion polls have revealed this anti-Americanism to be far less widespread than its more dramatic manifestations may sometimes suggest, but whatever its strength and incidence it is disturbing enough to demand an explanation and to be taken seriously into account. It indicates that, for an appreciable number of Europeans, what was once seen as the prime requirement of deterrence, that is, the commitment of American power to the defense of Western Europe, no longer provides the political reassurance that once it did; in some respects indeed the exact opposite. So far from the Americans being in Europe to help the West Europeans defend themselves, they are seen in some quarters as being here in order to prosecute

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"their" war—a war in which the Europeans have no interest and from which they will be the first to suffer.

How has such a widespread and grotesque misunderstanding come about? Obviously there is a whole complex of reasons, in which simple cultural friction plays its part. But it is at least in part the outcome of the process I have described, by which the defense of Europe has become perceived not as the responsibility of the Europeans themselves but increasingly in terms of a system of "extended nuclear deterrence" manipulated from the United States in accordance with strategic concepts with which few Europeans are familiar. If I may return to my historical discourse, in the eighteenth century the European bourgeoisie was well content to leave the conduct of war to its specialists and enjoy the improved quality of life made possible by that division of labor. But it was precisely this divorce of the bourgeoisie and their intelligentsia from the whole business of national defense that gave rise to the first peace movements. It was the intellectuals who maintained that, because wars were conducted by monarchical states with aristocratic-led professional soldiers, it was this war-making mechanism that actually *produced* wars, and that all that was needed to abolish war would be to abolish monarchs, aristocrats and the military profession, after which it could be assumed that the peoples of Europe would live together in peace and harmony.

The wars of the French Revolution were to disillusion them, as the First World War was to disillusion another generation of peace-bred intellectuals and the Second World War yet a third. But it takes only one generation of successful peacekeeping to engender the belief, among those not concerned with its mechanisms, that peace is a natural condition threatened only by those professionally involved in preparations for war. The military become the natural target for the idealistic young. And how much more will this be the case if those military are predominantly foreign; if the decision for peace or war appears to lie with a group of remote and uncontrollable decision-makers whose values and interests do not necessarily coincide with one's own; and if war is going to involve slaughter on so unimaginable a scale? Is it not the Americans who are actually provoking the war? So the growth of pacifism, always endemic in a society that delegates defense questions to specialists, has in contemporary Europe become associated with anti-Americanism, and derives from that a populist veneer that otherwise it might lack.

It is here that the change in the military balance comes in. I

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would not like to judge how far the effectiveness of American reassurance in the 1950s and 1960s was due to any general perception, in Western Europe, of American nuclear predominance. Certainly neither European nor American defense experts ever cited this as evidence for the credibility of nuclear deterrence, and the latter could seldom be persuaded to admit that any such predominance existed. One can only say that expectations of the damage Western Europe might suffer as a result of Soviet response to that American "first use" on which NATO strategy explicitly depended led to no widespread questioning on this side of the Atlantic of the validity of that strategy. It was the Americans, under then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who were unhappy about it, but they could find few Europeans, outside our tiny defense community, to share their doubts.

But in the last few years it has been clear to all, and publicly admitted by the United States, that the nuclear balance is one of parity—indeed, some American official utterances have tended to suggest that the Soviets may now be ahead in key respects. The fact that the present peace movement has become active in Western Europe in this situation may or may not be coincidental. It does mean, however, that the peace movement can now support its arguments with some fairly tough strategic analysis, and find more sympathy within the defense community than would have been the case 20 years ago. It is no longer just a minority of anti-militarist intelligentsia who question the validity and credibility of a deterrent posture which would, if activated, destroy everything it is concerned to defend.

The result of these developments has been a serious disjunction between deterrence and reassurance. The object of deterrence is to persuade an adversary that the costs to him of seeking a military solution to his political problems will far outweigh the benefits. The object of reassurance is to persuade one's own people, and those of one's allies, that the benefits of military action, or preparation for it, will outweigh the costs. It is true that Europeans were reassured in the 1950s not by any careful calculation of what they would lose or gain by war, but by their perception of the reverse—of how much the Russians would have to lose and how little to gain. They could threaten, or rather their allies could threaten, such cataclysmic damage to the enemy, at such low *immediate* social cost to themselves, that the risk of any comparable damage to themselves was seen as low enough to be tolerable.

This is the situation that has been changed by nuclear parity, and it is a change of which all Europeans and an increasing

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number of Americans have now become conscious. Defense specialists may be puzzled and scornful that people who have been under threat of nuclear attack for at least 20 years should only now be beginning to take the problem seriously, but that they have now begun to do so is a new political fact that governments will have to take into account. It is also apparent, at least in Europe, that reassurance cannot be reestablished by any improvement in the mechanism of deterrence, certainly not of nuclear deterrence. Perhaps the peoples of Western Europe ought to feel safer when the installation of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles has made clear our capacity to counter an SS-20 first strike, but I doubt whether they really will. Perhaps we ought all to feel safer if the United States were to develop the capacity to carry on, and "prevail" in, a prolonged nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. In fact, public opinion in Europe is appalled at the prospect—and so is much of it in the United States. In the calculus of nuclear deterrence both developments may appear appropriate, even necessary, but such a calculus does not translate easily into the language of political reassurance; certainly not in Europe where any nuclear exchange, on however limited a scale, spells almost inconceivable disaster. Limited nuclear options do not look very attractive if we are likely to be one of them ourselves.

Any consideration of domestic consensus on defense questions must therefore begin with the realization that in Europe the Soviet Union is seen as less of a danger than the prospect of nuclear war. I state this dogmatically and can support the statement with no evidence from opinion polls. It is an impression gained from a wide study of the press, the media, and discussion with friends and colleagues outside the defense community. It is also important to realize that the nuclear war anticipated is not seen as one arising out of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, but rather from some self-sustaining process of escalation, perhaps originating in an extra-European conflict but essentially caused by the whole apparatus of nuclear weaponry in some way "getting out of control." Nuclear war is widely seen as a *Ding an Sich*, unrelated to the existing political situation or to any security requirements likely to arise out of it. It is therefore against the prospect of nuclear war itself, rather than that of Soviet attack, that the Europeans now require reassurance, and any measures taken to deal with the latter that make the former seem more likely will continue to be deeply disruptive.

The explanation that any measures effective in deterring Soviet attack make nuclear war *less* likely is no longer, for many Euro-

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peans, altogether persuasive. As fears of nuclear war become detached from fears of Soviet attack, so reassurance becomes divorced from deterrence. And it must be admitted that those calculations of nuclear strategy so distressingly prevalent in the United States, which take place in a kind of empyrean remote from the political realities of Europe or anywhere else, have powerfully contributed to this divorce.

V

How are we to deal with this problem? How are deterrence and reassurance to be once more reconciled? This is the task that will confront statesmen and strategists for the rest of this century.

The task is complicated by differing perspectives on either side of the Atlantic as to what it is that we have to deter. The difference between European and American readings of Soviet power and intentions have here to be accepted as given: the fact that as European fears of Soviet aggression have waned over the past 30 years, so American fears have grown; the curious phenomenon that the countries most directly threatened by Soviet military power, West Germany and France, are those most confident of their ability to handle the Soviet Union through the normal machinery of diplomatic and political intercourse, while for the most remote, the most powerful and the least threatened of the allies, the United States, the Soviet Union still bulks as a figure of almost cosmic evil with which no real dialogue is possible.

Whether the European attitude is the result of greater wisdom or merely of wishful thinking is a matter that we could debate endlessly. But I believe that a significant element in this difference of view lies in the degree to which we Europeans have abandoned the primary responsibility for our defense to the United States; have come to take the deterrence provided by others for granted; and now assume that the dangers against which we once demanded reassurance only now exist in the fevered imagination of our protectors. A certain American tendency to hyperbole, an attachment to worst-case analysis and some unfortunate attempts to make our flesh creep with official Pentagon publications in gorgeous technicolor whose statistics have been questioned even by European defense specialists, none of this has helped improve matters. Such propagandistic efforts are widely discounted, and even when they are believed they are likely to engender not so much resolution as despair.

Our first task must therefore be to get Soviet power and intentions into perspective. The exaggerated melodrama implied

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in the term "the Soviet Threat" seems and has always seemed to me unnecessary and counterproductive. There is a major problem of ideological hostility, and a major problem (though one not to be exaggerated) of military imbalance between a power the size of the Soviet Union and the smaller, even if richer and more dynamic, states of Western Europe. One does not have to attribute to the Soviet Union either predatory intentions or ambitions for global conquest to make clear to all but a stubborn minority that the states of Western Europe have a problem of military security that must be solved if normal intercourse with the Soviet Union is to be sustained on a basis of equality. The Soviet Union has shown itself to be no more reluctant to use military means to solve political problems, when it can get away with it, than anyone else. It is not difficult to reach consensus within most groups of West Europeans that Western Europe needs defenses against the Soviet Union. Where consensus breaks down is over the question, whether Europe can possibly be defended by nuclear war.

The second task therefore is to show that Europe *can* be defended, and that the costs of doing so would not outweigh the benefits. These costs must be seen as twofold: the prospective costs of war, whether nuclear or conventional, with which public opinion is chiefly concerned, and the immediate costs of an economic kind, which are what worry governments. It is easy enough to say that no price is too high for the preservation of our independence, but it does not quite work out like that. Governments are concerned with independence, but they are also concerned with social stability. Even in the darkest days of the cold war the "Soviet Threat" was seen as ancillary to, and only given credibility by, the danger of social disintegration in the West. It is still generally assumed that a stable and prosperous Western Europe will not present an attractive target to Soviet ambitions. Defense expenditure has therefore to be fitted into a general framework of economic policy in which the maintenance of an industrious economy and a high level of social welfare (so far as these can be reconciled) must enjoy an overriding priority. This assumption has not altered over the past 30 years, nor is it likely to change much over the next 30.

During the past 30 years this problem of costs was, as we have seen, taken care of by nuclear deterrence. The immediate costs were kept acceptably low, the risk of incurring the ultimate costs seemed acceptably slight. Now, although there is a far greater reluctance to incur those long-term risks, there is no greater readiness to accept any increase in immediate costs, especially

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during a period of recession when the danger of social instability seems greater than at any time since the 1940s. Again, it is easy to say that no price should be too high for the avoidance of nuclear war. But for governments concerned with their everyday tasks nuclear war still remains a remote if terrifying hypothesis, while mass unemployment, commercial bankruptcies and industrial discontent are an imminent reality. A society where domestic consensus has collapsed is in no position to fight a war, nuclear or otherwise.

So where does this leave us? First, the requirement for effective deterrence remains, if only because the Soviet Union cannot be expected to observe a higher standard of conduct toward weaker neighbors than other states, whatever their political complexion, have shown in the past. Second, deterrence can no longer depend on the threat of a nuclear war, the costs of which would be grotesquely out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to be derived from engaging in it. Third, proposals to make nuclear war "fightable," let alone "winnable," by attempting to limit its targets and control its course, however much sense this may make in the military grammar of deterrence, are not persuasive in the political language of reassurance. And, finally, the problem cannot be solved by any massive transfer of resources to conventional capabilities. The immediate social costs of doing so, whether one likes it or not, are unacceptably high.

VI

Whatever the solution may be, I do not believe that it can be found at the macro-level of nuclear deterrence. There is a point beyond which the elaboration of nuclear arsenals ceases to bear any evident relation to the real problems faced by political communities, and so far as Europe is concerned we passed that point long ago. It must be sought at the micro-level of the peoples, the societies that have to be defended, and for whose political cohesion, moral resolution and military preparedness nuclear weapons can no longer provide a credible substitute.

There has been for many years what I can only describe as a morally debilitating tendency among European defense specialists to argue that if the reassurance provided by the American nuclear guarantee were to be in any way diminished, European morale would collapse. This has always seemed to me one of those unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecies, and one that American defense analysts have taken altogether too seriously. The reassurance on which most Europeans rely is the presence among them of

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American troops; a presence that makes the defense of West European territory appear a feasible proposition and has encouraged us to make greater provision for our own defense.

What is needed today is a reversal of that process whereby European governments have sought greater security by demanding an ever greater intensification of the American nuclear commitment; demands that are as divisive within their own countries as they are irritating for the people of the United States. Instead, we should be doing all that we can to reduce our dependence on American nuclear weapons by enhancing, so far as is militarily, socially and economically possible, our capacity to defend ourselves.

By "defend ourselves" I mean defend ourselves in the conventional sense with conventional weapons. I know that this view will not be universally popular. It is often argued that no such defense is possible unless we are prepared to turn Western Europe into an armed camp, a proposition that would be true only if we intended to fight a total war aiming at the destruction of the Soviet armed forces and the dictation of peace in Moscow. It is argued that, whatever effort we made, the Soviet armed forces would ultimately overwhelm us. Of course they could, if they were prepared to pay the price; which is why I for one would be unwilling explicitly to renounce under any circumstances the use of nuclear weapons. But the price can be a high one, even without recourse to these. It has been argued that, for those exposed to it, conventional war is no less terrible than nuclear war, and indeed events in the Lebanon have shown us just how terrible it can be—especially for those who have no means of defending themselves. But terrible as conventional war would be in Europe, nuclear war would be unimaginably, unendurably worse. Modern societies recover from conventional war within a generation. Whether humanity would ever recover from nuclear war is a matter for legitimate doubt.

Let us remember what we are trying to do. It is to deter the Soviet Union from using military force to solve its political differences with the West; deter them in a way that will be credible to their leaders and acceptable—reassuring—to our own peoples. It is to make clear to the Soviet Union that in any attack on the West the costs will hugely outweigh the benefits, and to our own people that the benefits of such a defense will outweigh the costs. We have to make it clear to our potential adversaries that there can be no easy military solution to their political problems, no "quick fix." And this is best done by showing that any attack would be met by lethally efficient armed forces, backed

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up and where necessary assisted by a resolute and prepared population; with the distinct possibility that the conflict might escalate to nuclear war and the certainty that, *even if it did not*, their armed forces would suffer casualties out of all proportion to any likely gains.

I admit that this is an ideal model to which we can hope only to approximate, but I defy anyone to think of a better. The only likely alternative indeed is one of inadequate, ill-equipped and undertrained forces, fighting on behalf of a divided or an indifferent population and dependent on an American President being prepared to sanction a nuclear release that would certainly destroy all they were fighting to defend and might very well unleash a global holocaust. That is the prospect that worries so many of us today, and the peace movement is only articulating, in extreme form, many widespread and legitimate doubts.

To escape from this situation and move toward the goal I have suggested would mean a change of emphasis from nuclear deterrence to conventional, or even unconventional, defense. It would mean a shifting of primary responsibility to the Europeans for the defense of our own continent; and it might involve a greater degree of popular participation in defensive preparations, participation the more likely to be forthcoming if it is clear that such preparations were predominantly non-nuclear. An invitation to participate in such preparations would indeed be the acid test for the peace movement, sorting out those who were interested only in making moral gestures and those whose sympathies lie on the other side of the Iron Curtain from the great majority of thoughtful citizens seriously concerned with questions of defense.

Progress along these lines, however modest, would do much to resolve the difficulties within the Alliance and create what Professor Lawrence Freedman has called "a more mature relationship." It would create a defense posture acceptable to our own people as well as credible to our potential adversaries. It would not solve the problem of deterring a first nuclear strike by the opposition. For that, as for much else, the Europeans must continue to depend on the United States, and few Americans would wish it otherwise. But this reliance must be placed in perspective. A Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, or the plausible threat of one, is not utterly inconceivable, and it is certainly an option that we need to deter. But it does not rank high on the list of political probabilities, and the measures taken to counter it should not be regarded or depicted as being basic to European defense. The necessity for such countermeasures should be fully and publicly

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explained, but they should be put in the context of the fundamental task which only non-nuclear forces can effectively carry out—*the defense of territory*. Nuclear deterrence needs to be subordinated to this primary task of territorial defense, and not vice versa.

It is the reassertion of this order of priorities, this reuniting of deterrence and reassurance, that seems to me basic for the creation of consensus within the Alliance over the requirements for the defense of the West in the 1980s, or indeed for however long it may take to establish such intimate and friendly relations with the Soviet Union that defense becomes a pure formality. And in order to maintain consensus, the achievement of this relationship must be seen to be our long-term goal. I hope it goes without saying that any developments along the lines I have proposed should go hand in hand with arms control initiatives, both to eliminate unnecessary causes of tension and to keep the costs of defense on both sides down to socially acceptable levels. But we should not allow ourselves to expect any miraculous breakthroughs as a result of such initiatives, or be unduly depressed or bitter if they fail. This "dual track" is essential to effective reassurance: peoples expect their governments to provide them with adequate protection, but they also expect them to seek peace and ensue it, and if they are not seen to be doing so, consensus over defense will crumble away.

Above all we must stop being frightened, and trying to frighten each other, with specters either of Soviet "windows of opportunity" or of the prospect of inevitable, self-generating nuclear war. Defense will continue to be a necessity in a world of sovereign states. Nuclear war is a terrible possibility that nothing can now eradicate, but of whose horrors we must never lose sight. To deal with the dilemma arising from these twin evils we need clear heads, moral courage, human compassion, and, above all, a sense of proportion. The main condition for consensus in the 1980s is in fact that we should all grow up. This, unfortunately, may be the most difficult requirement of all.

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Eliot A. Cohen

THE LONG-TERM CRISIS OF THE ALLIANCE

That the Western Alliance is undergoing one of its recurrent crises is beyond doubt: the important question is whether this crisis is different in nature and more perilous in its likely outcome than those of the past.[1] If NATO simply faces the chronic tensions of an alliance constructed of 16 members of varying size, geographic location and temperament, there is little cause for concern. The disputes of the moment—the questions of trade with the Soviet Union (including the Euro-Soviet natural gas pipeline) and European theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization—will be resolved by inelegant but workable compromises; the petty resentments of the moment will be understood as such: fits of pique which lead to the spats common to any couple, no matter how secure their marriage.

Even if we assume that the disputes are serious ones, it is possible to argue that differences between Europeans and Americans could have been avoided, and can be resolved by enlightened statesmen. In this view the disagreements are major but amenable to solution. What is needed is intensive investigation of the merits of each issue coupled with a strenuous effort by politicians to change their way of doing business. One version of this argument is that the current crisis has been produced by the gaucherie and diplomatic ineptitude of two American Presidents, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and can be remedied if the second will only try to acquire some worldly wisdom. To continue the marital metaphor: husband and wife quarrel over where to live or what house to buy. Generosity, good sense and tact are needed—indeed, in their absence a serious breach may occur—but the dispute can be resolved on its own terms.

The third possibility, and unfortunately, the one closest to the

[1] A spectrum of opinion on this matter can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, "NATO at Thirty: Variations on Old Themes," *International Security*, Summer 1979, pp. 88–107; Robert J. Art, "Fixing Atlantic Bridges," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1982, pp. 86–104; Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?" *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1979, pp. 45–53.

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truth, is that profound antipathies imperil the marriage. The current crisis of NATO is, in fact, a structural one, which no accommodations on such issues as the Euro-Soviet gas pipeline or TNF can solve. Forces beyond the control of any statesman, no matter how skilled or dedicated, have jeopardized the very survival of the Alliance.

To be sure, observers have, since the early 1970s, identified three developments likely to cause tension in the Atlantic Alliance: Europe's economic recovery and rivalry with the United States; the "decoupling" effects of parity in nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union; and the widely different views Americans and Europeans hold concerning the benefits and costs of détente.[2] By themselves, however, these factors do not pose a mortal threat to the Alliance. The Western economies compete as much with Japan as with the United States and, in any event, economic disputes (over steel pricing, for example) are more amenable to compromise than other issues. The strategic decoupling problem has plagued the Alliance ever since the Soviets acquired the ability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. The effectiveness of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe has rested primarily on an admittedly uncertain, but nonetheless intimidating, prospect of American strikes to protect American troops, if no one else.

The problem of opposing views of détente is a more serious one; however, we must regard it as part of a larger problem than that of differing benefits from the relaxation of tensions between East and West. Certainly the Europeans gained more materially and psychologically from détente than did the United States. Nonetheless, détente did, after all, help the United States to contain the diplomatic damage consequent upon its withdrawal from Vietnam, to curtail some costly arms expenditures, and to allow the development of a considerable trade with the Soviet Union. Whether détente also, as its critics suggest, caused the United States to disarm psychologically is an open question. The root of the current problem, however, lies in the European belief that détente can and should continue, and the American conviction that it cannot and ought not.

If these three developments—economic rivalry, strategic parity, different views of détente—do not in and of themselves portend a crisis, why then should we think one exists? The answer lies foremost in the increasing asperity of NATO debates over a range

[2] See the lucid summary in Karl Kaiser *et al.*, *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981.

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of issues, a bitterness of tone which stems not from the specific disputes but from a larger sense of mistrust. On both sides of the Atlantic, unilateralists and neutralists of various hues attack the structure and spirit of the generation-old Alliance[3]

This degeneration in tone and the divergence over substance between America and Europe become most alarming when one considers the context in which they occur. Alliance disharmony has increased even as we have seen a menacing multifaceted assertion of Soviet strength: the invasion of Afghanistan; the acquisition and reinforcement of client states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia; the suppression of Poland; and the dismantling of the Soviet dissident movement. A gradual but relentless military buildup has enabled the Soviet Union to eliminate many of the strategic and tactical nuclear disadvantages under which it labored during the 1950s and 1960s. Soviet land forces have grown in size and sophistication in both the Chinese and European theaters, while a substantial strategic reserve has been enlarged. The Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense force to a blue water fleet, and the Soviet Union now possesses a capacity for air and sealift comparable, if yet inferior, to that of the United States.

Moreover, the crisis of the Alliance occurs despite the solutions of what initially promised to be its knottiest problems. In 1949 decolonization and German rearmament posed the greatest threats to the American-European Alliance, and yet both were achieved without visible lasting damage. None of the Alliance's leading politicians today are nearly as obstructionist as General de Gaulle, whose withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure of NATO presented a third shock to the Alliance. Nor is the notion that the past two American presidents deserve the burden of blame for the deterioration in U.S.-European relations a correct one. The current period of tension began in 1973, despite the presence in office of a President and Secretary of State who admired and advocated a version of Realpolitik familiar and congenial to Europeans. The problem worsened during the Carter years, despite the commitment of his Administration to increased allocation of American defense resources to Europe, and to such measures as coproduction of weapons. Indeed, a careful examination of the record of American administrations since the early 1970s reveals great continuity in the substance of policy, despite oscillation in the rhetoric which has presented it.

The Alliance's present crisis is a severe one. Even if we assume that the TNF modernization and Siberian natural-gas pipeline

[3] See Theodore Draper, "The Dilemma of the West," *Encounter*, March 1982, pp. 8–21.

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issues are finally resolved, there is good reason to believe that a larger and perhaps fatal crisis may await us in the next two decades. To understand why this is so we must look at four long-term difficulties.

II

The greatest danger to the Alliance arises from the psychological relationship between the United States and an Old World dependent for its very survival on the arms of the New. As Raymond Aron has said, "By its very nature, Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its own defense is unhealthy."[4] Once Europe had recovered from the devastation of World War II—let us say, for the sake of convenience, by 1960—the relationship of protector and protected was likely to evoke arrogance and condescension from the one side, resentment and irresponsibility from the other. To be sure, this is hardly a novel observation. What has not been sufficiently appreciated, however, is that under these conditions the relationship will not remain constant but rather will deteriorate. The more prosperous and self-confident the Europeans become, the greater will be their petulance; the more harried the Americans feel, the greater will be their umbrage.

Two factors make the relationship all the more tense. First, the formal organization of NATO and the rhetoric which justifies it utterly belie the reality of the Alliance. "The Western Alliance is an alliance of equals. Its cohesion is therefore based on the greatest possible realization of the principles of equal risks, equal burdens, and equal security."[5] Distinguished experts assert this, but it is patently false nonetheless. 300,000 European troops do not stand guard on the Rio Grande, and the United States does not call on France or Great Britain (much less Germany or the Benelux) to bolster America's own defense by giving guarantees to wage nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The preservation of a free Europe is vital to American security, but American power is vital to European survival.

Second, despite efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to forget the history of Atlantic relations before 1945, the old perceptions—deeply rooted in both cultures—remain. Many Europeans then as today despised the vulgarity and provincialism of American culture while they feared the bluster and crudeness of American

[4] Raymond Aron, "Ideology in Search of a Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World, 1981, p. 508.

[5] Karl Kaiser *et al.*, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 1161.

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power. In the words of a recent British ambassador:

> It boosted and boosts European morale to spotlight American errors, to savor its failures, to exploit its market, to resent its overseas investments, to have a critic's ringside seat at its global tribulations, to mock its culture, to deride its leaders.[6]

For their part, Americans in large measure still believe in the exceptionality of their regime and its superiority to all others. In current American denunciations of the allies for failure to share the burdens of defense and for supine willingess to appease commissars and sheikhs, one hears echoes of the rhetoric of 50 or 75 years ago, when Europe was perceived as the playground of cunning and duplicitous politicians eager to entangle America in European broils.

The experience of World War II suppressed, for a time, these states of mind. Americans felt themselves more than ever part of a common Atlantic civilization threatened by two lethal strains of barbarism. Their pity for a Europe wasted by war matched European gratitude for American aid and protection, and European admiration for triumphant America's political and economic system. On both sides of the Atlantic, two generations—that which directed World War II and that which filled its armies—were profoundly affected. From their ranks came the statesmen who founded the Alliance and led it during its first quarter-century.[7]

Within the next few decades a new generation will take over, one molded not by World War II or the cold war (whose periodic Berlin crises reinforced the sense of an embattled but free Atlantic community) but by Vietnam, Watergate and the social turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Perhaps, as Josef Joffe has suggested, each country's successor generation will see its interests clearly, without "misperception or false consciousness."[8] But this is cold comfort, for the strength and stability of NATO rests as much on bonds of sentiment as on calculations of benefit.[9] A profound sense of comity has lubricated the delicate machinery of alliance. In its absence, friction will build, and the machine may come creaking to a halt.

[6] Peter Jay, quoted in Theodore Draper, "The Western Misalliance," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, p. 62.

[7] See Marion Dönhoff, "Bonn and Washington: The Strained Relationship," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1056.

[8] Josef Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, p. 846.

[9] See Lester B. Pearson, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1949, p. 378.

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III

The second great threat to the Alliance stems from the changing nature of the Soviet challenge. The steady Soviet buildup (which began in the mid-1960s and continues today at a rate of increase of some four-and-a-half percent per year) will pose in and of itself certain threats to the Alliance. The United States (whose own force modernization was delayed by the Vietnam War, when funds went to expansion and combat replacement, not new development and acquisition) finds itself hard put to redress simultaneously the nuclear and conventional balances. The possibility that space may become a new arena of competition and the need to cope with the first threat to American naval supremacy in 40 years will place heavy demands on the American defense budget. One place to seek economies will inevitably be in forces in Europe or those committed to their reinforcement.

The Soviet buildup, however, would be less threatening were it not accompanied by an aggressive Soviet politico-military policy. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked a departure in Soviet policy. For the first time since World War II, Soviet troops were in action beyond the borders of the Soviet Empire. Moreover, in Cuba and, to a lesser extent, East Germany, the Soviet Union has found militarily potent clients to gain positions in Africa and, possibly, in Latin America. In the 1950s and 1960s the West feared communist subversion: now it faces the prospect of outright Soviet military intervention as well.

All this amounts to an increasingly serious threat to Western security outside the traditional NATO area. So far, at least, the European powers have been unwilling to extend NATO, while the United States feels itself hard put to cope singlehandedly with the Soviet threat. If, as can be assumed even under the new leadership, the Soviets continue to press their military advantages overseas, NATO will face two strains: a material strain on American resources leading to increasingly embittered relations if the Europeans should fail to ease that squeeze, and a deepening of mistrust should European powers attempt to maintain a continental détente in the midst of a global cold war.

Ironically, however, the Alliance will be threatened by Soviet weakness as much as by Soviet strength. The decay of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the failure of the siege economy (worsened by the cost of supporting militarily potent but economically feeble clients such as Cuba and Vietnam), the demographic problem, and the growth of unrest in Eastern Europe combine to threaten the stability, and perhaps in the long run even the existence, of

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the Soviet regime and its dominions. This will make the world increasingly unstable. We can find an instructive analogy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the start of the twentieth century, which reacted to stagnation and ethnic turmoil at home with a belligerent policy abroad.

The American and European views of the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 suggest that Americans and Europeans will react very differently to these challenges to the Soviet imperium. In essence, the Europeans cling to George F. Kennan's version of containment, hoping that if the West prevents further expansion of the Soviet Union into Europe, the Soviet regime will, after a time, mellow. The prospect of successful revolts in Eastern Europe may alarm them more than that of successful Soviet repression, for such revolts could increase the likelihood of war in Europe. In addition, like Kennan, the Europeans tend to see the U.S.S.R. more as a successor to the Tsarist regime than as a qualitatively different one. Because of this they will oppose policies which, they think, may only serve to push the new leadership toward an equally, or even more, assertive Russian-chauvinist military dictatorship.

Most Americans, on the other hand, have long viewed the conflict between East and West as one driven by ideology rather than by national ambition. Shielded by their own nuclear deterrent and menaced by Soviet-backed communist regimes in many parts of the globe (including the Caribbean), Americans may be more eager than the Europeans to work for the eventual disintegration of the Soviet empire, more willing to take political and economic steps (embargoes and the like) to hasten that day, and more willing to engage directly Soviet clients such as Cuba in order to quicken the collapse of Soviet power. For over three decades, containment has worked in some places (Europe, Iran, Korea) and not in others (Southeast Asia, Afghanistan). This is inevitable when foreign policy is based on an essentially reactive principle. If, as is possible, President Reagan's successors continue to promote a policy aimed at weakening the Soviet empire rather than parrying its periodic thrusts, the Alliance will have two fundamentally different and incompatible approaches to the central issue of Western foreign policy.

IV

It would be absurd to suggest that the turmoil in the Third World is directed by and for the purposes of Moscow. It would be wrong, however, to deny that Moscow takes advantage of such

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instability, feeding it with weapons, advice and propaganda, and it would be folly to suggest that, simply because a rebellion or an invasion is not controlled by Moscow, it poses no threat to the West. It is dubious, to say the least, that Ayatollah Khomeini takes orders from the Kremlin, but that makes the Iranian revolutionary state no less a threat to American and European interests. The questions to be asked are: What is the nature of the threats to Western interests in the Third World? What resources does the Alliance have to cope with them?

To answer the second question first: during NATO's first two decades the United States could count to some extent on the colonial powers, and above all on Great Britain, to cope with extra-European threats to Western security. In the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Africa, Britain retained not only political influence but also forces adequate to intervene where necessary—as in Kuwait in 1961. At NATO's inception it was not assumed that the United States would take on global responsibilities, but rather that it could rely heavily on British forces overseas.[10] Despite the loss of India, Britain remained the world's second naval power, retained a large and capable army and had a network of overseas bases second to none. As late as 1968 Britain played a critical politico-military role in the Persian Gulf.

But Britain did not, and indeed could not, sustain the role of the world's third major power. The brutal treatment meted out by the United States at Suez confirmed what many Britons had sensed for some time, that the British Empire was no longer a superpower. The trauma of two world wars, the inevitable enfeeblement of Commonwealth allegiances, economic decline at home, and the lack of a rationale for a global strategic network once India gained independence—all of these led Britain to willingly accept a secondary role in world affairs. The 1982 Falklands War with Argentina, despite its successful outcome, revealed how much British capabilities had shrunk since the 1950s.

The other former colonial powers, with the exception of France, retain little capacity and no inclination to intervene abroad. French resources, however, are absorbed in the management of an extensive African sphere of influence, the construction of an independent nuclear deterrent, and the maintenance of a sizable continental army as well as substantial Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets. Because of the French decision to maintain armed forces which in scope, but not size, resemble those of the super-

[10] See, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and the Defense of the Grey Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1955, p. 427.

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powers, she possesses little surplus power, even were she prepared to cooperate openly with the United States. France is a European and an African power, but cannot, despite her claims, be a global one.

In summary, the United States has now assumed the global role which it formerly shared with the European powers—during a period when its once effortless naval supremacy has vanished and when other threats to its security (in the Caribbean and the field of strategic nuclear forces) have grown. All this would be acceptable, perhaps, if the dangers to Western security were the same or fewer than in the past. Such, however, is not the case.

The prospect of greater global instability is a certain one. Bloody coup attempts in such putatively secure Third World countries as Kenya, the potential disintegration of the Organization of African Unity, the metastasis of insurrection and civil war in Central America, and the continuing power of militant Islam—all point to a more troubled world. The new states no longer have the reality of even the recent memory of the anticolonial struggle to inspire them: instead, they face uncontrolled population growth, an uncertain world economy, a lack of national identity, and the dislocation caused by overly rapid urbanization.

As a general matter, then, the United States can expect new threats to its security to boil up in various corners of the world, including its own backyard. The most serious threat to its security and that of the entire West lies, needless to say, in the Persian Gulf. That region is vital to American security despite the fact that the United States could, in a pinch, dispense with its oil, which provides only some ten percent of U.S. needs. The economies of Europe and, above all, Japan need Persian Gulf oil to function, and the economic collapse of those countries could not help but threaten the world order the United States has sought since 1945.

The threats to the security of oil supplies are numerous and varied and have increased since the Iranian Revolution. Of these the threat of Soviet invasion of the area is one, albeit the least likely. The possibilities of Iranian assaults on the lesser Gulf states and of domestic upheaval, in Iran or elsewhere, are more serious. Here too we see a fundamental divergence between European and American views. The Europeans have argued that in most cases military force cannot secure the West's oil supplies; they have urged instead such political measures as a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Americans, on the other hand, see a need to develop a powerful interventionary force, composed of naval, land

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and air elements, backed by extraordinary logistical support, to cope with the whole spectrum of threats to the region.

The Americans disagree with the Europeans not only over the utility or impotence of military force, but over the related issues of Middle East politics. The two sides differ greatly in their attitudes toward Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the modalities of Middle East diplomacy. Europeans perennially see American policy as excessively pro-Israel and heavily influenced by domestic political factors; and Americans see Europe seemingly motivated by a myopic and cowardly concern for the continuity of its oil supplies. In particular, the failure of NATO nations to support American diplomatic and, more important, military action during the October 1973 war left deep scars, and to many Americans rendered questionable the military value of having substantial bases, forces, and war stocks in Europe.

For better or worse, the American strategic and diplomatic approaches have prevailed, mainly because the Europeans are impotent to oppose them. A Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) now is expected to be made up of a 300,000-man, four-service, triphibious force of intervention, which only the United States has the resources and will to provide. The RDF would, in all probability, only be deployed if lesser, more covert forms of action (such as that undertaken by Britain in Oman during the 1970s) should fail.

Nonetheless, the RDF causes two difficulties for the Alliance. First, some of the American forces which compose it must be diverted from the mission of European defense: much of the RDF is currently allocated to European reinforcement. In the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union which coincided with or included a crisis in the Persian Gulf, an extremely difficult choice would have to be made. Moreover, the eventual creation of an Indian Ocean fleet and the increased logistical support needed will either demand increases in the defense budget or allocation of money away from the Army and to the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, i.e., away from Europe.

Second, it will be politically difficult to use the RDF without one of two European responses. Either sizable European forces must join the RDF and fight alongside it (unlikely, given continuing European disagreements with American policy in the Arab world and the region), or the European powers must substantially relieve American forces on their own front. True enough, American intervention in the Persian Gulf would serve the American na-

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tional interest whether or not European soldiers fought side by side with American troops. Such excessively rational calculations, however, would not convince the American public that their sons, husbands and brothers should die to keep French, Dutch, German and Japanese homes warm and factories running.

V

The final source of Atlantic tension arises from America's pressing need to reorder her military institutions. In retrospect, it is astonishing that this has not been done earlier, that the last great wave of military reform in the United States occurred in the late 1940s, before the shape of America's long-term politico-military position became clear. As Great Britain discovered, world power requires unique, carefully crafted and balanced military institutions, institutions quite different from those of continental powers.

The fundamental problem which American strategists must grapple with is the disproportion between America's military resources and her global political commitments. The indisputable fact of military overextension has already touched off a hot debate between "Atlanticists" on the one hand and "globalists," or "navalists," on the other.[11] During the 1860s, the first two decades of this century, and the 1920s, Great Britain found itself in a similar predicament and found it necessary to withdraw from some areas and reinforce others, to drop some friendships and cultivate new ones. In all three cases the gap between foreign commitments and the armed forces needed to honor them required profound institutional reform, the destruction of old institutions and the creation of new ones, such as the Cardwell system of regimental organization, the British Expeditionary Force, the Territorial Army, and the Committee on Imperial Defence.

The emerging debate over the Joint Chiefs of Staff system suggests that the United States is reacting similarly to a similar predicament. As many critics have pointed out, the current system assigns too much power to the individual services, too little to the Joint Staff.[12] The result is that service chiefs seek unanimity

[11] See Robert Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 1124–44; Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 122–35.

[12] Even elements in the Navy, traditionally the most independent of the services, have come around to this view. See the May, June, July, and August 1982 issues of *Armed Forces Journal International*.

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through compromise and incremental change. A powerful Joint Staff could be expected to take a more global point of view, to grapple with such questions as whether the Army should consist in the main of "heavy" divisions to fight in Europe, or "light" divisions to fight elsewhere, whether the Navy should consist primarily of forces designed to protect convoys of troops heading for Europe, or whether it should be designed to win command of the sea and project force ashore.

In short, the effort to fashion a coherent American military policy in an age of increased threats, whether it results in a new Joint Chiefs of Staff system or not, will highlight the disproportionality of American commitments to NATO, and the role which inertia, rather than foresight, has played in this respect. This attempt is already under way, and indeed has already had the effect of strengthening those services least involved in the European theater: the Marine Corps and the Navy. The rise of relatively well-informed civilian critics of the defense establishment, politicians such as Senator Gary Hart and journalists such as James Fallows, who cogently deplore particular policies, rather than abstractions such as "the military-industrial complex," has made the American public aware that difficult choices must be made. The quiet emergence of a new generation of professional military intellectuals, such as Admiral Stansfield Turner and Colonel Harry G. Summers, suggests that the military as well is preparing to grapple with such problems.

This upcoming reorientation of America's defenses, necessary though it is, poses obvious dangers to the Alliance, and, indeed, it is vital that the incipient battle between Atlanticists and globalists be toned down. The Atlanticists would have America maintain her current type and level of commitment to Europe and thus follow a policy which, as we have argued above, will lead to the collapse of the Alliance they rightly seek to preserve. The globalists would have America unilaterally and radically devalue the Alliance and thereby bring her, unwillingly but inevitably, to the same result. In either case America would suffer a severe defeat, for all must admit that the European Alliance has been the keystone of her postwar foreign policy. The globalists are correct in thinking that the United States must recast its deployments and force structures; they are wrong in thinking that it can do so without the most careful effort to preserve and revitalize NATO.

The debate over America's force structure—"heavy" versus "light" divisions, for example—will likely remain a constricted one, conducted mainly in professional forums. The question of conscription, however, will at some point spill into the voting

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booth, the courtroom, and perhaps the streets. Opposition to a peacetime draft—certainly to a draft of the kind that requires two years of military service anywhere in the world—is deeply rooted in American political culture.[13] Moreover, as a purely prudential matter, the lessons of Vietnam and the French and British overseas experience (the Falklands War, for example) would seem to indicate that volunteer professional armies are best suited for the small wars which a world power must fight. And yet, the sheer size of America's active forces—which today number more in relation to population than those of West Germany—coupled with the shrinking recruiting base of draft-age young men (from 8,800,000 18 to 21 year olds in 1979 to only 7,500,000 in 1988) suggests that either force levels must be cut, or the draft reintroduced. This issue will become especially acute if the current Reagan five-year defense program, which envisages a substantial increase in military personnel, stays on course.

To be sure, the Defense Department has met current recruiting goals, thanks in large measure to economic recession. Nonetheless, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), particularly the Army, has yet to attract the same percentage of well-educated young men that it did during the draft period. The relatively low enlistment quotas have created an Army incapable of fighting even a small war without a reserve mobilization—a time-consuming, awkward and politically difficult task. In addition, unlike its European allies, the United States lacks a substantial reserve of trained men to fill the ranks in the event of a protracted or large-scale conventional war.

The combination of shrinking age cohorts, economic prosperity and a more traditional (i.e., restricted) use of women in the armed forces will force the United States to choose among three options: a draft, a decrease in the size of the Army, and an across-the-board cut in manpower levels. The last seems unlikely, given the current consensus in favor of a large air force and naval expansion. When the choice is made, as it must be in the next few years, there will be numerous voices raised to call for the withdrawal of divisions from Europe and the reduction of forces slated for wartime deployment there, instead of a return to the draft. These voices will carry political weight. Many Europeans cannot understand American opposition to conventional conscription, for they confuse with mere shirking what is, in fact, part of a long and powerful tradition. Similarly, they will underestimate the prudential arguments against a return to the draft, which rest on the

[13] I will address this question in my forthcoming book, *Systems of Military Service: The Dilemmas of a Liberal-Democratic World Power*, Cornell University Press.

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need to fight small wars and the problem of how to democratically select and indemnify conscripts—the problem, in other words, of "who serves when not all serve." European insensitivity to America's peculiar traditions and needs, however, are matched by a corresponding American unawareness that for most countries, including all European countries save Britain, a serious defense policy is inconceivable without a draft

VI

To summarize the argument thus far: the Alliance is imperiled by a number of structural contradictions and adverse long-term trends. The leaders of the West can only seek to ameliorate the threats to the Alliance as currently constructed; they cannot eliminate them. Indeed, recent experience suggests that it can be counterproductive to try. We have seen a paradoxical deterioration in American-European relations at the same time as (and in some measure because of) a substantial *increase* in America's military commitment to NATO. In the past ten years Republican and Democratic administrations have implemented three such policies aimed at bolstering NATO's conventional defense: increased allocation of American active and reserve forces to the reinforcement of Europe in the event of war; NATO (as opposed to European) weapons standardization; and modernization of tactical and theater nuclear weapons.[14] What have been the consequences?

The first, the increased earmarking of American reserve and active forces stationed in the United States to wartime deployment in Europe, has had little or no visible effect on U.S.-European relations. The United States now has duplicate sets of equipment for two divisions warehoused in Europe, and will soon have enough for two more. NATO military planners may rest easier as a result, but there is no indication that these measures have improved political relations. NATO standardization policy, on the other hand, particularly in its more extreme forms, has increased Alliance mistrust.[15] When several European nations "standardize" on an American fighter (the F-16), they do so at the expense of a European one (a *Mirage* or possibly a *Tornado*). A professed adherence to standardization aroused expectations of a "two-way street" in arms sales which, because of a host of military and domestic political factors, could never be achieved: examples here are America's cancellation of the *Roland* surface-to-air missile and the failure to purchase a European tank.

[14] See Robert Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1973–74, pp. 37–48.

[15] I have discussed this at greater length in "NATO Standardization: The Perils of Common Sense." *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978, pp. 72–90.

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The third policy, the modernization of U. S. tactical and theater nuclear weapons in Europe, has led to several acrimonious popular and governmental disputes between the United States and its European allies. The public outcry in Europe in 1978 over the proposed deployment in Europe of enhanced radiation warheads ("neutron bombs") is but one example of how an attempt to strengthen European defenses led to American mistrust of European resolve, and European suspicions of an American overreadiness to fight a war—even a nuclear war—in their homeland. As of this writing, the Europeans still refuse to accept the stationing of American neutron bombs on their soil. Meanwhile, Europeans came to see TNF modernization (originally urged by former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in 1977) as an attempt by the United States to impose unwanted nuclear weaponry on its European allies—a disquieting misreading of recent history, to say the least.

Thus, policies intended to increase the capacity of the West to deter and resist a conventional Soviet onslaught have, perversely, weakened the cohesion of the Alliance. Even the 1978 agreement to increase defense budgets by a steady three percent (in real terms) per year produced more friction than strength. Why has this been the case?

To be sure, the Allies must strengthen their conventional position in Europe, a position threatened by the steady numerical growth of Warsaw Pact forces and the equally steady improvement in their quality. Nonetheless, Americans and Europeans can redress the conventional imbalance if, and only if, they deal with the more fundamental problem—the calcification of an Alliance whose anatomy was formed by the conditions of the late 1940s. The three policies referred to above only exacerbated the discrepancies between the realities of American and European political, economic and cultural positions on the one hand, and their combined military policy on the other. What is required, therefore, is a thorough reconsideration of the purposes and institutions of the Alliance—a restructuring of NATO.

The difficulty of such an enterprise is enormous. Statesmen find it easiest to treat crises symptomatically, attempting to resolve particular issues as they arise. During periods of relative tranquillity, they may reasonably argue that it is foolhardy to tamper with the status quo, to take bold and risky measures to avert the Alliance's destruction in a decade's time. The great danger, however, is that the mortal blow could fall suddenly, before statesmen were able to parry it. NATO would face just such a terminal crisis if the United States felt it necessary to intervene suddenly in the

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Persian Gulf while the European allies looked on with alarm or, worse, disdain.

A restructuring of NATO should not only seek to avert the collapse of the Alliance, but also to give it new resilience; it should be an effort to restore a sound foundation to Western (not simply American) security policy, not a reluctant concession to circumstances. The essential terms of the redefinition of NATO should be that the United States will concentrate on global responsibilities, Europe, on regional ones: the geographical position and strength of the former fit it for extra-European tasks, and the traditions and wealth of the Europeans suit them for the preeminent role in their own defense.

Neither side would expect major support from the other in their respective areas of responsibility, save in the event of a protracted and intense conventional war. NATO would thus be confined to its present geographical area, but within NATO the United States would play substantially less of a role on the ground than heretofore. Similarly, no efforts to formalize or intensify joint action outside the traditional NATO area would be made, although the informal and ad hoc kinds of cooperation which, thus far at any rate, have succeeded in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, would continue. Indeed, the very absence of European (as opposed to national) commitments outside the NATO area may foster such useful cooperation.

In trimming America's military commitment to Europe, it is important to remember the strategically sensible and politically defensible purpose of American forces in Europe. They are, and have always been, a symbol to friend and foe of a willingness to wage war, even nuclear war, in defense of our European allies. The American public and its leaders have never questioned this role: they have, however, criticized the vaguer one of playing a leading part in Europe's conventional defense on the ground. This role has come under attack by way of the Mansfield Amendment of the early 1970s, more recently in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*,[16] and on the floor of the Senate, where Assistant Senate Majority leader Ted Stevens (R.-Alaska) has received support from conservatives and liberals for a move to withdraw troops from Europe. The recent vote (by a 12-to-1 margin) of a Senate appropriations subcommittee to fix American troop strength in Europe at 1980 levels—in effect reducing current strength by 15,000 men—suggests that a large American ground commitment will come under public attack soon, and perhaps this time successfully.

[16] David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, pp. 781–812.

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A comparison with America's only other frontline overseas commitment, that to South Korea, is an instructive one. Despite the profound cultural differences between the two countries, and despite the presence of an unstable and brutal military dictatorship in Seoul, there has been no popular agitation for withdrawal of troops from there, although President Jimmy Carter proposed a draw-down nonetheless. In Korea since 1953, unlike Europe since 1945, American troops have been killed by the other side. The prospect of a shooting war there has been far more real than in Europe, and yet there has been no Asian equivalent of a Mansfield Amendment. Why?

Part of the answer lies in the fact that American land forces in Korea consist of one scant division—enough to ensure that Americans will fight for South Korean independence with all means necessary. The South Korean forces consist of 21 divisions plus auxiliary troops, and South Korea spends as great a—indeed, until recently, a greater—percentage of its gross national product on defense as the United States (over 5.5 percent). By contrast, the Netherlands spends 3.4 percent, Germany, 3.2 percent and even France, only 3.9 percent.[17] This is not to suggest that American leaders can or should browbeat their European counterparts to reach South Korean levels of military mobilization. It *is* to suggest the sole set of circumstances under which America can sustain her current commitment to Europe, without condescension and resentment on one side, and peevish irresponsibility on the other. If Europe builds up her conventional forces as part of a general reallocation of burdens, rather than as a result of American nagging, mutual trust and cooperation can be restored or, indeed, strengthened.

A restructuring of NATO cannot, therefore, confine itself to a statement of new and different principles of alliance: real and substantial changes must be made in force structures and deployments. As it stands now, the United States keeps a ground force in Europe of some 220,000 men, and between two-thirds and three-quarters of America's active army is preparing to fight there. Now, the Europeans possess the wealth, manpower and skills to raise another dozen divisions, and have, in addition, the inestimable advantage of proximity to the battlefield. Our permanent conventional ground forces in Europe (as opposed to our air force of some 75,000 men, which should remain constant) could be reduced to an armored force of perhaps two divisions plus support, or 100,000 men, stationed in the front line as a guarantee of

[17] Figures taken from *The Military Balance 1981-1982*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 112-3.

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America's willingness to wage war on Europe's behalf. America's air and nuclear forces would remain on the continent, and perhaps even be augmented.

How much reinforcement of the Central Front the United States can or should promise its NATO allies is a difficult question, well beyond the scope of this article. One possibility might be an agreement to provide large-scale reinforcements in the event of protracted war. The United States could meet this commitment in a number of ways, including the adoption of a Swedish type of draft, which would obligate most young Americans to some eight months of training followed by five or six years of reserve duty. If this happened, the active American army could recede to a smaller, but more efficient and readier, force of some 600,000 men, as opposed to 800,000 today.

As the United States reduces its land commitment to Europe, it should develop its ability to fight elsewhere, particularly in the Persian Gulf. It should amass greater air and sea lift to ensure that the Rapid Deployment Force is indeed rapidly deployable, and establish a fifth fleet permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean, rather than one composed (as at present) of detachments from other fleets. The creation of such a fleet, and the resumption of a limited liability draft, would demonstrate that America was not casting off old obligations but reordering them, and striving to meet the most pressing.

In return, Western Europe could assume the greater responsibility for creating an effective conventional defense against the Warsaw Pact. As in the case of a new American fleet or militia-type draft, the symbolic effects of a division of labor should reinforce the practical ones: thus, the possibility of appointing a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) should be explored. At a more practical level, America would forebear from competing in Europe with Europe's fledgling supranational arms industry, and might even lend technical assistance (e.g., sale or gift to Europe of medium-range ballistic missile or cruise missile technology) to the creation of Anglo-German or Anglo-Franco-German long-range theater nuclear forces.

More important by far than any particular policy, however, is the necessity for a new and healthier understanding of the purposes, and, equally important, the limits of NATO. To disarm the psychological and cultural tensions outlined earlier, Americans must know that their allies will assume almost all of the burden of their own conventional defense, freeing the United States for global tasks. The Europeans must rid themselves of their resent-

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ment of American power and its uses by, insofar as they can, emancipating themselves from American protection. By discarding the pretense of international political equality, and seeking to reduce the reality of military disparity, Europe and the United States may renew and indeed strengthen their peculiar generation-old marriage of sentiment and interest.

VII

A restructuring of NATO can only come about as a product of prolonged negotiation and consultation. Because the crisis is a structural one, we ought not—and need not—plunge into hasty measures to counteract it: there is a case for waiting for better economic conditions before asking for a substantial increase in European land forces.

Nonetheless, Europeans and Americans must not confuse amelioration of the symptoms—resolution of TNF disputes, for example—with a cure of the disease. To restructure NATO successfully, statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic must first fully comprehend the depth of the long-term crisis and the very real possibility of a precipitous and disastrous disintegration of the Alliance. Thereafter we will all need courage and imagination of the same epic quality that went into the formation of the Alliance in the first place. This suggests at once the seriousness of the predicament, and real, if slim, hope for its resolution.

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Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski

LATIN AMERICAN DEBT

The music has stopped. In August, Mexico, the largest single recipient of Eurocurrency bank credits in recent years, announced that it could not for the time being meet its scheduled repayments of principal on the external debt of the public sector. Service on the Mexican private sector and banking system debt is sporadic or interrupted because of the shortage of foreign exchange. Argentina has in effect been unable to meet its scheduled debt service since the time of the South Atlantic conflict. And, since mid-1982, international bank lending to Latin American countries has all but ground to a halt. As a result, Brazil may find it very difficult to meet its scheduled debt service, since, like the other countries in the area, it needs a constant inflow of funds to pay off old debt.

The problem for such countries is in a sense as if the U.S. Treasury suddenly found itself unable to borrow. And, at the same time, most countries of the area, both large and small, with a few notable exceptions, face extremely difficult economic problems. These stem in most cases from the combined effects of the international recession and domestic fiscal deficits, which in turn originate in part from overly optimistic projections two years ago of what would happen to the international economy. Since the Latin American economies have been the largest borrowers in the Eurocurrency market, from a wide array of international banks, their balance of payment and debt problems are not just regional questions, but raise issues of great international economic significance.

In the last ten years, the growth of the Euromarket—consisting in large measure of dollars outside of the U.S. monetary system—has been one of the major developments of the international economic scene. World inflation and the need to "recycle" OPEC surpluses have greatly stimulated international lending, mostly

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from the Euromarket. Lending to developing countries, particularly the resource-rich and economically more advanced ones, absorbed roughly half of this lending—and in turn two-thirds of that went to Latin American and Caribbean countries, so that about one-third of all Euromarket bank lending has been to Latin American countries. Brazil and Mexico have by themselves accounted for close to one-quarter of all the internationally syndicated Euroloans made in the last ten years.

As of mid-1982, according to my estimates described later, Latin American and Caribbean countries owed international commercial banks at least US$200 billion in medium-term loans and short-term borrowing to finance trade and the maintenance of foreign exchange reserves. At the interest rates prevailing in the first half of 1982, the annual interest due on this sum alone—without counting principal or the service on the remaining US$95 billion or so of debt owed to governments, international institutions and others—was in the range of US$30 billion. This sum should be set against export earnings in 1982 of about US$110 billion: it is then easy to see that the region as a whole has a serious financing problem. Some Asian countries have a similar problem, but it is less widespread since few of those countries have been able to borrow commercially and their fiscal management has in general been more conservative.

In Latin America, the size of the debt has meant that the adverse impact of the run-up in international interest rates in 1981–82 has been particularly painful, especially when combined with the drop of close to one-third in the purchasing power of commodity exports in the same period. This scissors effect—higher interest payments and lower export earnings—has been the major cause of the recent problems. It is clear that governments cannot adjust to this new environment without both extremely tough and unpopular economic measures—already being taken in some countries—on the one hand, and a more favorable international environment and continued capital inflows on the other. Even with all these favorable developments and measures, the task will be very difficult. Without all of these elements, several countries in the region could become the scene of social upheavals and political instability which would threaten hemispheric security, and will extend far beyond the region.

The escalation of the problems which the large international banks have had to face in the last two years, both at home and abroad, has spawned a sometimes alarmist debate on the solidity of the international banking system. Unlike the 1930s, however,

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in recent years the central banks of the major financial centers have made clear that they will step in with special support to avoid catastrophes. Still, the events in Mexico and Argentina, and jitters among the lenders themselves about Brazil, have now put the banks somewhat in the position of a mountain climber on the icy slope of a sharp peak. Having—perhaps rashly—undertaken the adventure, the climber, instead of continuing upward, looks down at the abyss and starts to wobble, increasing his chances of falling.

In any event, the present sharp cutback in lending to major developing countries, if sustained, will—not "could"—hasten the day when those countries are no longer able to meet their scheduled debt service obligations. The adjustment required to a situation of negative capital inflows, in which erstwhile borrowers would have to become exporters of capital, is simply too large and too sudden for most countries to absorb. Mechanisms have to be found, which we review at the end of this article, to avoid these serious problems, which would greatly hamper not only the borrowers but also the creditors.

But, before we address these critical action issues, we need a more detailed analysis of the crisis. How did it reach its present pitch—with such apparent suddenness—and what is its scale and nature? Why did borrowers and lenders interact as they did, and what were their shares of responsibility, as well as those of the governments of the major industrialized countries in which the lending banks are located? Is the crisis simply a short-term debt service problem, stemming from readily reversible policies, or does it have deeper roots in the basic situation of the major Latin American countries at this stage of their development? Does the crisis endanger individual exposed banks (or even the banking structure as a whole), and how are they reacting and likely to react to meet it?

Each of these questions has already been under intense discussion, in stated or unstated form, among the participants in these events; they are of equal concern to those who now have to understand the crisis and who may be asked, in political terms, to support efforts at controlling and eventually resolving it.

II

There is an obvious risk of overgeneralizing about "Latin America." It is clear, however, that the majority of countries in the region have had better access to external commercial borrowing than those in other areas, that their external debts have in most

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cases grown much faster than their export earnings, and that the double impact of high interest rates and declining export prices has therefore been particularly burdensome in Latin America. According to data estimated by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company,[1] several Latin American countries in 1982 will have to make interest payments on their external total debt equivalent to 30 percent or more of their exports of goods and services: Ecuador (30 percent), Mexico (37 percent), Chile (40 percent), Argentina (44 percent), and Brazil (45 percent), in ascending order. No developing countries in other regions, even among those facing balance of payments problems—such as Korea, the Philippines and Yugoslavia—have had ratios approaching these.

A key ingredient in the buildup of external debt in the last two years has been short-term debt. The large difference between the outstanding, external public medium- and long-term total debt of Latin American countries, as reported by the World Bank for the end of 1980 (US$159 billion), and the above estimate of about US$290 billion for mid-1982, is of course partly explained by the passage of time and the fact that the latter figure includes the external debt of the private sector, which is particularly important in the case of Brazil and Mexico (a total of at least US$50 billion). The main difference, however, is short-term debt, the precise amount of which is not publicly available.

Short-term debt by itself need not be a matter of concern, since it is normally tied to trade. For example, the production and processing of a crop for export is often financed through external bank loans which are automatically repaid some months later as the product is exported and payment is received. The security for the loan is the crop itself. The same happens in reverse on import transactions. These "self-liquidating" debts, which represent advances against future sales, are the essence of commercial lending and are normal as long as the proportion of future earnings or payments devoted to repaying the advance financing does not rise to the point of being excessive.

Unfortunately, it appears that this point may have been reached in the last year in a number of Latin American borrowing countries. I estimate very roughly that the amount of trade credit outstanding at any one point should be no more than one quarter-year (or 90 days) of exports and imports, after deducting the capital goods which are financed in part with medium- and long-term loans. On this basis, the "normal" outstanding short-term

[1] *World Financial Markets*, October 1982.

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debt of Latin American countries should be in the range of US$30 billion to $40 billion. It is probably twice that amount.

The excess has largely been built up in the last two years as a result of the gradual tightening of terms, in the Euromarket, for developing country borrowers, especially Latin American ones. Countries were able to get both lower interest margins and larger sums from the lenders by "temporarily" borrowing for short terms, of one year or less. This phenomenon explains why, even though the amount of new syndicated loans announced in each of the years 1979-81 for Latin American borrowers stayed almost constant at around an average of US$27 billion to $28 billion of commitments annually, the outstanding debt to banks of the major borrowers from the region was actually expanding at an average annual rate of more than 30 percent, well above the growth rate of their exports. The one exception was Brazil, where the growth of outstanding debt to the banks was held down to about 17 percent each year.

It is this buildup of short-term debt, well above the amounts normally associated with trade, that explains the apparent suddenness with which the problems of Argentina and Mexico have burst upon the international financial market. Both borrowers and lenders were in effect attempting to buy time, in the hope that interest rates would come down, and export earnings revive, in the wake of an often announced but, until now, not yet begun recovery of the business cycle in the United States and Western Europe. Unfortunately, the lenders apparently did not tally what each one was doing until, partly because of the delay in the expected improvement, and also because of the lagged availability of statistics, it became apparent that even more net short-term lending would be required. At that point, sometime in mid-1982, a major retraction of lending took place. It had in fact already begun at the time of the South Atlantic conflict, when the banks sharply held back new loan commitments to Latin America as a whole, irrespective of country.

Another important factor was the misperception, both among lenders and borrowers, of the likely lag between the expected international improvement and its effects on the finances of borrowing countries. For example, the interest rate decline which has occurred since August will not reduce interest payments until next spring, six months after the event, when the next interest payments come due. Commodity prices, if past experience is any guide, will initially strengthen somewhat as a result of the interest rate decline, but sustained improvement, especially for industrial

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raw materials and minerals, will only occur once the recovery is well underway and the investment climate turns around. Finally, the depth of the industrial recession in the United States and Europe was only realized in 1982: as the lenders began to grapple with major domestic credit problems and bankruptcies, the realization of the large impact of the recession and high interest rates on the rest of the world helped to stimulate a more conservative approach to lending.

It is not easy to put together consistent data on the external debt of developing countries, including debt of both the public and private sectors, and both short-term and longer-term debt. The estimates below, as of mid-1982, are therefore subject to a margin of error, but the broad numbers show that Latin America has a rather high indebtedness, especially when related to merchandise export earnings.

EXTERNAL DEBT: LATIN AMERICA VS. OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(US$ BILLION EQUIVALENT)

	Latin America[1]	*Other Developing Countries*[2]
Estimated total outstanding external debt, mid-1982	295[3]	340
a. held by:		
financial institutions	200	105
official agencies and bondholders	95	235
b. of which:		
short-term	75	60
medium and long-term	220	280
private sector	(80)	—
public sector	(140)	—
Merchandise Export Earnings 1981	113	290
Total GNP 1981	650	730
Debt as percentage of exports	261%	117%
of GNP	45%	47%

[1] Including Cuba.

[2] Excluding China, major high-income oil exporters (Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), Iran and Iraq. Includes other major oil exporters (Algeria, Indonesia and Nigeria), which in 1981 had exports of US$55 billion and a combined GNP of about US$200 billion, with an estimated external debt of about US$75 billion.

[3] Of this total, about US$90 billion corresponds to Mexico, US$75 billion to Brazil, US$30 billion each to Argentina and Venezuela (in the latter case largely offset by international reserves), and US$15 billion to Chile, with the remaining US$55 billion among the remaining countries of the region, including the Caribbean. Note that these are rough estimates.

SOURCES: Author's estimates derived from the *World Bank Annual Report 1982*, and external positions of reporting banks according to the Bank for International Settlements. Data on short-term and private sector debt are the author's approximations from other sources and should be interpreted carefully.

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It is of course true that the ability to service debt depends not only on current foreign exchange earnings—mainly merchandise exports—but also on the level of international reserves and on new capital inflows from loans and foreign investment. In short, it is the whole balance of payments that counts, though the ratio of debt service to export earnings does provide a good first approximation.

The burden of debt should also be compared to gross national product (GNP). On that score, the group of Latin American countries does better, a phenomenon which reflects the fact that income levels (an average of about US$1,800 per capita in 1981) are much higher than in the rest of the world (about US$460 in 1981, excluding China and the capital-exporting Arab oil exporters), which is heavily weighted by India. In other words, in very simplified terms, Latin America, compared to the rest of the developing world, is a *high* income area with a *low* proportion of export income in relation to its external indebtedness, features which in turn reflect rapid industrialization oriented to the relatively large domestic markets of the principal economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela.

III

Why did the principal actors behave as they did? Here the first point to note is that international commercial bank lending, particularly to the more advanced and large developing economies, has played a vital role in helping these countries adjust to the post-1973 environment.

Commercial bank lending out of the Eurocurrency market has accounted for roughly one-quarter to one-third of the net capital inflows into the non-OPEC developing countries in the period 1974–81. Without this "recycling," the middle and higher income countries that were the recipients of these loans would have had to face much lower growth rates: this applies both to oil importers such as Brazil and to countries such as Mexico which have become major oil exporters. If the capital inflow had not been obtained from the Euromarket, or from another source, about one percent a year would have been cut from the growth of GNP of the developing world, which averaged 5.5 percent over the last decade; given the population growth rate of 2.2 percent per year in the same period, this would have been a reduction of about one-third in the average growth of per capita income.

Second, while the first oil shock of 1973–74 affected the external

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accounts of both developed and developing oil-importing countries to a high degree, and the admittedly modest recovery in the industrial countries came relatively soon, the second shock of 1979–80 fell particularly heavily on the developing countries, and the recession in the industrial countries has been long and deep. At the same time, the oil-producing country of special concern today, Mexico, along with other oil producers, embarked on ambitious development programs, predicated on rising prices for oil. Both the oil exporters and the oil-importing developing countries thus found themselves in difficulty.

Because of concern about those problems and the impact of increasing debt amortization, net loan disbursements to the Latin-American countries tended to peak in the period 1979–81, at about US$20 billion annually. The total current account deficits of non-OPEC developing countries averaged about US$75 billion in the same period.

In general, as a larger debt amortization burden fell due, it became more difficult to make new loans in increasing amounts: in 1980, there was a sharp drop in new commitments to Brazil and Mexico, as most banks tried to cut back the growth of their exposure to these very large borrowers. In 1981, however, lending resumed on a larger scale, but much of the increase went to pay for debt amortization. In the first half of 1982, gross loan commitments to Mexico rose, largely as a result of short-term loans, to double the annual rate of syndicated loan commitments in 1981, which had been about US$8 billion. Then in July, as we have noted, lending there stopped dead, and slowed down to a trickle in the rest of Latin America, irrespective of country.

A third point to note is that the contribution of the Euromarket would probably not have been possible, or at least would have been much more difficult, without the special nature of that market. Bank lending in Eurodollars, mostly in the form of "syndicates" or pooled risk loans among many banks, has accounted for more than 90 percent of the direct flow from capital markets to developing countries in the last decade. All of this lending has been on a floating rate basis, with only the most creditworthy countries having access to the bond markets, which maintain much stricter creditworthiness standards.

Let me digress for a moment here to comment on the widespread lay view of the Eurocurrency market as a large pool of funds "sloshing around" outside the control of monetary authorities, and feeding exchange speculation. It is of course true that the Eurocurrency market is not formally regulated in the sense that monetary authorities do not influence the reserves which the

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banks have to keep, and do not set interest rates in the way that they do at home. However, the market, dominated by the U.S. dollar, is virtually an extension of the U.S. monetary system and tends to feel quite quickly the effects of U.S. monetary policy. Effective regulation of the Euromarket would probably help to create a new market, a sort of "Euromarket II," as funds sought to avoid interest rate and profit constraints. The real need is not so much for regulation as for readily available credit information—a point to which we shall return at the close.

In any case, the fact that the Euromarket is a wholesale one, without retail preoccupations, has kept costs down and made the funding of lending easier than in domestic markets, where the mix of funds and loans is far more complex. In the Euromarket, the problem of mismatched assets and liabilities, when banks obtain short-term funds from deposits and take the risk of lending them at longer term, has been substantially reduced: loans are, in fact, simply short-term obligations to lend, which are rolled over periodically—when the interbank deposits which fund the loan mature—at the cost of funds plus a margin at the time of the rollover. The fact that there is little risk of adverse interest rate movements or of mismatched maturities between deposits and loans, together with the wholesale, and therefore low overhead, cost of the operations, explains much of the dynamism of Euromarket lending in the last decade.

Finally, why did lending to the more prosperous developing countries expand so rapidly? Quite simply, because it was profitable in an expanding world economy. In general, the interest rate margins over the cost of funds paid by developing country governments were substantially higher than those paid by first class corporate borrowers—although there were periodic exceptions—and the amount of legal and financial work for a loan to a government or a government-guaranteed borrower was much less than for a corporation. As to the risk factor, it was the dominant view that, as a number of leading bankers said publicly, in the last analysis, countries could not go bankrupt, whereas corporations could and did. What these bankers meant, of course, was that countries did not disappear into the limbo of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the way some corporations do—although past history shows that countries can indeed go broke.

Moreover, the relatively rapid adjustment of the world economy to the first oil shock encouraged optimism. The expansion of world trade, of which the more advanced developing countries were important beneficiaries, and the relatively high commodity

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prices of the second half of the 1970s (when the Club of Rome was predicting major raw material shortages) encouraged an upbeat attitude. The economic departments of major banks saw that borrowing countries were able to support a level of debt service much higher than would have been considered prudent in the past.

In fact, some major money-center banks discarded the idea of the ratio of debt service to export earnings, laboriously built up over the years by the World Bank, as a simplistic measurement of the ability of countries to pay: the indicator to look at was the level of reserves of the central bank—forgetting that most if not all of these reserves might themselves be the result of government external borrowing. The pseudo-science of "country risk analysis" flourished. Some of its practitioners, trumpeting their mathematical matrixes and models in the international money magazines, seemed to think that it was as feasible to predict the fortunes of a country as the number of victims of accidents for an insurance company.

Why is it that much of this optimism has turned out to be misplaced in the setting of the early 1980s? The key reason has undoubtedly been the depth of the recession in the industrialized countries, and its far-reaching effects on the rest of the world. The scissors effect of depressed commodity exports and high interest rates has already been mentioned. In the case of Brazil, for example, each increase of one percent in Eurodollar interest rates in 1981 led to a $500 million annual increase in external debt service, or the equivalent of a reduction in export earnings of about 2.2 percent. This meant that the increase in interest rates which occurred in 1980–81, on top of the deterioration in the terms of trade, was the same as if the purchasing power of exports had been cut by about 40 percent in a little over a year, a crushing burden to bear.

The governments of major industrialized countries, including the United States, did not forecast the duration and severity of the domestic recession. Very few foresaw its international impact, and fewer still are fully aware of its tremendous effect on the emerging industrial developing countries, which are in the middle of a delicate economic transition that still requires high levels of external capital.

It is also true that the governments of most of these emerging industrial powers did not foresee the depth of the recession either. In 1978, Mexico based its public spending plans on a permanently rising international oil price, which appeared to be a correct

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forecast until the end of 1980, but afterward turned out to be unrealistic. The Brazilian authorities, on the other hand, slammed on the brakes at the end of 1980; a major economic adjustment program was undertaken at that time but, given the unfavorable international setting, it was not possible to reduce external borrowing, only at most to hold back its growth.

IV

To come at the question whether the crisis is a short-term one or much more basic, we need to look at a number of features of the development of the major Latin American economies which have helped to increase external indebtedness rapidly. Three in particular stand out: the sometimes excessive push to industrialize at relatively high cost; extensive, not to say bloated, public sectors; and often erratic exchange rate and interest rate policies.

To some extent, of course, the push to industrialize reflects the stage of development at which the larger Latin American economies find themselves, with relatively large internal markets in comparison with other developing countries, and a level of per capita income—especially among upper income groups—which creates a demand for high income goods found in the industrialized countries, such as cars and appliances. The industries associated with this type of consumption generally require large amounts of capital, and create a need for equipment imports and the loans to finance them.

The pattern of industrialization of the large Latin American economies has thus been different in emphasis from that of the Far East developing countries, which has been export-oriented—reflecting the relatively small size of their domestic markets—and has relied on relatively low wages. In Latin America, at least in the larger countries, export orientation, although growing in importance, has been a secondary consideration. New industries have no particular internal comparative advantage, since they rely largely on imported capital-intensive equipment and a relatively highly paid, elite industrial labor force; indeed they require protection from imports in order to survive.

These features of industrialization in the region, very broadly and perhaps unfairly generalized, have been accentuated by the importance of state enterprises. Functioning under the umbrella of implicit or formal government guarantees, and often lacking sufficient capital, state enterprises in industry and related productive activities have tended to finance a very high proportion of investment with borrowing, largely external.

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In fairness, it should be said that politicians naturally use state enterprises to push through particular projects, often highly capital intensive and not necessarily efficient. State industry is a happy hunting ground for equipment salesmen, the cleverest of whom thrive under the cover of international tenders, which are sometimes maneuvered by underpaid public officials. Public service activities, such as grain importation and distribution, fuel distribution, and public utilities, are often used by governments as ways to subsidize the cost of living for volatile and underemployed urban masses.

The losses of government-controlled industrial and public service enterprises, fostered by these various problems, have been the major factor in the recurrent fiscal problems of a number of countries in the region. In the case of Mexico, for example, the public enterprise deficit in 1982 will be on the order of ten percent of GNP, larger than the central government deficit. The bloated public sectors of a number of Latin American economies, as a proportion of GNP, and even more in relation to their ability to manage themselves, are undoubtedly a major contributor to the present debt problems.

The public enterprise issue cannot be easily removed or resolved. Some governments have in recent years faced the problem of subsidies squarely—Brazil, Chile and Peru, for example—and, sometimes at considerable political cost, have eliminated or reduced subsidies and substantially raised the price of basic services and staples. Such moves inevitably cause noticeable increases in the cost-of-living index, since it is heavily weighted by these items of basic popular consumption. In other cases, adjustments have been delayed, at substantial fiscal cost, and perhaps even greater political cost when large increases eventually have to be made. Even where the political conviction and courage exist, selling off the enterprises is not easy, given their size, and may not solve the problem in the case of activities properly considered public services, where the basic issue is price regulation.

A third area of concern has been the perennial conflict between populism and orthodoxy in monetary and exchange policy. It is understandable that chiefs of state, and many others too, should dislike high interest rates and devaluations, which are seen to raise domestic prices and the cost of living. Clearly they have this effect, especially when large-scale adjustments have to be made in the midst of inflationary expectations, and after periods of substantial overvaluation of the currency and negative interest rates. The recent economic history of Argentina, Chile and Mexico has

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illustrated once again the proclivity, even under very sophisticated economic managements, to repeat past history.

In the Southern Cone countries in the late 1970s, an economic theory took root that was peculiar in the inflationary setting of those countries. At least it had the unusual merit of reconciling economic technocrats with their rulers. The economy was to be made to adjust so as to maintain a fixed exchange rate. In other words, employment rather than the exchange rate would vary.

In the case of Chile, where the public sector had no deficit and inflation was falling rapidly, this policy came close to succeeding. However, the momentum of prior inflation, after the exchange rate was fixed in 1979, rapidly made the exchange rate overvalued: with a cheap dollar and an apparently guaranteed exchange rate, the private sector, and especially the commercial banks, borrowed large amounts abroad (about US$10 billion), while production for the domestic market and for export languished as imports flooded the domestic economy—artificially holding down the cost of living—and the profitability of exports eroded. The collapse of copper prices in 1981–82 completed the deterioration of the balance of payments, and in mid-1982 the authorities devalued the currency by about 60 percent. According to official estimates, GNP in 1982 will fall by over 10 percent, and the unemployment rate is above 20 percent.

In Argentina, where the public sector deficit continued at high, albeit reduced, levels, the policy of a slow devaluation in the face of still very rapid inflation never had a chance, and contributed to the buildup of both private and public sector debt.

The case of Mexico, where economic theory was not the main driving force, was a more classical one of increasing public sector deficits, augmented in 1981–82 by the fall in the price of oil to a level well below what had been expected. It too resulted in large-scale borrowing by the private and public sectors, and eventually in the large devaluations of 1982 and the introduction of exchange controls in September—a difficult undertaking in a country with no recent experience in the management of controls, and with a long border and a very large trade with the United States.

Finally, the political legacy in Latin America of "banana plantation" types of foreign investment dies hard. Few countries have encouraged investment from the outside in an economically meaningful way. In the last five years, foreign direct investment in Latin America has accounted for less than one-fifth of capital inflows, and has been heavily concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. The idea has arisen among politicians of various tendencies that

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loans create less "dependency" on the outside than investment. In fact, the attitude of foreign investors has become much more flexible and accommodating than it was 20 or even 10 years ago, and the recent debt difficulties highlight the fact that profit remittance payments—which require the availability of profits and do not carry the same level of international obligation as the service on debts of a government—are actually a less problematic burden than debt service.

Are these traits endemic to Latin America? The outlook is mixed. On the one hand, a new generation of well-educated economic managers is arising, in a political climate where understanding of economic problems is making progress, although there is still much ground to be covered. On the other hand, the present stage of development of the more advanced Latin American economies naturally creates some of these features. A growing middle class wants to enjoy the good things of life. It desires long-term mortgages to buy a home and cheap exchange rates in order to travel abroad and own an automobile, the cost of which is heavily influenced by imported materials. A substantial proportion of this middle class works in the public sector. The emerging middle class is a potent political force, and its evolution will take a long time.

Thus, the emerging industrial economies of Latin America are in some ways at the same stage as the United States in the period from the 1840s to the 1880s: rapid expansion of infrastructure and basic industry for the domestic market, based in part on a large inflow of foreign loans. The high rate of growth of population in the United States then, augmented by migration, was comparable to that of Brazil and Mexico today. Bankruptcies, financial panics and balance of payments crises were periodic as late as the 1890s. Today, however, we live in a more orderly world, with clear rules of international financial behavior, which had not yet been firmed up then.

The economic development of the large Latin American economies *will* become less dependent on foreign capital, but this will take much longer than the present horizon of international bank lending. The debt profiles of several debtor countries, both large and small, suggest that even after the present liquidity crunch is overcome—one hopes in the next couple of years or so—service payments will continue to be relatively heavy on the medium and long-term external debt which exists today, without counting necessary new borrowing. Beyond the immediate liquidity issue, there is no quick fix for the longer-term debt problem, which

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essentially relates to development. As population growth rates decline as a result of economic advance, and savings rates move up, while the need for public investment declines, the problem will begin to go away. That, however, is a long-term horizon.

Brazil perhaps best illustrates the difference between the immediate and the longer-term problem. To avoid further losses of international reserves, Brazil needs to be able to continue borrowing in the Euromarket. At present, its access, along with that of most Latin American and developing countries, has been very sharply cut back. Unless it is restored, or alternate funds become available, Brazil will in effect have to force a minimum capital inflow by rescheduling a part of its repayments of principal. Further cuts in imports are extremely difficult, and would impinge upon basic inputs needed for exports. Fairly drastic fiscal and monetary action was already taken at the end of 1980 and GNP has actually declined in 1981 and 1982, after 15 years of continuous high rates of growth. The liquidity problem is thus a pressing one, where the borrowing country has very limited room for maneuver.

The longer-term debt problem, on the other hand, should be more manageable. Brazil has succeeded, from 1979 to 1982, in raising its merchandise exports from US$15 billion to US$25 billion in an inhospitable international economic environment. Barring more trade barriers, this performance should be even better when the world economy revives. Population growth is declining, and a transition in the next 20 years or so to a pattern of development less dependent on large-scale financing from abroad is certainly a reasonable expectation.

V

It is perhaps natural that the existing and possible debt problems of the major Latin American economies, coming on top of well-publicized domestic bankruptcies and problems in the United States, Canada and Europe, have spawned a debate on the solidity of the major banks engaged in international lending. This has been particularly the case in the United States, where accounting rules prohibit the accumulation of "hidden reserves," a form of back-up, non-taxed capital, and where the large money-center banks obtain a substantial part of their earnings from international operations.

The debate has ranged widely. Some sections of the press and outside commentators have said that banks should be "punished" for their past lending—as if their present problems were not

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enough: for most of the large banks, the lowest stock prices in years in relation to earnings; a higher relative cost in obtaining funds from traditional sources, such as the sale of certificates of deposit; regulators in all major countries breathing down their necks; and boards of directors in a state of alert.

Other discussions have focused on the adequacy of the capital of banks. Simple arithmetic will show that in the case of the largest U.S. banks, their exposure in the major Latin American debtor countries is larger than their capital. But to go on from there to say that banks will have to write off such loans is unrealistic, although in several cases the loans, particularly in Mexico, will have to be significantly stretched out. The key point is the payment of interest. For example, on the unlikely hypothetical assumption that no interest on the debt of the three largest Latin American economies was paid for a year, the gross earnings of the five largest U.S. banks would decline by about seventy-five percent, but the net after-tax effect would be considerably less.

It is thus likely that the present debt problems—both of some major Latin American countries and of other borrowers as well—will affect the borrowers more than the lenders, as credit flows are reduced. A number of recent market developments buttress this conclusion. First, the interbank Euromarket is changing and its growth is shrinking: major banks are finding that it is too risky in relation to likely profits to deposit their surpluses in the interbank deposit market. They are reducing deposits with secondary banks. (Incidentally, the approximately US$6 billion of interbank deposits, outstanding in October 1982 with the Eurocurrency branches of Mexican banks, are being called on their due dates rather than being renewed, as in the past, so that they are in effect becoming a liability of the Mexican government, in the wake of the Mexican bank nationalization of September 1.) Deposits with consortium banks are also being reduced. The revival of the U.S. capital market is keeping funds at home and the disappearance, for the time being, of the surplus of the major Arab oil producers has removed an important inflow into the Euromarket.

Secondly, the recent credit problems have led banks in Europe, North America and Japan to be more aware of the inadequacy of their capital and to cut back new lending accordingly. In the last three years, lending by these banks to the developing world grew at an annual rate of more than 20 percent, about twice the rate of growth of bank capital.

Third, regulators are bearing down on the banks, particularly in Germany, Japan and the United States. Germany has intro-

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duced strict limits on the ratio of assets to capital which may be loaned out to any one borrowing country. And guidelines issued in October 1982 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in effect require banks to disclose, by mid-1983, their outstanding loans by country. Obviously, with nervous boards of directors, lending officers will do their utmost, before that date, to reduce the exposure of their banks to countries and borrowers considered risky.

Given these trends and actions, the danger to individual banks or to the banking structure looks controllable. But, by the same token, it would be quite unrealistic to expect the major banks active in international lending to continue international lending to developing countries at anything like the pace of recent years. The main question is the extent of the reduction.

Will it be a reduction in *net exposure*, the corollary of which would be that borrowers would become net repayers of debt or exporters of capital? That is where a conflict would probably come, since major debtors, at least in Latin America, are unlikely to be in a position to do that—even with major domestic adjustments, which are politically very difficult, and more favorable markets for their exports. It is very difficult to contemplate an overall reduction in banks' exposure in Latin America, since that would require developing countries to become exporters of capital, virtually an impossibility on a sustained basis. What is required is a slower growth of net indebtedness, but even that is not easy to achieve without a recovery in the world economy and international trade on the one hand and, on the other, the application of needed, and in some cases severe, domestic fiscal and monetary adjustments.

So far, but this is only a distant gleam, it looks as if the major banks are seeking to avoid such a confrontation and have prevailed on smaller banks to slow down the reduction of their exposures. Clearly, such a maintenance of lending would be helpful to the bigger banks, which would hardly be in a position to offset major reductions in exposure by the new entrants into the Euromarket in recent years, including regional and smaller-sized banks.

However, if one more major debtor has to renegotiate its debt, the thread of remaining confidence could snap and a major confrontation between lenders and borrowers could ensue. In order to avoid such an occurrence, it is essential that, at a minimum, there be a continued flow of commitments—from all sources as necessary—which has the effect of renewing maturities as they fall due. And, for some countries, even that will clearly

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not be enough, so that additional sources of financing are urgently needed.

VI

At the last annual meeting of the International MonetaryFund (IMF) and the World Bank, held in Toronto in early September, bankers and government officials were able to agree, at least implicitly, on some important points, which are not new: that developing countries, particularly the larger Latin American borrowers, were no longer able to continue the rapid growth in external commercial borrowing; that more orderly processes for renegotiation of debt were necessary; and that better credit information was urgently needed. However, there was not much analysis of how a transition to lower levels of commercial financing can be achieved without some special form of alternate financing.

A number of special schemes have been discussed in order to confront the financing problem of major developing countries. It has been suggested, for example, that the Bank for International Settlements provide the additional resources needed in emergencies, as it has done in the case of Mexico—but subject in part to approval by the IMF of the Mexican stabilization program. The BIS gets its funds from central banks and is thus able to move faster than a scheme through the IMF, which would probably require budgetary appropriations and parliamentary approvals. While the BIS could thus be of major immediate importance, in the longer run it suffers from not being a worldwide multilateral institution—nor was it ever intended that it would be one—and does not have the staff or the historic expertise in developing countries of the IMF. In the end, therefore, a scheme which would avoid undue confrontation between lenders and borrowers has to revolve around the institution created specifically for that purpose, namely the IMF itself.

Discussions at Toronto with regard to the future funding of the IMF lacked broad consensus and urgency. Part of the problem is the difficulty of quantifying what the needs might be, which in turn depend on the rate of recovery of the world economy and world trade, and their impact on developing country exports and the ability of these countries to import and to meet debt service. Serious balance of payments problems in the larger Latin American economies would have serious effects on European and Japanese exports, and, to a lesser degree (except in the case of Mexico), on U.S. exports. Another element of the problem is defining whether the IMF will continue to be an institution whose

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main role is to put the stamp of good housekeeping on the financial management of countries, relying only to a limited extent on its own resources to support these programs. In the last ten years, major commercial bank lending has accompanied IMF-supported stabilization programs in Latin America. This may no longer be the case, at least on a similar scale, in the next few years. The IMF would then have to marshal far larger resources in the future, in effect substituting for part of the market lending of the past.

In reaching a judgment on this last issue, we must take into account the powerful forces working to reduce the net exposure of commercial banks in major Latin American and developing countries. There does not appear to be full awareness of the immediacy of the need. No one can challenge the desirability of increasing the quotas of IMF members substantially—although there are differences between the developing and the industrialized countries on how much—but there is also no doubt that it would be several years before such a move would actually put more usable resources in the coffers of the IMF.

After the first large-scale oil price increases, the IMF established an oil facility, a special window for extra credit for countries especially hard hit by these events. This facility was not only useful in itself, particularly to the poorest countries with no significant access to Euroloans, but its presence was also an element of reassurance to lenders and to developing country governments. Even if the present need turns out to be smaller than some expect, there is an urgent need to establish a special temporary facility within the IMF, which could make available a substantially larger proportion of support funds for stabilization programs than has previously been the case. A new temporary facility, of at least US$25 billion for the time being, is required.

While there may be the possibility of obtaining some of these resources from the capital markets, in the end the bulk of them will have to come from central banks or governments. Even if the facility takes several months to put together—there are several previous IMF special funds to serve as precedents—the fact that serious work had begun, and that there was basic agreement on the establishment of the facility, would probably be sufficient to inject necessary confidence in the system and avoid major defaults.

In contemplating such a facility, it is well to remember that there are extraordinary circumstances at present: a clear retraction of international commercial bank lending to developing countries, after close to a decade during which it was the largest single source

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of external finance for the larger Latin American economies; a deep international recession combined with high positive real interest rates; and serious balance of payments problems in a number of major borrowing countries. Business as usual is unlikely to come to grips with such problems. Fortunately, there is a growing awareness of the problems, the first essential step toward their mitigation and eventual solution.

There are no doubt critics who see such a scheme as a "bail-out" for the banks or for the borrowers, depending on their point of view. No doubt it is a bail-out. On the other hand, what are the alternatives? Politicians of a radical stripe in Latin America have suggested an "OPEC" of borrowers, who would stop servicing their debts on the theory that it is the creditor who has the problem, not the debtor. As we have seen, that is not true. But major balance of payments crises, with the ensuing economic and political turmoil, could give political credence to such extreme views.

A balanced but swift approach to these problems, including a continued inflow of capital, is needed in order to prevent false solutions from becoming popular. Unilateral defaults would of course trigger the immediate suspension of all lending by official agencies, and would cause the immediate default of all trade financing, leading to economic paralysis. This type of cocktail-party idea has even less intrinsic merit than the search for scapegoats which has characterized some of the discussion on Latin American debt.

A scheme through the IMF has the merit that the institution has shown over the years that it does not support unilateral bail-outs, but requires a genuine recovery program. The IMF is not popular among developing countries. Neither are emergency rooms among patients. The basic adjustment measures have to be taken when the money runs out, although it is much better to avoid some of the pain by taking the measures earlier.

For such early action, up-to-date economic information is vital, especially on short-term borrowing. A number of worthy proposals have recently been made by banks to set up an in-house system of shared information. The borrowers need to use the information also, however, and are a logical official source for it. A review of the role of the IMF should include the establishment of an official, comprehensive and internally consistent body of reasonably prompt information on short-term debt: official statistics are the only ones which can provide such data in a consistent and comprehensive way.

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A large expansion in the role of the IMF should also lead to more discussion of whether its basic prescriptions are universally correct. A few cents worth of tax adjustments, in the enthusiasm for fiscal balance, can sometimes jeopardize important development decisions, and can, in some instances, lead to much larger losses in opportunities for fiscal revenues and export income. Careful evaluation of development programs is necessary. An expanded IMF role, even if only temporary, requires even closer coordination with development institutions, especially the World Bank, the regional development banks and the export credit agencies.

As has been often repeated, we live in an interdependent world: a cutback in the trade of developing countries is not only politically counterproductive, but would affect the prospects for the recovery of the world economy.[2] The inevitable retraction in commercial bank lending highlights the importance of supporting the efforts of the development banks to expand their capacity to lend for well-conceived development projects.[3] Only an integrated balanced effort can prevent the present serious, but so far manageable, problems from turning into a major crisis.

[2] See again *World Financial Markets*, October 1982.
[3] See my "Action Steps After Cancún," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1022-37.

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John J. Rhodes

THE FAR SIDE OF THE HILL

In the 30 years that I have spent as a U. S. Congressman, I have considered myself mainly a hawk on national defense issues. It is my view that the communist world is deadly serious in its intent to conquer the globe. Toward that end, the communists can be counted on to probe for weaknesses on the part of Western nations. Where weaknesses can be found, the communists will move swiftly to take full advantage. I feel that our defense and foreign policy makers must always be aware of this very basic fact.

Yet, I also have a profound belief in the validity of that great fourth dimension—time. Too often we assume that what is "good" today will always be "good," and that the fixed concepts of today will always be valid. Thus, I feel strongly that we must look—not to the next five years—but to the next 50 years. We must decide the kind of world we want ours to be; then, and only then, make plans and establish agendas to accomplish our goals. In the process, we must correct errors of action and attitudes which block our path.

Simplistic? Yes—but read on.

II

Never have I been as concerned about our nation's defense posture and its foreign policy as I am today, on the eve of my retirement from Congress. Now is a period in our history when, it seems to me, a thorough reexamination of our posture is badly needed and long overdue. Looking at the near term, we have fallen behind the Soviet Union in some very important categories of armaments. Our economic and fiscal situation at home is becoming increasingly worrisome. We are faced with three challenges: (1) to rearm effectively enough to deter attacks; and (2) to rearm at a price our economy can support. These are not easy challenges to meet simultaneously.

John J. Rhodes will retire in January 1983 after having served since 1953 as a Member of Congress from Arizona. He was Minority Leader of the House of Representatives from 1973 through 1980, and Chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee from 1967 to 1979, and his committee assignments have included the House Intelligence Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. He also served in the U.S. Army in World War II, and as a reserve colonel graduated later from the associate course of the Army's Command and General Staff College.

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The third challenge facing us is even more basic than the first two. It is to determine the purpose, or goal, of our foreign policy. What is it that we hope to accomplish in various parts of the globe? What are the physical tools needed? Can our economy support all of the activities we might find desirable, or must we set priorities among our points of concern? What can be accomplished now, and what must depend on a more protracted, sustained effort?

Defense and foreign policies must intertwine and be mutually supportive. Our nation's defense must be a part of a coherent foreign policy, and the framers of foreign policy must be constantly aware of our defense strengths and weaknesses. My definition of the term "foreign policy" is: "A plan to create and maintain a world climate in which our national way of life can survive and prosper into the indefinite future, in peace." I suggest that the most important words in that definition are "into the indefinite future, in peace."

What seems to be lacking in America's foreign policy today and in recent years is any sense of long-range planning consistent with the definition I offer. Unlike Oriental leaders, who tend to plan their societies for periods of up to 50 or 100 years, we in this country seem to rock along from year to year, crisis to crisis, with no overall plan for where we want to go and how we intend to get there.

The analogy I like to use is rudimentary, but it illustrates my point. Suppose you are climbing a hill. When you are below the brow of the hill, you have no way of knowing what is on the other side. The tendency, therefore, is to plan to cope only with what you see and proceed as best you can toward the crest. Common sense, however, tells you there is a large world beyond the crest and that, once this particular hill is traversed, there will be other obstacles to deal with. Knowing this, the prudent person will go through the physical or mental exercise of calculating what is probably on the other side of the hill—the side he cannot see. In battle, he would send a reconnaissance unit ahead for a report. Lacking those facilities, he would simply draw upon past experience and form some idea as to what he should be prepared to meet as he comes over the brow of the hill.

Unfortunately, I do not detect any coherent long-range plan for the future against which our present decisions can be measured.

When we begin to put the problems of our world into a longer time frame, solutions which had eluded us become more apparent. Matters which seem extremely important to us today fade into a

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lesser degree of importance rather rapidly when measured against the yardstick of an extended period of time. Even more basic is the fact that many of our policies which now seem correct are obviously incorrect when measured by the yardstick of time.

III

Let me give a few examples. In our present position on the hill, we see that our economy is dependent upon the use of oil as the main source of energy. Therefore, it seems vital that a foreign policy designed to maintain our national way of life ensure access to a supply of oil.

The Persian Gulf is, at the present time, the part of the world which supplies most of the oil which we and our allies use. Therefore, we jump to the assumption that defending the Persian Gulf area from any nation which might cut off that supply of oil is absolutely imperative. Thus, we decide that we must fashion our foreign policy, and therefore our military posture, to accomplish this at all costs.

Having reached this conclusion, if we are the least bit prudent, we will take a look at the magnitude of the job which we have resolved to undertake. The Persian Gulf is flanked by nations, some of which have unstable governments, demonstrably capable of irresponsible acts at any time. Even worse, farther away, but still much closer than we are, is the brooding presence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one of the world's two superpowers.

Can there be any doubt that were we to try to defend the Persian Gulf against a Soviet incursion, we would be assuming a task which could be performed only at the risk of World War III? Does anybody doubt that the magnitude of such an effort would have a devastating effect on the American economy?

Does anybody believe we would receive full support from our "allies" in Western Europe? We should remind ourselves that when we needed to transport material to Israel to save it from being overrun in the last Sinai war, practically all our "allies" in Western Europe not only would not give us facilities for landing and refueling our aircraft—many of them would not even let us fly over their territory. Can there be any doubt that if we were indeed to get into a war with Russia in the Persian Gulf that those same "allies" would be doing their very best to make some kind of a deal to acquire access to the energy which they need for their own economies, without regard to our needs or desires? I think the answer is obvious.

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So, we must try to predict what might be over the brow of the hill which could either aid our efforts to defend the Persian Gulf, or lessen the necessity of keeping the oil of the Persian Gulf available to us and our "allies."

If, over the brow of the hill, there await solutions to the problems of harnessing the energy produced by the fusion of hydrogen and its isotopes, it would lessen the importance of the Persian Gulf immediately. Also, if we could anticipate a technology for producing huge amounts of energy from the rays of the sun, by the use of photovoltaic cells or by other means, again the whole imperative for obtaining energy from oil, wherever located, would be altered.

The point is that if you just look ahead at the hill, and note the need for energy in the form of oil which now exists, you come to a very dangerous conclusion—defend the Persian Gulf at all costs. If, however, you project capabilities which are not yet available, but which can be developed to produce huge quantities of energy from basic materials which are universally present, you realize that the necessity for taking terribly risky positions in the Persian Gulf area need not exist. What is required is our willingness to revise our priorities and dedicate the assets necessary to bring these new power sources on stream as soon as possible.

IV

Take another example of the changes time can bring about. For many decades prior to World War I, Western Europe comprised the most powerful and advanced group of nations in the world. Through their empires, the nations of Europe controlled most of the earth's surface. The science and technology that came from their factories and universities fueled most of the industrial progress in the Western world.

In those days, any nation which could establish hegemony over Western Europe could, in effect, control the globe. Britain, for many years, played the game of preventing that from happening, and did so quite successfully.

Beginning with World War I, we got into the "balance of power" game also. Americans were told that they were "saving the world for democracy." Really, they were saving Europe from the domination of Germany. This was true of World War II in a large measure. It was the reason for our participation in the "cold war" against the U.S.S.R. in the late 1940s, and it is the amalgam which holds NATO together today.

Our preoccupation with Western Europe still dominates our

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foreign and economic policies, as well as our military posture. The North Atlantic Alliance has the purpose of counterbalancing the brooding threat of Soviet Russia and its allies in the Warsaw Pact nations. We entered NATO gladly, assuming we had no other choice. At that time, our decision was a wise one.

Yet, one wonders why we continue this preoccupation with Western Europe. The comparative power of the European nations has gone down continuously since World War II. Their former empires are now a myriad of independent nations which make up much of what we call the Third World. While the combined economies of Europe are still formidable, and their scientific know-how is impressive, they no longer constitute the overwhelming economic and military power they were prior to World War I and World War II.

A reexamination of our posture causes us to consider many things, including the military safety of our troops in Europe. Since the withdrawal of France from the NATO military structure, with the resulting unavailability of the supply lines from the French ports to bring to our troops the reinforcements, ammunition, and other materials which they need, the position of American forces in southern Germany is bothersome, to say the least.

Supply lines must now come from the German and Belgian ports directly across the North German plain. It is fairly obvious that any Russian thrust would probably come across the North German plain and, if successful, would interdict our supply lines rather early in any conflict. This might result in our 350,000 troops defending a perimeter without hope of reinforcement or resupply. This is a possible result that no American should find palatable.

When we try to defend Europe at less cost in American assets and manpower, we are often met by firm opposition. For some time the American government has sought the agreement of the nations of Europe to deploy a neutron bomb. This weapons system, if in place, would be the most effective deterrent of all to a massed land attack by the U.S.S.R.—much better than any number of allied tanks. The neutron bomb could destroy Soviet tanks and personnel without doing significant or lasting damage to the cities and populations of our allies in Western Europe. It is ideal for the purpose of deterrence. It could suffice to stop a Russian attack, making a full-fledged nuclear confrontation unnecessary. Yet the governments of Western Europe have mainly not favored its deployment.

We also realize that none of the NATO nations have volunteered

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to help us defend the Persian Gulf, or any other areas of the world outside of Western Europe. In fact, it seems that they are telling us that we must continue to participate in their defense (even though it is 37 years since the end of World War II), in addition to protecting the interests of the free world in all other areas of the globe. One wonders how long the American economy is supposed to support burdens such as these without greater assistance from the economies of Western Europe.

Recently, we have tried to get our "allies" not to extend credit to help the U.S.S.R. to build a pipeline to transport gas from Siberia into Western Europe. There are several reasons why we take this position. First, we are wary of the political influence Communist Russia might be able to exert on a capitalist Western Europe which would be largely dependent on Russia for energy supplies. Second, the U.S.S.R. has dedicated a huge portion of its gross national product to armament. We would like to force it to devote more assets and hard currency to other purposes—i.e., pipelines. Extending credit for purchases needed for the pipeline gives the Russians more hard resources to use for arms. Third, when you are an overextended creditor, you are at the mercy of your debtor. Many European governments and banks are already suffering from overextension of credits to the Eastern bloc.

It seems now that our "allies" will ignore these quite cogent arguments, and will proceed to aid the U.S.S.R. to build its pipeline on credit and thus continue its armament buildup. These could become the twin shackles which will bind the free economies and political independence of Europe.

We even see some of our "allies" actively aiding rebels in Central America against governments which are friendly to us. If "linkage" is to be applied to our relations with the U.S.S.R., as it should be, perhaps the same principle should apply to the actions, or lack of action, of our "allies" in various parts of the world.

I don't believe the nations of Europe are adopting the policies which they now pursue because they don't like the United States. They are doing so because, consciously or subconsciously, they perceive their own best interests to be in a closer rapprochement and détente with the U.S.S.R. than we think is safe. I believe that this changed attitude is not an aberration, but is the beginning of a new era—a new perspective. I doubt that we can stop it, and I doubt that in the long run—50 to 100 years—we need to fear it.

The peoples of Western Europe have seen communism, with all its ugliness, repression, and dinginess. They are not going to

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embrace it voluntarily, and I doubt that it can be forced upon them over a long period of time, even with military and police power. In fact, the worst thing that could happen to communist Russia would be to swallow capitalist Western Europe. In less than 50 years, Russia would have absorbed a lot of capitalism—Europe would still reject the dullness of communism.

Western Europe has depended on us for its defense for too long. If it *really* wants to resist the predatory powers of Eastern Europe, let it do so with our blessing, our aid, but not our day-to-day participation.

I can understand the continuance of our mindset toward Western Europe. We have always been European-minded, practically ever since the foundation of our nation. And yet, if we were to project the power curves of the world society and look over the brow of the hill, I think we would see that our present policies may not be calculated to put us in the best position for the indefinite future.

Our European tilt has recently led us into an awkward situation. The Argentine Republic invaded the Falkland Islands. In my opinion, that invasion was unwise, illegal, wrong and reprehensible. Great Britain has been our most dependable ally. She was our mother country, and we have emotional ties to her which will never be dissipated.

However, I suggest we may have allowed Great Britain's understandable reaction to the Falkland invasion to influence our own policy unduly. First, we seem not to have been aware that, over the brow of the hill, the nations of South and Central America are likely to be even more important to us than are the nations of Western Europe, including Great Britain. Furthermore, given the decline in British capability to project power over great distances, I think it is a fair bet that in the long run the Falkland Islands will at some time come under the sway of Argentina, if she persists. Great Britain simply will not have the economy and the resources to support a long war or a protracted occupation in force of those not-too-valuable islands. In her own interests, she should not expend the assets necessary to defend such far-flung barren areas. She probably won't. Thus, over the brow of the hill, the Falklands are probably going to belong to the Argentine Republic, whether we or the British like it or not.

It seems to me that the only way to have solved the problem was for the British to have been more forthcoming in negotiating the future of the Falklands before invasion occurred. Argentina

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made it apparent that she was deadly serious about regaining those islands. A compromise involving shared rights to minerals, joint use of ports, and local autonomy for the inhabitants would surely have been preferable to warfare, and probably could have been had.

In other words, it seems to me that a fair balancing of interests, looking ahead 10, 20, or even 50 years, would have indicated that the Falkland Islands are not worth the treasure which Britain will spend on them. Certainly, from our standpoint, the erosion of goodwill we have experienced vis-à-vis our Latin American neighbors is a loss we cannot yet measure. A different tilt in our foreign policy priorities might have enabled us to avoid the unfavorable results of the Falkland affair.

V

The nations of the Third World certainly are going to increase in importance, not only totally, but also in relative importance to the United States. We have a unique opportunity, because of our advanced science and technology, to help the Third World nations to economic and social viability.

I am not one who believes that we should give of our treasure to nations which merely have their hands out. I do believe that we can help most nations to help themselves.

In what way can we help them? The answer is that any nation can become industrialized if it has people who are willing to learn, those who are willing to teach them, access to raw materials, and energy which is available and cheap. We can help them by teaching them much of our technology, but the greatest help that we can give them is supplying access to energy. I have already mentioned that over the brow of the hill is energy produced by the fusion of the hydrogen atom, and from the sun's rays. Hydrogen and the sun's rays are available throughout the globe.

Basic to a plentiful and universal supply of energy is the fact that we have flown the space shuttle *Columbia* several times, and will fly it and its sister ships many times more. With craft of this type, we can do many things, including building satellites in space with photovoltaic cells which can supply electric energy from the sun directly to practically any spot on the globe. This could become the most effective aid the developed world can give to the Third World.

I do not have the temerity to offer such a satellite power system as an easy or immediate solution. The scientific, technological and

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production problems involved in building such satellites, placing them in geosynchronous orbit, and equipping them with efficient photovoltaic cells are themselves extraordinarily great; these have been well analyzed in a recent study by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.[1] While this study projects that such a system could not be in place much before 2030, my hunch is that this underestimates what could be achieved by a crash effort.

Moreover, the deployment of such a satellite power system would require not only scientific, technological and engineering innovations, but political and legal agreements among nations which will make the "Law of the Sea" efforts seem simple by comparison. In short, it requires the dedication of assets over a long period of time which can probably be supplied only by a consortium of industrialized nations.

Yet the ability to produce power from the sun and to make it available almost anywhere in the world portends such an impact on world energy and social problems that it cannot be overlooked. A satellite power system seems the most promising large-scale approach, and I feel the United States must take the lead in beginning to solve the problems involved, and in recruiting as many adherents as possible.

I am also aware of the progress being made in producing energy from fusion of hydrogen and its isotopes. I hope an efficient system can be produced in the near future, but there are still formidable problems to be solved before fusion power can be called "within the state of the art." And the scale and sophistication of future installations for fusion power may make it less suitable for Third World needs than some means of harnessing solar energy such as the satellite power system I have described.

The bottom line for our foreign policy has to be a peaceful world. Otherwise, my definition of foreign policy makes no sense. Wars come as a result of the failure of foreign policy. Making available to every nation on earth the chance to find a way to "the good life" for its people is not necessarily a guarantee of world peace, but it will certainly help. We will still have our rapacious and irrational Hitlers, Mussolinis, Idi Amins, and Genghis Khans around the globe, but they will not be able to attract the popular support which they might otherwise have if the peoples of the globe either possess, or have in prospect, a lifestyle which is attractive to them.

[1] This 1981 study is entitled *Electric Power From Orbit: A Critique of a Satellite Power System.*

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It must be stressed that a nation in which our aid results only in making the rich richer, and more capable of feeding Swiss bank accounts, is not going to further our aim for a peaceful world. Yet we cannot force political, social, or economic democracy on other nations. Perhaps if we can make governments understand that our aid is provided to promote peace, and that world peace depends upon hopeful, progressive *people*—not just nations—we can, in time, further the adoption of those three kinds of democracy.

VI

I have mentioned that our military posture must be a part of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, foreign policy must be made up with many considerations in mind.

The capability to produce goods and services which will keep the economy healthy through reinvestment, provide the lifestyle which our people can reasonably expect, and provide adequate military preparedness, must always have our concern. I am certainly not suggesting that we should stint on providing for the defense of our country. Defending its people and its land is the first duty of any government. I am suggesting that after this objective is attained, any further military plans and preparations must necessitate the expenditure only of those assets which can be provided without undue distress to our economy. After all, in our efforts to provide safety for our way of life, a sound American economy is absolutely indispensable. Americans have never wanted to be world policemen. We are, and should be, concerned; but we are not, and shouldn't be, meddlers or enforcers.

Let me put it another way. If we cannot defend access to places or materials without serious damage to our economy or without unacceptable risk of nuclear war, we should turn our capabilities and our assets to finding substitutes to satisfy our needs through our science and technology.

Looking at our present military posture, as previously mentioned we are now falling behind the Russians in numbers of reentry vehicles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. If we allow the Russians to continue to enjoy this advantage, there can be serious consequences. The result could be political blackmail, allowing the U.S.S.R. to gain hegemony over many parts of the world without firing a shot. Or, it could tempt them to try a first strike hoping for a nuclear victory. We must not allow either of these things to happen.

And, yet, I see little profit in meeting the Russians missile for

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missile. It scares the whole world to death, and really accomplishes very little in the way of providing a peaceful world. Instead, should we not consider using our advantages in science and technology, to do an end run around the Russians?

Again, we can call on the *Columbia* and her sisters, which are capable of putting impressive quantities of matériel into earth orbit. Satellites equipped with rays capable of incapacitating or destroying ballistic missiles before they have reached their point of descent to their targets could be developed and deployed. We could, in time, put enough of those satellites in orbit to ensure that very few, if any, Russian ballistic missiles reach their targets. Such a system would require massive dedication of our capabilities, talents, and assets, but it would require no more outlays than would continuance of the nuclear arms race.

This would be a truly defensive system. It does not add to the prospect of war. In fact, it lessens those prospects. It should reassure the people of the world that we, at least, do not intend to initiate the ultimate holocaust.

There are those who will say that our perfection of such a space-based system to kill nuclear warheads will indicate to the Russians that we are striving for a "first strike capability." This is why we must accompany the deployment of such a system with an offer to destroy all ballistic missiles we possess, if other nations do likewise. The name of the game is to prevent the first missile with a nuclear warhead from taking off from a launching pad. Once the first missile is on the way, the ball game is over for civilization as we know it. So nuclear disarmament is absolutely vital and imperative, at the proper time and with the proper surveillance.

It can also be said that a satellite system for intercepting ballistic missile warheads violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 sharply limiting ABM deployment. It may. If so, we should recognize the changes which have occurred since that treaty was promulgated, and revise it by negotiation.

When the ABM treaty was signed and ratified, both Russia and the United States had primitive anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Neither could rely on its ABM system as an effective deterrent against nuclear strikes. Deployment would have cost billions of dollars and rubles. The best deterrent we each had was mutual assured destruction (MAD).

The MAD system has kept the peace up to now, but it is evolving into a dangerous and never-ending nuclear arms race. This "MAD mess" must be ended. Deployment and counter-deployment of more missiles cause global jitters and do not give either nation the

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security it wants.

Technology can be developed for a real ABM system using our capabilities in space. We should pursue that course.[2]

Now, let's talk about conventional war. It is extremely expensive, particularly to civilizations such as ours. The American soldier requires more of our wherewithal to train, maintain, feed, supply and pension than the soldier of any other nation. So instead of building more tanks and the other accoutrements of World War II-type armies, we should equip our conventional forces with the very latest military technology available. Unfortunately, we are not doing that because too many of the persons who make decisions like these are still thinking in terms of conventional war as it was taught to them in their earlier careers. We need to put a premium on innovation and the use of our superior scientific community and technology in conventional as well as nuclear systems.

We also need to overhaul our military procurement system to insure that we get our money's worth. There is too much gold-plating, too many cost overruns, dishonest estimates, and the like. We must find better ways to get the taxpayers' money's worth from the military-industrial complex. Our economy cannot afford to support inefficiency and absurd degrees of redundancy.

VII

To sum up, while we stand looking at the hill, we must try to visualize those things which are probably over the brow of that hill.

We should look and plan at least 50 years ahead. We must prepare ourselves to lead the world into the use of energy from the sun and from hydrogen, not from hydrocarbons. Using oil, an extremely valuable but wasting asset, to heat boilers or drive automobiles is a profligate waste which we can no longer countenance. Oil is extremely valuable for lubrication, feedstocks, and a myriad of other uses which the whole world can enjoy. It should

[2] Again, it is not my intention to minimize the scientific, technological, and diplomatic problems which must be solved before a satellite ABM, using rays, can be deployed. I am informed that with the dedication of the requisite amounts of assets, the first two difficulties can be overcome. I think we should proceed to do so—forced draft. I am also informed that the Russians are very far advanced in perfecting their ABM and anti-satellite capabilities.

I agree that there are many advantages in the present treaty controlling the military use of space. Nevertheless, we should recall that dedication to the mutual assured destruction concept was the main rationale for the ABM treaty. If, as I advocate, we "work away" from MAD, revision of the various treaties to allow us and the Russians to use advanced concepts for ABM systems should not be unreasonable. It would be my hope that the remainder of the space treaties would remain intact.

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be conserved for future generations to use more efficiently.

The preservation of the ecology of our planet is of paramount importance. I, for one, am worried about the "greenhouse effect" which a massive increase in the carbon dioxide in our atmosphere from the burning of hydrocarbons might produce. We need to know more about this possible effect.

The development of fusion or solar energy will not only end this threat, but it will change our whole foreign policy thrust. It will open the way for us to concentrate on our relations with the other nations of the Western Hemisphere, which must be our most important friends in the years to come.

Again looking over the brow of the hill, important to our global foreign policy must be helping the Third World nations arrive at social and economic viability. I hope we will be particularly solicitous in our aid to the nations of Central and South America, without any attempt at domination. That does not mean we should neglect Africa, Asia, or the Pacific basin. As to Western Europe, those nations will always be valuable trading partners and our cultures will always be congenial one with another. In fact, it would be my hope that the nations in Western Europe would enter into a consortium with us to help provide clean, cheap and plentiful energy and technology to the nations of the Third World so that we might eventually remove most of the rational causes of their dissatisfaction. However, we should cease giving Western Europe a dominant role in our foreign policy, to our future detriment.

Further, looking over the brow of the hill, we should organize our defense forces to defend those things which are absolutely essential to the preservation of our way of life. After that, if we have slack left over in our economy (after providing for the capital infusion necessary to keep our economy viable, and to provide a lifestyle for our people which is healthy, congenial, and reasonable), then we might want to turn our attention to the defense of other interests of lower priority. However, I think it is time for us to make it clear to the Pentagon that it has no blank check, and that it, too, must take responsibility for the preservation of the American economy and the American way of life. That preservation certainly will be enhanced by the use of balanced good sense in allocating the amount of our national assets to be dedicated to military weapons systems. We must also convince the peoples of the earth that we will not assume the role of global policeman.

The last sight I see over the brow of the hill concerns the

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American people themselves. I now see a population that has shed many of the faulted philosophies of the last 40 years concerning the desirability of public largesse which comes to them "without cost." I think our people now realize that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Our labor unions are beginning to understand that the welfare of all of us is completely tied to the production of enough capital to keep the products of our economy competitive both in quality and in price with the rest of the world. I hope that this trend will continue, and will extend to a realization by all of us that a strong American economy is the greatest of all the bulwarks of world peace.

I see, far over the brow of the hill perhaps, but nevertheless in sight, a peaceful world with each nation having the opportunity to provide the lifestyle its people want, and in which each person may share fairly.

I may be describing heaven. I hope not.

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Ian S. Lustick

ISRAELI POLITICS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

President Reagan's address to the nation on September 1 deftly reengaged the United States in the Arab-Israeli peace process. At long last Washington broke free from the straitjacket of deadlocked autonomy negotiations to declare its intention of vigorously pursuing resolution of basic political issues. The success of this initiative will be tested by the extent to which subsequent political change in Israel and in the Arab world produces foreign policies gradually more conducive to compromise.

American foreign policy must indeed seek concessions from both sides, from Arabs as well as Israelis. Whatever signs of moderation can be elicited, on either side, will enhance prospects for positive movement on the other. We should continue to press Arab leaders to declare unambiguously their willingness to recognize and negotiate with Israel, reciprocating Israel's longstanding position on these points. In this regard it was right for Vice President Bush to state, publicly and promptly, that the Fez declaration of September falls short of the necessary explicit acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

But when one looks at Arab and official Israeli attitudes toward the substance of the Reagan initiative, the asymmetry runs the other way. Whereas the Arab side has found positive aspects in the Reagan proposals, the present Israeli government has rejected them out of hand, even as a basis for discussion. It is increasingly apparent that Jordan, Saudi Arabia, other moderate Arab states, and even portions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), are fundamentally willing to join Egypt in pursuit of a peace agreement consistent with what we consider to be Israel's security requirements and legal rights. The problem, on the Arab side, is to make that willingness as straightforward and explicit as possible—as a test of sincerity and as a spur to positive change in Israel. On the Israeli side the problem is quite different, at least as long as a right-wing government of the present complexion remains in power. The problem is not to make explicit and definite a willingness to compromise which is implicit and ambiguous, but

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to replace a clear unwillingness to compromise with an orientation toward the future of the occupied territories and the Palestinians which would make fruitful negotiations conceivable.

The required change in Israeli policy, in short, is drastic and can only be associated with basic changes in Israeli politics. This, American policymakers should realize, will take time: not weeks or months, but years. Meanwhile, Washington's most important contribution to the achievement of peace, and to the protection of American interests in the Middle East in the absence of peace, will be to invigorate processes of political change in Israel by encouraging debate over issues that divide the Begin government from many, if not most, other Israelis. Intensified and sustained internal debate, and the eventual emergence of an Israeli government inclined toward and capable of implementing political compromises on Israel's eastern frontier, are what U.S. policy should be designed to help bring about.

Such an approach is based on three crucial judgments, all of which are implicit in the profile adopted by the President and his top advisers since the September speech. First, President Reagan's public and rather detailed presentation of a peace plan known to be fundamentally unacceptable to Prime Minister Begin reflects a conviction in Washington that achievement of a workable autonomy agreement with the current government in Jerusalem is impossible. Secondly, Administration support for eventual Israeli disengagement from the bulk of the occupied territories implies a judgment that the process of Israeli de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has not yet created, and will not soon create, a politically irreversible situation. Finally, the Reagan initiative and the U.S. government's concomitant willingness to wait for opportunities to pursue directly the consummation of a negotiated agreement imply the judgment that specific U.S. policies can be implemented, over time, to maintain and increase the momentum toward peace.

II

How valid are these judgments? There is no doubt that the first assessment, concerning the unwillingness of the Begin government to sign an autonomy agreement that would be minimally acceptable to any other party, is sound. Neither Palestinian, Jordanian nor Egyptian negotiators can reasonably be expected to sign any agreement which does not reduce the prospects for permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza below what they would be in the absence of a signed agreement. Yet precisely the reverse

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of that criterion determines the negotiating position and tactics of the Begin government: it will sign no agreement that *does* reduce the prospects for permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza below what they would be in the absence of such an agreement.

For Prime Minister Begin and a majority of his Cabinet there is no higher priority than protecting what is known in Israel as the "integrity of the Whole Land of Israel." In full sincerity they may advance a host of other arguments, including security concerns, protection of Jewish rights in Jerusalem and threats of irredentism from a Palestinian homeland. But these arguments are intended primarily to attract support for the absorption of "Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District" from those Israelis, and from Israel's supporters in the West, who do not share the present Israeli government's profound commitment to the expansive interpretation of Zionist ideology propounded by Menachem Begin's hero and mentor, Vladimir Jabotinsky.[1]

But is it still possible, then, that some future Israeli government, after Menachem Begin, could implement such an agreement? Clearly, Likud policies since 1977 have been designed to establish Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza so firmly and extensively that no future Israeli government could survive the political firestorm that attempts to disengage would trigger. This effort has entailed doing everything possible to erase the "green line" (the 1949 armistice line between Israel and the territories occupied in 1967), and to place Jewish settlements where they will obstruct any future attempts to divide the West Bank into separate Jewish and Arab enclaves. Formal erasure of the green line has been at least partially achieved by orders to state radio and television reporters forbidding them to refer to "Judea and Samaria" as the "West Bank" or as "occupied" or "administered" areas unless quoting an identified source. Official maps no longer include the armistice line between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel proper is officially referred to as the area "within Israeli municipal boundaries."

More concretely, by integrating the power grids of Israel and the territories; by building conurbations and road systems straddling the old border; by implementing water policies which

[1] For Menachem Begin, as it was for Jabotinsky, Jewish sovereignty over all the Land of Israel is an article of faith. Partition is akin to heresy. In 1981, Begin dramatically affirmed his devotion to the cause. At a large campaign rally in Ariel, a new settlement erected in the heart of a heavily populated district in the West Bank, he declared: "I, Menachem, the son of Ze'ev and Hasia Begin, do solemnly swear that as long as I serve the nation as prime minister, we will not leave any part of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights."

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require long-term access to fresh water sources in the West Bank; and by maintaining economic policies which force 100,000 workers in the West Bank and Gaza to depend on employment in Israel, and thousands of Israeli employers to rely on this cheap Arab labor, a recognized and minimally practical way to distinguish Israel proper from "Judea, Samaria and Gaza" is eliminated.

Some knowledgeable Israeli observers do, in fact, feel that the process of de facto annexation has passed the point of no return, at least in terms of domestic politics in Israel. To the casual observer, a visit to the West Bank creates an impression of Israeli settlements dotting the landscape in such profusion, and the establishment in certain key areas of such imposing and elaborate structures (notable examples are Ariel, southwest of Nablus; Maale Adumim, east of Jerusalem; Kiryat Arba, adjacent to Hebron; and Ephrat, south of Bethlehem) that contemplation of their removal or their transfer to Arab legal and political jurisdiction seems a fanciful exercise.

Dani Rubinstein, Arab affairs correspondent for the Labor Party newspaper, *Davar*, is well known in Israel for his dovish views. But, at the beginning of 1982, he wrote that after 15 years of Israeli administration, including five years of Likud rule, "there is no chance that Israel will be able to give up as much as one meter in the West Bank and Gaza, even if it wishes to do so." Although he personally views this as a catastrophe for Israel, he found himself forced to conclude that "the extensive settlement operations in the territories, the confiscation and acquisition of land, the Israeli Defense Force [IDF] deployment there, the bases, the emergency stockpiles, the training fields, the economic integration of the territories, all have been perpetrated by Israel's latest government in a way that even a partial renunciation thereof will lead the entire country to collapse."

Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, a leading member of Shulamith Aloni's "Civil Rights Movement," and himself a long time advocate of generous territorial compromise, has embarked on a systematic study of the process of de facto annexation. Citing the settlement in the West Bank of thousands of Israelis who have little or no ideological commitment to living there, but who are attracted by special government housing subsidies, Benvenisti has argued that the development of their settlements "as an inseparable part of the urban areas to which they belong" reflects the extent to which the territories have been absorbed into the everyday life of Israeli society. "The Jewish control of the West Bank after fourteen years is similar to the

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Jewish control of Galilee after thirty-one years." When Benvenisti wrote this, one and a half years ago, there were 60 settlements in the West Bank inhabited by 20,000 settlers; today there are some 100 with 25-30,000 settlers, and with the continuing step-up in the pace of settlement, there may be as many as 70,000 more settlers in the next two years.[2]

Some Israeli doves have been driven to contemplate binational formulas that could accommodate Jewish and Palestinian Arab aspirations within one political administrative framework, as an alternative to pursuing the chimera of disengagement. They suggest that formal annexation, with Israeli citizenship imposed on Arab inhabitants, may be a way to preserve Israeli democracy, even at the expense of the state's Jewish-Zionist ethos. Indeed it would be relatively simple for the Begin government, or any annexationist-oriented Cabinet—by the authority of an act of the Knesset passed in 1967—to declare the formal and permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza.[3]

In sum, it is clear that Israel's stake in keeping permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza has increased dramatically over the last five years. The price of withdrawal will continue to increase with every new apartment building and settlement, every land acquisition and every new administrative decree. For a future Israeli government, disentangling Israel from those territories in a way that could provide real opportunities for Palestinian political self-expression will be a highly complex task, requiring more imagination, more patience and greater willingness to take risks than it would have required in the past.

III

Despite the intricate web of fact and belief binding the West

[2] This is the estimate of Amos Elon, the noted Israeli author and journalist, and is consistent with government plans and projects already initiated. Moreover, the figures given here leave out the 65,000 Israelis who have become residents of the sprawling East Jerusalem district neighborhoods since 1967, in areas beyond the green line. Their inclusion brings the present total of Israelis now resident in the West Bank to nearly 100,000, equalling ten percent of the territory's population. (See pages 397-8 of this article for further discussion of the problem of Jerusalem.)

While unwilling to characterize the situation in as categorical terms as have Rubinstein and Benvenisti, Elon thinks that with almost one-third of the land Israeli-owned, "for all practical purposes," the West Bank and Gaza "have already been annexed to the State of Israel, perhaps irrevocably." Although he himself favors a territorial compromise with Jordan, and although he is not ready completely to rule out the possibility of its achievement, he seriously doubts that there is still any territory which could actually be returned.

[3] By virtue of this act, the minister of justice is empowered at any time to extend Israeli law to any part of the Land of Israel under Israeli control. Thus an Israeli government so inclined would not even have to turn to Parliament for its approval, as the Begin government was required to do in December 1981, when the Golan Heights were annexed.

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Bank and Gaza to the Jewish state, however, and despite the day-to-day possibility of formal annexation, I believe the Reagan Administration is correct in its judgment that Israel can, and eventually will, stretch or break its ties to the territories sufficiently to permit a negotiated settlement—or more precisely, a series of negotiated settlements.

Although formal annexation is a possibility, it should also be recognized that any Israeli decision about annexation would have to take into account serious negative consequences. Apart from longer term demographic pressures, it might well result immediately in the closing of the Jordan River bridges. This would slow if not stop Arab emigration from the areas and flood Israeli markets with cheap agricultural produce currently exported from the West Bank and Gaza to the Arab world.

Thus formal annexation is unlikely, though possible. In any case U.S. decision-makers cannot permit American foreign policy to be held hostage to the ability of any Israeli government, at any time, to issue a particular administrative decree. The Knesset is sovereign in Israel, and what it or the government does can be undone. The real determinants of the future of the occupied territories are not only the facts created on the ground, but also the balance of political forces, inside Israel and out, that will struggle to maintain or change them.

That there is long-term flexibility in the Israeli political system on the territorial issue is suggested by the precarious political base of any ultranationalist government in Israel's multidimensional political arena. It is also reflected in the genuine and explicit fears of West Bank and Gaza settlers that disengagement is only too possible.

Following Israel's successful raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and thanks to a sudden and massive allocation of money to subsidize luxury purchases by low income groups, the Likud managed a very narrow come-from-behind victory in the June 1981 elections. But only three to six months earlier the Labor Party had appeared destined for a sweeping victory. Poll after poll indicated that the Labor Party would form the next government and that it would do so with an unprecedentedly large plurality. Not only did Labor lead all other political parties, but Labor Party personalities, such as Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Abba Eban, were preferred by wide margins over their Likud counterparts for crucial ministerial posts.

There were many reasons for the popularity of the Labor Party in early 1981. Begin's health had deteriorated, the economy was

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suffering from triple-digit inflation, Jewish emigration was steadily rising, and constant backbiting, as well as several scandals, had severely weakened public confidence in the Likud and its coalition partners. What is of crucial significance is that the decidedly moderate position of Labor leaders did *not* prevent decisive majorities of Israelis polled from giving them their support. While Ariel Sharon, as chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Settlement, was implementing widespread and highly publicized land seizures in the West Bank, and announcing, on behalf of the government, the inauguration of settlement after settlement, Labor Party leaders were making their commitment to territorial compromise very clear and were even signaling their readiness to consider evolution of interim agreements toward more substantial accommodation of Jordanian-Palestinian ambitions.

Describing in January 1981 the parts of the West Bank his government would insist that Israel retain, Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres spoke, not of Israeli sovereignty, but of "deployment in the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion, and the Jerusalem area." In March he conducted highly publicized "secret" talks with King Hassan of Morocco and was widely reported to have established contacts with Saudi officials about a possible solution to the Jerusalem problem. He also publicly refused to promise that he would not remove settlements in the West Bank, even if they had been legally established.

As a rule, Israelis on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, of Sephardic (Oriental) background, with less education and with higher levels of religious observance, have tended to be more opposed to territorial concessions. The important point is not that the Labor Party positions described above were decisive in attracting support from these Israelis—they were not. But in the 1981 campaign the polls showed that the overwhelming majority of Israelis put problems of the Palestinians, the occupied territories, and the peace process very low on their list of priorities. What is instructive is that so many Israelis from groups marginally opposed to Labor Party policies toward the future of the occupied territories expressed their willingness to entrust the leadership of that party with the reins of power.

In other words, despite organizational problems and personality clashes within the Labor Party, demographic trends that are, at least in the short run, increasing the proportion of rightward-leaning, religious Jewish voters, and the Likud's recent success in exploiting the animosities and frustrations of many Sephardic Jews, the ultranationalist Right cannot be considered to have

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established the kind of ideological and political hegemony enjoyed for so long by the Labor Party.

In a poll of Israel's Jewish population conducted during the war in Lebanon (the first week in August), only 33 percent of those questioned favored "annexation of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza with all that involves" as a solution for the Palestinian problem. Sixteen percent favored "recognition of the [Palestinians'] right to self-determination in preparation for the gradual establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza;" and 37 percent chose "the return to Jordan of parts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, while demilitarizing them and guaranteeing security arrangements." Fourteen percent indicated no opinion. The continued readiness of a large proportion of Israelis to oppose the clear and consistent position of their government by expressing willingness to relinquish "integral parts of the Land of Israel," in return for peace with the Arabs, represents a fundamental political failure on the part of the Begin government.

There is no group in Israel that appreciates the extent of this failure, or the necessity to instill in the Israeli people a much stronger commitment to "the Whole Land of Israel," than the West Bank and Gaza settlers themselves. Consider their reaction to Israel's withdrawal from Sinai under the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, specifically the evacuation of the Yamit district in April 1982.

That evacuation involved 8,000 settlers and was preceded by months of speculation about the possibility of violent resistance and mass suicide. When the dramatic day finally arrived, Israelis witnessed scenes broadcast by state television and radio of hysterical mothers and children being carried away, and anguished confrontations between stubborn settlers and unarmed, often tearful soldiers. The conventional, or, more to the point, the official view of the evacuation is that of a "national trauma," of a society stretched to the limits of its psychological endurance. As many have argued, the shock, pain and sacrifice entailed in the forcible uprooting of Jews from Yamit evoke the horrible possibility of civil war, should the same be attempted in Judea and Samaria. Yet there is another interpretation, instructive albeit less well-publicized, of the Yamit evacuation.

What has impressed settler activists about the events of April 1982 is not how secure they show the future of Israel's presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to be, but how tenuous; not how difficult it was for a government to resist the pressure exerted by the settler lobby, but how easy; not how traumatic was the shock

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of withdrawal for Israelis, but how rapidly it could be assimilated and forgotten. In a series of formal and informal postmortems on their failure to prevent the evacuation, Gush Emunim leaders have attributed a great deal more fluidity to Israeli politics, and much wider discretion to Israeli governments inclined toward disengagement, than do many Israelis who would favor such an outcome.

Transcripts and summaries of many of these discussions were made public in several issues of *Nekuda* (Point), a journal published monthly by the Association of Jewish Settlement Councils in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. In the first issue published after the Yamit evacuation, the editors argue that should the legally constituted authorities make the decision to abandon the West Bank and Gaza, such a decision, though with a great deal more difficulty than in Sinai, could be carried out:

> Who was able to order the evacuation of Sinai and Yamit, the destruction of everything we built there, and the uprooting of all that had been planted; who was able to make those decisions and implement them, can do the same in other parts of the Land of Israel.

Still, the evacuation of Yamit did not destroy the faith of Gush Emunim in settlement as a means to make permanent the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel. Settlers view expansion and acceleration of settlement activity to be as important as ever. But the evacuation of Yamit did convince many of the movement's leaders that only settlement on a much larger scale—one that would eliminate the demographic preponderance of Arabs in the occupied areas—could be decisive in the determination of their future.

The consensus reached by the settlers was summarized in their new slogan: "*Behityashvut lo dai*!" ("Settlement is not enough!") That thousands of Israelis are taking up residence beyond the green line in order to live in government-subsidized housing is of course welcomed by Gush Emunim. But Gush activists fear that if utilitarian and not ideological concerns are what lead Jews to live in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, then utilitarian calculations, including offers of financial compensation, might some day lead them to move back into Israel proper. Accordingly, the editors of *Nekuda* have declared that sustained, well-organized political action must be mounted over the coming years:

> If we want to prevent another tragedy from befalling us we must act *before* the Israeli political machine—that is the government— is put in motion by forces from inside and outside the country.

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In a booklet published in the summer of 1982, entitled *A Plan of Action for a Time of Emergency*, the settlement councils detailed an elaborate program for the invigoration and expansion of Gush Emunim as a broad-based political movement. The pamphlet portrays the struggle for Israeli public opinion as crucial; it is to be conducted over many years and in all spheres of Israeli life—in the news media, inside governmental and quasi-governmental bureaucracies, in parliamentary and intra-party elections, in the schools, in the theater and in the armed forces. In the settlers' view, the permanent incorporation of "Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District" will not be assured until the vast majority of Israelis share their commitment to the "integrity of the Land of Israel" as the Jewish people's highest priority. In the long run, Gush leaders believe, this will require sharp reductions in Israeli dependence on foreign economic aid and a new willingness on the part of most Israelis, including poorer Sephardic Jews, to accept a reduced standard of living.

The Labor Party leadership shares the settlers' view that Israel faces a lengthy, multifaceted and profoundly difficult internal struggle, determining whether, and within what boundaries, a Jewish state will survive in the Middle East. And it also believes that trends toward de facto annexation are reversible. In mid-August, even before the end of the war in Lebanon, Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres announced plans for a renewed campaign "to reopen the great and burning controversy over the direction in which Israel is heading . . . an historic argument that cannot be escaped or blurred." Peres also feels that the struggle to annex or disengage from the territories must be thought about in terms of years. Emphasizing the fundamentally disruptive consequences of absorbing the large Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza, Peres characterized the Labor Party's position, and that of the government, as

> two sharp national alternatives . . . an Israel large in territory or an Israel justified in its path . . . prepared to give up some of its territory.
>
> Just as Mr. Begin sees this as a part of his fight for the greater Land of Israel, for the Whole Land of Israel, I see—and now more than ever—a need to explain to the nation and to the youth our choices. I do not want us to wake up in another ten years with our sons asking: Did you not see what was happening, that between the Jordan and the sea most of the children being born were not even Jewish children; that in the Galilee the Jews or the Jewish colony is in a constant downswing?

In sum, the struggle over the West Bank and Gaza will certainly be prolonged, and will subject the Israeli political system to

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enormous strains, but evidence suggesting the possibility of Israeli disengagement from the occupied territories is strong enough to justify U.S. pursuit of territorial compromise. Polls continue to show that a substantial proportion of Israelis, and often even a clear majority, express willingness to trade territory for peace. In spite of Menachem Begin's political success, he has yet to demonstrate that his stand against territorial compromise can itself attract a decisive measure of support from the Israeli electorate. Both the settlers, who are closest to the process of de facto annexation, and the Labor leadership, representing what still is the single largest political party in Israel, consider the fate of the West Bank and Gaza an open question.

IV

Given the impossibility of negotiating a territorial compromise while Menachem Begin is Israel's prime minister, and given the difficult internal struggle necessary before any Israeli government could disengage from the occupied territories, policymakers must now concentrate on sustaining the peace process—through short-term failure to long-term success. In other words, however much Washington might welcome a more forthcoming attitude on the part of the present government in Israel, and no matter how genuinely we may seek to elicit it, American policy must be fashioned not to alter the policies of the present Israeli government but to help create conditions supportive of substantial shifts in Israeli politics.

Three elements will support this approach. One is the potential for flexibility that does exist in Israel, especially if peace can be seen as dependent on territorial compromise and political accommodation with the Palestinians. Another is the very extremism of the Begin government (or any committed to permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza), which can abet U.S. efforts to end the association in Arab minds between the U.S. and Israeli policies. The third element is the willingness of moderate Arabs, including Palestinian leaders, to wait for the achievement of a settlement; that is, to wait as long as they receive credible assurance that real opportunities for achieving their basic demands are being preserved.

This combination of circumstances should enable American diplomacy to limit the damage to U.S. interests from the current absence of a solution, to increase the explicitness of moderate Arab willingness to make peace with Israel, and, most important of all, to encourage the emergence of a new constellation of political

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power and purpose in Israel. Central to the accomplishment of these objectives will be sustained and gradually elaborated criticism of Israeli policies, corresponding to the fault lines that divide mainstream Israeli opinion from ultranationalist ambitions and slogans.

Maintaining such an approach will, however, require more sophistication about the dynamics of internal Israeli politics than has often been reflected in U.S. policy. It is important, first of all, to dispel the widely held misconception that a vast majority of Israelis can be mobilized to support the country's leadership whenever it strikes a pose of "resisting American pressure." Washington must understand the fundamental importance, for any incumbent or aspiring Israeli prime minister, of claiming that he can foster the close ties between Israel and the United States—that the "special relationship" will be preserved. At the same time, although it is important for Israel to receive regular assurances from the United States of our commitment to its security and economic viability, it is not altogether unhealthy for Israelis to wonder whether long-term support for the Jewish state may be endangered by Israeli government policies which go beyond the Israeli "national consensus."

Conversely, the key to success in dealing with Israel does not lie in simply "squeezing" the country toward a sense of weakness and insecurity. Nor will it be found in the application of quid pro quo sanctions or the promise of rewards to manipulate Israeli policies. *The key to success lies in the convincing promotion of U.S. ideas that affect the rhetorical and political resources available to competing Israeli groups.*

The potency of this crucial factor was illustrated—in reverse—from 1979 through 1981, when active U.S. pursuit of an autonomy agreement, in formal closed-door sessions, without any other indication of basic U.S. policy, had a powerful counterproductive impact on the environment of political competition in Israel. Negotiations were taking place, generating a stream of vague but hopeful joint communiqués. This made it very difficult for the Labor Party and compromise-minded elements within the government to challenge Begin's autonomy plan as a plausible solution to the West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian problem. Meanwhile, implementation of maximalist settlement programs in 1980 and 1981 elicited little negative comment from U.S. policymakers anxious to preserve the autonomy negotiating process and protect the final stages of the Sinai withdrawal. As a result there was almost nothing on the Israeli political horizon, aside from minor flare-ups on the West Bank, giving credibility to arguments that

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keeping all of "Judea, Samaria, and Gaza" was possible only at ruinous cost to American support, as well as to Israeli society and to the chances for peace. In this context the Labor Party and other opposition groups were unable to exploit broad public uneasiness with de facto annexation by launching a full-scale debate on the future of Israel's relationship with the West Bank and Gaza.

This contrasts dramatically with the impact in Israel of President Reagan's speech and of subsequent elaborations given to the American initiative by Secretary of State Shultz and other Administration spokesmen. For the first time since his initial victory in 1977, Prime Minister Begin has been put on the defensive on the issue of de facto annexation. Zevulun Hammer, Minister of Education and Culture, and Deputy Foreign Minister Yehuda Ben-Meir, both leaders of the hawkish young guard of the National Religious Party, appear to be distancing themselves from former allies in Gush Emunim and to be calling for a profound reassessment of Israel's foreign policy. The invigoration of the debate in Israel about the process of de facto annexation, and the new political capital of Israeli opponents of that process, are at least partially the result of American attention to issues which divide Begin and his ultranationalist allies from the anti-annexationist majority of Israelis.

V

Peace, or even serious negotiations toward that objective, will not soon occur. Just as it is important to avoid excessive distress at the sluggish rate of change in official Arab positions toward Israel, so is it necessary to avoid overreaction to early signs of movement in Israeli politics. If elections are held in 1983, there is at least an even chance that the Likud will emerge victorious once again. Nor, if Labor should come to power (alone or, much more likely, in a new coalition), will fruitful talks necessarily ensue. Even if Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinians were willing to join Egypt in negotiations based on U.S. ideas, a Labor government would still be powerfully constrained by the hawks within its own ranks, strong ultranationalist factions among its religious party coalition partners, and the extra-parliamentary pressure which a large, dedicated and well-organized annexationist opposition will be able to exert. Thus it would be a serious error for the United States to make the return of the Labor Party to power its policy objective. Such an effort would invite counterproductive criticism of U.S. attempts to directly manipulate Israeli politics,

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without resulting in enough change in Israel to permit necessary political and territorial compromises.

To encourage the evolution of the Israeli political system toward the emergence of a government which could negotiate fruitfully—whether led by the Labor Party or some as yet unformed political coalition—the United States must stop characterizing the present as a golden and not-to-be-missed opportunity. Washington must prepare for years of patient diplomacy, backed by concrete measures that lend to American policy ever increasing weight and conviction. These measures must serve not only to shape the context within which Israeli politics will develop, but also to enhance the credibility of our commitment to legitimate Palestinian rights, and thus to protect the alignment of Arab states willing to make permanent peace with Israel.

What are some such measures?

First, the United States should begin again voicing its opinion about the legal status of the settlements. We should base our position on the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), according to which Israel's High Court of Justice has unanimously declared any "permanent" settlement to be, ipso facto, illegal.[4] According to the High Court's interpretation of the Convention, land for settlements cannot be "expropriated," but only temporarily "requisitioned" as required, not for political or ideological purposes, but for vital military needs. The Hague Convention also prohibits a wide range of settlement-related activities in occupied areas. This judicial admonition was prominent in two cases concerning settlements that aroused intense controversy in Israel in 1979 and 1980.

These rulings provide an ideal basis for the articulation of U.S. positions which can be "legitimized" in the Israeli political context. They permit a sharp distinction to be made between opposition to Jewish settlements established in occupied areas against the will of the local population, and support for the principle that Jews, as well as Arabs, should have the right to live wherever they please. U.S. interpretations of the legal constraints on Israeli settlements, framed to correspond to those stipulated by the High Court, would give politically important encouragement to those in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza striving to use the legal

[4] Up until 1981 U.S. spokesmen clearly and consistently characterized the West Bank and Gaza settlements as "illegal," but the State Department's legal adviser expressly based the government's position on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory, does explicitly prohibit the kinds of settlement activities sponsored by the Israeli government in the occupied areas. But for complex juridical reasons the Israeli High Court of Justice has ruled that the terms of the Geneva Convention are unenforceable in Israeli courts.

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system to limit land seizures and settlement activity and to protect the principle of the temporary nature of the occupation. Such a move would also encourage a more explicit debate over the wisdom of pouring scarce resources into legally "temporary" settlements, and increase the felt risks of Israelis who may consider investing in the construction of their own homes in the West Bank and Gaza.

We can also give more concrete effect to our opposition to the settlements. Since 1967, every American Administration has stipulated that no U.S. aid could be used by Israel to fund projects in the occupied territories. This policy has received regular legislative support in Senate and House hearings on annual foreign aid appropriations. Six billion dollars in economic aid have been awarded to Israel between 1967 and 1982,[5] but the ban on the use of our funds beyond the green line has never been enforced. In fact it could not have been, because the aid has been extended under the category of "security support assistance," or, as it is now labeled, an "economic support fund." This kind of economic aid consists of budgetary support in the form of cash transfers (loans and grants)—in contrast to most other aid relationships, the projects we fund in Israel are not specified. Nor has a single official at the State Department or the Agency for International Development (AID) ever been assigned to supervise the use of our funds by the Israeli government.

The transfer of even a small portion of economic assistance to Israel from the "economic support fund" category to that of "development assistance" would entail the immediate creation of a bureaucratic mechanism at AID for evaluating and monitoring its use in Israel. For the first time, the ban on Israel's use of U.S. aid beyond the green line could be at least partially enforced. Although the Israeli government would still have its own ample resources to go forward with projects in the West Bank and Gaza, this action would be a strong signal to Arabs and Israelis alike of Washington's determination to maintain the fundamental distinction between Israel and the territories that has been U.S.

[5] In addition, military aid amounted to around $14 billion during this period. It is interesting to note that aid figures increased dramatically in the mid-1970s. Economic aid climbed sharply in 1975 (to $353 million), as a consequence of Israel's worsening balance of payments situation in the aftermath of the rise in oil prices, and again in 1976 (to $714 million). It has ranged from $742 million to $791 million in the years since then. Military aid jumped sharply in 1974 (to $2.4 billion), to help replace Israeli losses in the 1973 war, and has ranged from $1 to 1.5 billion in the years since then—except in 1979, when the appropriation of $4 billion included $3 billion for costs incurred in the withdrawal from the Sinai, as required by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (Source for figures: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*, Report prepared for the use of Congress by the Office of Planning and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, 1981.)

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policy during the last 15 years.

As determined appropriate, the proportion of funds delivered to Israel within the development assistance category could be gradually increased, providing more opportunities for oversight and enhancing the credibility of our opposition to the process of de facto annexation. Should that process continue to accelerate, an added step might be to deduct from aid to Israel, and to place in escrow, funds equal to the amount estimated to have been spent in the previous year on settlements over the green line. Again, the possible usefulness of such a measure should not be evaluated on the basis of resulting changes in Israeli policies, but in terms of its impact on moderate Arab political calculations as to U.S. intentions, and on political struggles within Israel linking expenditures on settlements to decreases in government-sponsored social welfare programs.

A second key area where the United States may exert influence is in its approach to West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. The single most powerful argument of Israelis advocating disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza centers on demography. That Israel be a Jewish state, with a preponderant Jewish majority, is the very core of Zionism—to transform the Jewish people from a tolerated minority everywhere to a dominant majority somewhere. The Arab minority within Israel proper has grown to represent 16 percent of Israel's citizenry—a problem demographically, but a manageable one. But if the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are included, the Jewish majority shrinks to less than 65 percent. (Indeed, since 1972, the number of Arab babies born annually "between the Jordan River and the sea" has exceeded the number born to Jewish parents.) In 1980, the natural increase of Palestinian Arabs under Israeli jurisdiction was 20 percent more than that of the Jewish population. When they are forced to respond to the social, political and ideological problems that these population statistics portend, ultranationalist spokesmen hint that currently high levels of Arab emigration from the West Bank and Gaza are likely to continue, and eventually increase, with the application of tougher policies against dissidents and transformation of the areas into integral parts of the Jewish state.

The United States can reduce the credibility of this argument, and thereby accentuate Israeli concerns over the demographic problem, by bolstering the morale of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and supporting their efforts to remain in their homes and on their lands. We should therefore, first of all, cultivate closer ties with Palestinian spokesmen, and support economic and

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social projects to enhance the quality of life for West Bank and Gaza Arabs. Concern for their welfare could be demonstrated, for example, by increasing the range and regularity of contacts between our ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Amman and local representatives of Palestinian opinion. At present, these contacts are primarily maintained on a low profile basis by the staff of the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem.

As to dealings with the PLO itself, the United States would be wise to adhere to the 1975 undertaking by Secretary Kissinger, not to recognize the PLO or negotiate formally with it, until its public posture changes to demonstrate clearly its acceptance of Israel. However, as ex-Presidents Ford and Carter have joined in suggesting, informal dialogue with PLO representatives might well be useful; such informal contact was never excluded by the 1975 undertaking. The State Department could also begin to allow leading PLO representatives to travel and speak in the United States, a privilege we have frequently accorded to representatives of similar movements not formally recognized.

Such possibilities are sensitive and difficult for Israeli public opinion and for many supporters of Israel in the United States. An American-Palestinian dialogue, however, can have a positive impact in Israel as well as the Arab world to the extent that its nature and pace are guided by signs of movement in the PLO position. Both informal contacts and the opportunity to convey their views can serve to emphasize to Palestinian leaders the importance of ending all forms of terrorism and of demonstrating political maturity and discipline in the pursuit of an accommodation with Israel.

We should also increase our presently modest official aid to private service organizations providing health care, agricultural and vocational training, cultural support activities, educational programs, and municipal development assistance to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By raising our financial assistance substantially and by taking a more active and public role in the defense of these organizations against administrative harassment by Israeli authorities, Washington can help slow the emigration of Arabs, especially educated Arab men, from the West Bank and Gaza. Besides signaling, in the most concrete manner, our concern for local Palestinians, such measures would help discredit ultranationalist responses to the demographic dilemma. To the extent that the United States is perceived as strongly committed to the rights and welfare of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, it will be more difficult for Israelis to believe that Arabs in those areas will

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gradually disappear, or that they could be incorporated into Israel without granting them full civil and political rights.

A third main area for U.S. influence with Israel concerns the role of Jordan in the peace process. Jordan is mentioned no less than 14 times in the Camp David Framework for Peace. The Hashemite Kingdom is viewed as one of the four principal participants, along with Israel, Egypt and "the representatives of the Palestinian people," in eventual negotiations "on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects." Involvement of Jordan in negotiations toward establishing a "transitional arrangement" for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and of Jordanian personnel in the "strong local police force" envisioned as responsible for internal security, were both explicitly mentioned in the Framework document.

Jordan's refusal to participate in the ill-starred autonomy negotiations, as conducted to date, should not be interpreted as evidence of its unwillingness or inability to pursue political compromise with Israel along the lines set out in the Camp David Accords. The decision reflected a valid political judgment. The terms of reference for the autonomy talks, as well as the content of U.S. and, especially, Israeli policies, indicated that Jordanian participation would help camouflage de facto annexation, rather than enhance prospects for a "transitional arrangement" that would leave open minimally satisfying options for the permanent disposition of the areas.

The question of Jordan's role has opened one of the deep fissures in Israeli politics separating ultranationalists from most of those willing, in principle, to disengage from the territories. Anxious to at least appear to be advancing some positive solution to the Palestinian problem, the Begin government and many Israeli hardliners have argued that Jordan, with a majority of Palestinian refugees already, should be considered a Palestinian homeland.[6] Also questioning the legitimacy of Hashemite rule, some suggest, with more clarity and explicitness than in the past, that an end to the present regime in Amman would be a positive development. Implicit in this position is the hope, if not the design, that large numbers of Palestinians presently living under Israeli jurisdiction will eventually decide to make their homes across the Jordan River. The longstanding position of the Labor Party, on the other hand, and of most Israelis inclined toward disengagement, is that the solution of the Palestinian problem must be found in the

[6] See, for example, Yitzhak Shamir, "Israel's Role in a Changing Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, p. 789.

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context of a Jordanian-Palestinian entity encompassing the Hashemite Kingdom as well as the bulk of the occupied territories.

By insisting on the principle, laid down at Camp David, of Jordanian and Palestinian participation in negotiations toward a transitional agreement, by maintaining the suspension of the autonomy talks until participation would make good political sense in Amman, by (correctly) characterizing attacks on the integrity of Jordan as contrary to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and by supporting Jordan in other ways—such as arms deals, diplomatic visits and economic development projects—the United States would clearly establish its commitment to the political integrity of Jordan and the country's central role in the resolution of the West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian problem.

Aside from strengthening our ties with a friendly Arab government providing vital security support services to moderate states along the Persian Gulf, stronger U.S.-Jordanian ties would have a positive political impact in Israel. On the one hand, they would weaken the ultranationalist argument that Hussein's kingdom is artificial and temporary. On the other, they would strengthen the hand of Israelis who stress the need to offer realistic negotiating terms to King Hussein, in order to reinvolve him in the determination of the future of the occupied territories, and in a joint effort to create a politically manageable Palestinian homeland.

Consistent focus on the consummation of "transitional" or "interim" agreements is also key. There are still, and are likely to remain, substantial gaps between the position of any government capable of coming to power in Israel in the next few years, and that which internal and external pressures will enforce on Jordan. Negotiations that may take place should therefore be based on the principle (confirmed in Resolution 242) that acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible, and on the clear premise that interim agreements represent transitional stages in a gradual but comprehensive peace process. Only through tapping the trust generated by those agreements could Israeli and Arab leaders eventually bring their constituencies to accept more concessions than they can presently envision.

Clearly the distance between moderate Arab and Israeli positions is widest on the future of Jerusalem and its environs—that large chunk of the West Bank, from Ramallah to Bethlehem, defined by Israel since 1967 as part of the municipality of Jerusalem. Resolution of staunch and diametrically opposed claims to sovereignty will be possible only when conceptions of the politically possible on both sides of the dispute are substantially altered.

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At that time it may be possible to maintain the integrity of a smaller municipality, while dividing sovereignty among Arab and Jewish boroughs.

In this connection—paradoxical as the proposal may seem at first glance—Washington should be alert, at some point down the road, for a propitious moment to declare U.S. willingness, in principle, to recognize *West* Jerusalem as Israel's capital. By doing so, and by stressing that the permanent disposition of all territories occupied in 1967, including the East Jerusalem area, will be determined by negotiations to which Israel will be party, U.S. diplomacy could seek to prevent ultranationalists in Israel from using the Jerusalem question to block any movement toward compromise. For this is what they have done. Annexationists have used the broad-based commitment of Israelis to keep under Jewish sovereignty all of what was defined in 1967 as Jerusalem, as a kind of insurance policy against withdrawal from any part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By arguing that no territorial concessions will elicit agreement from the Arab world without also surrendering Israel's claim to a "united Jerusalem," they have sought to neutralize the willingness that exists in Israel to relinquish substantial portions of the occupied territories.[7]

VI

The measures suggested above are not exhaustive, but illustrative, not to be implemented in one fell swoop, but elaborated carefully. Whenever possible they should be timed to correspond with steps which bespeak Washington's strong commitment to Israel's security and economic viability, such as the delivery of new weapons systems, the passage of foreign aid appropriations, or the protection of Israel's status in international forums. But attempts to manipulate Israeli policies, or Israeli politics, through direct use of the country's military and economic dependence, will generate a severe backlash among Israelis, raise a storm of protest among Israel's supporters in the United States, and send dangerous signals to the Arabs that concessions on their part are unnecessary.

The approach outlined in this article is not likely to bring dramatic gains for a President who implements it. But it has the

[7] Thus, protection of Israel's control of the West Bank and Gaza was the real reason for the Begin government's promulgation of the "Jerusalem Law," declaring the entire city to be united forever as Israel's capital. This objective also explains the cult-like attitude of Likud government spokesmen regarding the sacred integrity of an expanded municipal district that, apart from the Old City and the Mount of Olives, contains relatively little that distinguishes it, historically or religiously, from the balance of "Judea and Samaria."

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great merit of being sustainable over a long period of time, during which threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East can be effectively mitigated and promotion of those interests significantly enhanced. At least while a right-wing government remains in power in Israel, domestic political costs within the United States should be tolerable. As is already apparent, intensified debate in Israel is bound to spur similar discussions among Israel's supporters in the United States, particularly within the American Jewish community. The airing of views long held privately will be healthy for all. Under such circumstances it will be less likely than in the past that either Republican or Democratic politicians will seek electoral advantage by out-bidding their opponents concerning U.S. support for Israel.

Most important, this is a policy that can succeed. It will encourage, gradually, lower-class Israelis to see their aspirations for economic and social advancement threatened by annexationist policies, dependence on Arab labor and the absence of peace. It will lead increasing numbers of religious Israelis, and others who value the country's cultural distinctiveness, to understand the implications for the Jewishness of the state of absorbing 1.4 million more Muslim and Christian Arabs. It will influence Israeli businessmen to appreciate how far staggering defense budgets, isolation abroad and instability at home, are obstacles to economic growth which could be eliminated along with efforts to extend Israeli sovereignty over the "Whole Land of Israel." More generally, it can create in the hearts and minds of all Israelis a profound sense of how devastating for the future of their country would be permanent incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza.

If pursued resolutely and implemented with no more error or misjudgment than is normal in the conduct of foreign affairs, an American policy designed to affect Israeli politics, rather than Israeli policies, can create genuine opportunities for building a durable peace.

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David MacEachron

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: THE BILATERAL POTENTIAL

In the tangled international tapestry certain relationships dominate the pattern. The U.S.-Soviet struggle has colored almost all world politics for a generation. Franco-German entente has ended centuries of European warfare. One relationship which holds much potential for improving world conditions is that between Japan and the United States. This bilateral relationship, conducted within a dense multilateral web in which each nation has many other ties based on interest and sentiment, is now, and will be increasingly, central to any proper functioning of the world economy and polity.

These two nations, so drastically different in history, culture, geographic size and location, outlook and temperament, have been thrust together in an unlikely partnership. They must simultaneously reorder their bilateral arrangements while improving their skills of international leadership. The United States must learn to rely more on the power of persuasion and become more sensitive to the legitimate interests of others. Japan must give up its small-nation mentality. Moreover, each nation can help the other in this, and in cooperation they can help guide the world through one of its most dangerous and exciting eras.

In today's climate it may seem farfetched to speak of Japan and the United States working in close collaboration. Angry comments from senior officials in both countries reverberate, and the economic struggle between Japanese and American firms at times seems relentless and even vicious. American doubts about the fairness of Japanese competition are met by Japanese questions as to the continued vitality of the American economy. Are not these two voracious economies likely to become bitter competitors for the world's markets and the world's dwindling resources? Can nations which start from such different notions of the role of the individual, the group and the state really mesh their systems in a sustained way?

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In the evolution of U.S.-Japanese relations, one thing is certain: the nature of that relationship in the coming decades will not only be of the greatest importance to both nations but also to the world at large. Their economic weight alone ensures this:

—Together they account for one-third of total world production and nearly half of the output of the non-communist nations.

—They provide the two largest sources of investment capital in the world.

—In several vital industries they are the world's two largest producers. Between them they share leadership in semiconductors, computers, steel, automobiles, earth-moving equipment and many other types of machinery.

—Together they import half of the oil imported by the advanced industrialized nations of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and consume about one-third of the world's annual production of other raw materials.

—With a combined population equaling only eight percent of the world total, they contain the two largest communities of scientists and engineers in the non-communist world.

Moreover, both nations can depend upon a relatively high degree of internal stability and public support for the policies which they pursue internationally.

And finally, the problems which usually divide nations and which divided the United States and Japan in the past are not present today. The last territorial problem between Japan and the United States as a result of World War II ended in 1972 with the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. Neither conflict over ideology or territory nor rivalry for regional or world leadership now exists between them.

Yet, despite these advantages and, indeed, the record of cooperation between Japan and the United States for a generation, relations between them are still subject to periods of tension and even crisis. Furthermore, there is a tendency for these periods to take on an unpleasant emotional tone which suggests that the importance of the relationship is not fully appreciated, at least on the American side, and that the foundations on which it rests are not as yet secure.

The bilateral trade between Japan and the United States, amounting to well over $60 billion annually, is currently heavily in Japan's favor. In 1981 the Japanese bilateral trade surplus was nearly $16 billion; it could go higher in 1982 and 1983. The impact on particular industries such as automobiles and consumer

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electronics is severe, adversely affecting hundreds of thousands of American jobs.[1] Even though the United States regularly has a sizable surplus with Japan in the service account and has not been in deficit globally in the current account, when adverse effects on employment of this magnitude are perceived as coming from a particular foreign country, a deleterious effect on the bilateral relationship is inevitable.

II

Speculation on the consequences of allowing U.S.-Japanese relations to deteriorate is helpful to understanding what is at stake. Extremes can be excluded, since a complete economic or diplomatic rupture is so totally contrary to the interests of both nations that ways will be found to avoid such costly developments. Worth considering, however, is the possibility of rising irritation and frustration which weakens mutual trust, causes each country to make a scapegoat of the other, and leads each to look for economic and diplomatic alternatives.

Worsening economic relations between Japan and the United States could well lead to growing mutual restraints on trade, planned and accidental disincentives for investment by one country in the other and a general lack of cooperation in economic matters. Each country would suffer directly economically, but the largest losses would probably occur as a result of the impact this would have on the world trade rules—mainly embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the world monetary system.

The growth of international trade since the end of World War II has been substantially more rapid than economic growth generally, and this trade is now essential to the prosperity of most nations. Trade as a percentage of the gross national product for many nations is one-quarter to one-third or higher. For both the United States and Japan the ratio is somewhat lower, with exports amounting to 7.8 percent of U.S. GNP in 1981 and 14 percent of Japan's in that same year.[2] Thus, for the United States, international trade is important while for Japan, which must import four-fifths of its energy requirements and most industrial raw materials, international trade is vital. This vast global exchange of goods, now amounting to over two trillion dollars per year, has

[1] C. Fred Bergsten ("What to Do about the U.S.-Japan Economic Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 1061) cites an estimate of over 500,000 jobs in the United States affected by the bilateral trade in 1980 when the Japanese surplus was much lower.

[2] Figures supplied by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.

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been reasonably well guarded for 35 years from the incessant demands of those in all countries who would protect local markets from foreign competition.

The GATT consists of a set of multilateral agreements and undertakings which set the ground rules for the conduct of world trade. Each nation which accepts the GATT provisions, including most of the industrialized democracies, undertakes to extend equal treatment to all the other participants. Should this multilateral undertaking seriously weaken, the impact on world trade and world prosperity would be profound. If the United States and Japan, the two largest national economies in the system, began to restrain their bilateral trade on a large scale, the consequences for the GATT system are reasonably clear. The encouragement such an example would give to protectionists in all countries is bound to be great indeed.

Trade between Japan and the United States is not now free from legal and informal restraints on both sides. Nevertheless, the policy has generally been moving toward reducing barriers further. Should that trend reverse, some of the exports of both nations would be diverted to third markets. Both Japan and the United States have substantial trade surpluses already with the nations of Western Europe. Although the situation is more varied as regards other markets, only certain of the oil-exporting nations have the ability to expand imports significantly. Inevitably then, other nations would begin to erect new barriers against exports from both the United States and Japan. Furthermore, the domestic forces within Japan and the United States, leading each nation to restrict imports from the other, would surely react against the third country exporters seeking to exploit the new opportunities apparently created by the decline in U.S.-Japanese trade. The unraveling of the GATT structure would proceed inexorably.

While the United States could adjust to a reduction of world trade, though at a cost, the effects on Japan would be calamitous. The most prosperous, stable, democratic nation in Asia would be subjected to intense economic pressures, which would surely have social and political repercussions. The prosperity of all other nations would be likewise threatened. Although the manner in which these pressures would find release cannot be predicted, that the peace and prosperity of the world would suffer drastically cannot be doubted.

Aside from the obvious advantages each nation gains from the bilateral trade—expanded markets for efficient producers, greater opportunities for consumers, technology transfer, and the related

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benefits—each nation also has a beneficial effect on the other through the force of competition. The impact of Japanese competition on American producers in numerous fields is palpable. This has been painful for American workers and companies, but one must ask whether the American automobile industry would have reacted as quickly as it did to rapidly rising petroleum prices if it had not been for the harsh competition from abroad, mainly from Japan. If the competitiveness of American steel has declined, is it not better to discover this now through the market mechanism while there is time to take the necessary corrective action? Indeed, in both automobiles and steel, as well as in electronics, the emerging pattern is one which involves both competition and important technical cooperation. Spurred by Japanese competition, helped by the study of Japanese methods, and aided by technology exchange agreements with Japanese firms, American industry is altering production methods to cut costs and prices while improving quality.

It is also worth recalling that the American economy is still, overall, the most productive in the world, even though the rate of increase in productivity is low. American firms in fields such as aircraft, heavy electrical equipment, genetic engineering, computer software, and health technology are still the pacesetters for the world. American agriculture and distribution systems are much more productive than Japan's. The exciting potential for fruitful interaction between these two dynamic nations would be lost if this interaction were retarded.

III

The likely diplomatic consequences of allowing U.S.-Japanese relations to weaken as a result of economic tensions are also ominous. The United States and Japan have remarkably similar diplomatic interests in the world. Both favor a liberal economic order, a world which is open to trade and capital movement. For both, open democratic societies are preferable to autocratic regimes with their inherent propensity to violence and sudden foreign policy changes. Both are eager for an end to Soviet expansionism and for a continuation of the evolution in the People's Republic of China toward moderation. Japan has been as supportive of the United States in the cases of Iran, Afghanistan and Poland as any of America's allies. Both Japan and the United States benefit from and support the growing prosperity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Expanding Japanese foreign aid has increasingly been directed to countries considered

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strategically important by the United States, such as Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt, as well as to the nations of Southeast Asia.

Only as regards the Middle East is there a significant diplomatic difference between Japan and the United States. Japan's dependence on Middle East oil (nearly 60 percent of all Japanese energy needs as compared to 7.5 percent for the United States), plus the absence in Japan of a special tie to Israel, has caused the Japanese to pursue a policy in that region which seeks, while trying to avoid antagonizing the United States, to maintain friendly relations with the oil exporters.

A weakening of the close diplomatic cooperation which has developed between the United States and Japan in recent years would be serious for both. Both would be more vulnerable to manipulation by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other nations as well, if either could be played off against the other. Support for the United Nations and other world institutions, which, with all their shortcomings, are still a moderating presence in many of the world's conflicts, would be weakened if Japan and the United States did not coordinate approaches on many issues.

A slackening in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic cooperation would come at a particularly unfortunate time for Japan. The trauma of defeat and occupation for Japan (which included the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the atom bomb) was a national experience of deeper impact than anything which has occurred in the United States, at least since the Great Depression and possibly even since the Civil War. For at least three decades following the war, Japan deliberately sought a low profile in world affairs and relied heavily on U.S. leadership. With self-confidence largely restored, Japan is cautiously making its own decisions in foreign affairs as, for example, in regard to Vietnam and the Middle East. Close cooperation with the United States, however, remains the oft-stated cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. If Japan should feel alienated from the United States, it is impossible to say what direction Japanese foreign policy would take, but every conceivable course, from accommodation with the Soviet Union to a massive rearming, including production of nuclear weapons, would be highly disadvantageous to the United States.

The implications of any weakening in Japanese-American security relations are truly alarming. Such a development would put in jeopardy American bases and supply lines which are essential for the American forces in the western Pacific. The U.S. divisions in Korea would be much less secure. Their withdrawal

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would represent a gamble which no American Administration for over 30 years has wished to take, but faced with uncertainty about Japanese cooperation, this policy would have to be reevaluated. The defense of the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and the other nations of East Asia would be put in doubt, and the security of the United States would be seriously weakened.

Yet the possibility of our defense ties with Japan reaching such a sorry state looms ever greater as the perception in the United States grows that Japan simply is not assuming its fair share of the defense burden. Coming under increased American pressure, and in response to the Soviet arms buildup, the Japanese government has called for annual increases in defense spending—up 7.34 percent this year—in an otherwise zero-growth budget. The problem with this figure is that while above and beyond the three-percent growth target that most NATO members are failing to meet, total Japanese defense spending amounts to less than one percent of Japan's total GNP. This summer a Pentagon *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* concluded that "Japan appears to be contributing far less than its share or what it is capable of contributing."[3] How long Congress will allow the United States to provide some 53 percent of the total, collective military budget of the allies, when Japan provides less than four percent of the total, is anybody's guess. The issue in most American officials' minds is not one of lack of funds but lack of political will. Unless evidence of that will is more forthcoming from the Japanese, we could witness a serious retrenchment of U.S. forces abroad and in the Pacific in particular.

The effect on Japan of such a breakdown in the security relationship would be severe. At present under the 1960 Treaty for Mutual Security and Cooperation, Japan essentially relies on the United States for its security. Should Japanese confidence in American protection decline to the point where the Japanese were faced with developing an alternative, three principal choices would be open to them. One, they could attempt to fashion a security arrangement based on cooperation with the People's Republic of China and such other nations as might be associated. This would require a much larger Japanese military establishment with the disadvantages discussed below plus, in all probability, Japanese help in the arming of the P.R.C. This would, of course, be seen as highly threatening by the Soviet Union and other nations of Asia as well. It would certainly carry a heavy burden

[3] *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, report to Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, July 21, 1982.

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of tension and potential conflict while offering only modest hope.

A second major option would involve a Finland-like accommodation with the Soviet Union, a move which would be congenial to the pacifist and neutralist elements in Japanese thought. The Soviet need for Japanese technology, and the Japanese need for Soviet raw materials, could possibly provide the basis for such an accommodation. However, the Soviet attack on Japan in the closing days of World War II, and the subsequent imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers, many of whom never returned; the Soviet occupation and arming of islands considered by the Japanese to be part of their homeland; difficult negotiations on many subjects including fishing rights; and growing evidence of Soviet aggressiveness have created such a deep distrust and even dislike in Japanese minds that an accommodation of this sort would probably be the least attractive course for Japan. Even if it were adopted as an expedient, there would be continuous efforts to escape from the arrangement, which would mean constant uncertainty and trouble in East Asia.

Three, they could seek to build an independent military force adequate to provide whatever security they could reasonably expect to attain without assurance of U.S. help. This would involve nuclear as well as substantially increased conventional forces. As regards strategic defense, the basis for policy would have to be somewhat similar to that announced by General de Gaulle—to the effect that Japan could not escape annihilation if the Soviets chose to attack with nuclear forces, but the Japanese could at least in retaliation tear off a Russian limb. A strategy based on raising the cost of aggression to unacceptable levels to the aggressor would also apply to Japanese conventional forces.

The cost to Japan and to the world of such a course would be high indeed. Not only would all of Japan's neighbors be alarmed at the specter of a large military buildup, but many Japanese also find this frightening. The memories of the results of military rule in Japan in the 1930s, as well as of the horror of nuclear weapons, are still living realities for many Japanese. There is concern that the rise of a powerful military-industrial complex in Japan would have a baneful effect on Japanese life and even on the health of democracy there. To a world already burdened with the great strategic arms race, plus several regional arms races, would be added the potential of yet another.

This brief discussion of the results of a weakening in the U.S.-Japanese alliance suggests how dismal the consequences are likely to be if this should be allowed to happen. Since there are many inherent bases for Japanese-American misunderstanding, there is

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a danger that things will unravel unless both countries maintain conscious and vigorous efforts to develop closer ties.

IV

The obstacles to Japanese-American cooperation are deeply embedded in the history and social structure of each nation. That Japan is homogeneous and the United States heterogeneous is self-evident, but the overwhelming importance of this singular difference cannot be appreciated until it has been experienced in both nations. There is nothing in the collective American experience that compares with the intensity of being Japanese. To be Japanese is to be aware from birth that one is part of a nation small in area and unique in language, culture, history and geographic location. No major nation has lived so completely unto itself; the heritage of two and one-half centuries of nearly complete isolation is still strongly felt. No other advanced nation has a similar continuity of institutions extending into prehistory. Japan is a creation of nature. An energetic and intelligent people, working to refine their society in isolation, the Japanese have created the world's most highly articulated large community, in which institutions, mores and individual aspirations have been brought into a much more precise connection than in any other large country.

America, by contrast, is composed of loosely integrated ethnic and racial groups united by agreement on methods of governance and dispute settlement. The United States was a deliberate intellectual creation based on institutional diversity compounded by a still-growing ethnic diversity. Whereas the intense, binding Japanese experience has produced in that country a pervasive understanding of what constitutes proper conduct in all normal circumstances, Americans have only a limited set of such generally agreed rules. To a degree unthinkable in the United States, therefore, the Japanese can settle disputes, decide on policy, and so govern themselves without benefit of the formalistic laws and regulations through which a heterogeneous population must make explicit that which is not implicit.

Since Japan is such a highly unified nation, there is no constitutional presumption of diversity of rule-making as there is in the federal structure of the United States. This has important practical significance. For example, Japan has no objection to national banks in addition to regional banks. Banks which are free to draw on the resources of an economy half that of the United States will clearly be strong competition for American banks which are still struggling to find ways to operate across state boundaries. The

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national newspapers in Japan have circulations five to six times those of the largest American papers and, as a result, much greater resources. Since the Japanese family subscribes on the average to 1.5 papers, often including a national and a regional paper, the Japanese population is better and more uniformly informed about national and international events than is the American population. A national educational system provides a relatively uniform and high-quality secondary education. A much more hierarchical system of national universities, public and private, helps to maintain the leadership cadre, public and private, selected largely on merit and much more united by bonds of friendship and common outlook than is possible in the United States. From the Japanese perspective Japan looks small and America large; from the viewpoint of the American firm, the massed power of Japan—including national banks working closely with allied production and marketing firms and supported by a cooperative government bureaucracy, notably the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance—seems very large indeed. For example, MITI has recently decided on a 30-year program to make aircraft a "target industry of the 21st century"—a clear long-term threat to aircraft manufacturers in the United States and Europe.

Integrated Japan versus decentralized America is vividly demonstrated in the different relationship between government and business in the two countries. The difference can be characterized as that of coach versus referee. Since 1854, when Japan reopened its doors to the world, the drive has been to catch up with the West, and the government has seen its role as the inspirer, leader and protector of private firms seeking to battle their way into world markets. Government and business in Japan for well over a century have shared a partnership—at times strained but nonetheless effective—pitting Japan against the competition. America, also insular but content in its continental size, viewed the outside world from the mid-nineteenth century until quite recently as intrusive, disturbing, even exciting, but not for the most part of great importance economically. The role of government was seen as the rule setter and system manager, guarding against monopoly and other abuses, unmindful of any cost that this imposed on American firms and their need to be competitive internationally.

The intense inward-focused Japanese experience has produced a set of values which puts the group—family, village, school class, firm, nation—higher on the value scale than is common in America, where the individual has been exalted. Commitments to jobs

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and to long-established relationships go much deeper in Japan. Human relationships based on mutual trust are built slowly, but once built are expected to endure. The operational significance for business and government relations is highly important and creates difficult obstacles for U.S.-Japanese cooperation.

There is also a discontinuity in mood between Japan and the United States which adds to the problem of cooperation. Japanese frequently display a legitimate pride over their astounding achievements, which at times borders on arrogance. This is combined, however, with an acute sense of vulnerability springing from their near-total dependence on a world economy over which they feel they have little control. They compare the ordered efficiency and peace of Japan to the disorder in other countries and in the world; understandably, they are reluctant to engage their destiny with foreigners any more deeply than necessity requires.

The mood in America contrasts sharply. The recent decline in American influence, associated in part with the decline in the relative size of the U.S. economy, as well as with the scars left from Vietnam, has darkened American optimism. Key industries appear to have lost their competitive edge. A mood of doubt and self-doubt has replaced the easy self-confidence of the early 1960s. With some feeling of self-righteousness, Americans now expect the newly powerful Japanese to help with the burdens of world leadership, just at a time when Japanese doubts about American reliability and durability are on the rise.

V

New efforts are therefore needed by both nations to ensure the continuation of the collaboration which has been so fruitful for both. Fortunately, the actions needed in each country, although involving in some cases significant short-term costs, are clearly in the long-term best interest of each, regardless of the requirements of the bilateral relationship.

On the American side, the essential need is a generally reinvigorated economy. This must include bringing inflation under control and creating the confidence that it will be kept under control. Savings and productive investment, including research and development, must be increased. Interest rates and unemployment must be brought down to acceptable levels. By now, these goals are generally accepted, though there is continuing debate as to how they are to be achieved. With a restrengthened American economy, many of the current economic problems

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between Japan and the United States would diminish to secondary importance or disappear altogether.

Japanese competition is only the early warning signal of the much more competitive international climate in which we are moving. If we attempt to turn off the warning signal through protectionist measures, we will inevitably lose time in our efforts to readjust to the world market, thus making the inevitable readjustment more costly and more painful. The damage done to our relations with Japan would only be compensated by ephemeral gains.

Assuming that America rises to the challenge, as it must in its own interest, the United States also needs to adjust the handling of its foreign policy. At the root of American difficulties in sustaining a sensible policy vis-à-vis Japan is the widespread lag in American perception of Japan's unusual importance to this country. Generally speaking, in the circles which shape policy, including government officials, businessmen, journalists and educators, there is still an inadequate grasp of the potential for gains and losses inherent in the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Although American awareness and knowledge of Japan have increased remarkably in recent years, much remains to be done. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that both the Nixon-Ford and Carter Administrations had difficult times with Japan in their early years, but as they came to understand Japan and its importance, relations between the two countries became much more amicable. Toward the end of the Nixon-Ford Administration, Henry Kissinger stated that bilateral relations had "never been better in thirty years." President Carter's unprecedented attendance at Prime Minister Ohira's funeral demonstrated a regard for Japanese sensibilities which was notably lacking at the start of his term.

The executive and legislative branches of the federal government are still critically understaffed with people who are deeply knowledgeable about Japan, or have the ability to work easily in the Japanese language. Congress is involved regularly with legislation affecting U.S. relations with Japan, but the number of congressional staff members with adequate knowledge of Japan is pitifully inadequate. The Department of State has a well-qualified group of Japan specialists, although none at the most senior levels. The many other agencies of government which also are regularly involved with Japanese affairs, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Education and Justice—plus independent agencies such as the U.S. Trade Representative, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the In-

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ternational Trade Commission—have few officials who are fully conversant in Japanese. The National Security Council and the White House are also involved with Japanese affairs on a continuing basis without benefit of enough expertise. This shortage of specialists on Japan is a self-inflicted handicap in managing U.S.-Japanese relations.

Consideration should be given to a special ten-year effort to create within the many involved federal agencies a corps of Japanese specialists, trained in language as well as other relevant aspects of Japanese society. In addition to recruiting Japanese specialists into the career service, a special training program might be established for up to 100 individuals a year, open on a competitive basis to appropriate career officials in all designated departments and agencies who are willing to undertake special training. This would include intensive language and cultural training in the United States and Japan, accompanied by a commitment by those who benefited from the program to work on Japan-related matters for a designated period at the pleasure of the government. Ideally, this program should be monitored on a government-wide basis to ensure that these specially trained individuals are maintaining and improving their competence and also to keep track of the way that they are being used by their respective agencies. It is to be hoped that many of these Japanese specialists would eventually be promoted to positions of broader responsibility involving more than just Japan-related official issues. The fact is that Japan and Japanese experience are now relevant to vast areas of American life.

Another possibility would be an adaptation of a successful program which has developed better understanding between European Community officials and their American counterparts. Under this program, matched exchanges of middle-level officials are carried out with each partner acting as the host for the visitor. The officials being in the same field, e.g., agriculture or central banking, each is able to arrange for the other the most useful program possible. In the course of reciprocal visits of several weeks, the paired officials have an opportunity to become well acquainted, and their friendships have helped to lubricate the contacts between the European Community and the U.S. government.

American multinational corporations, particularly those operating in Japan, could also benefit from a greater effort to recruit, train and utilize Japanese specialists. Firms now operating in Japan could use them to advantage both there and as specialists

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in their headquarters. Corporations not now operating in Japan could well afford at least some staff expertise on Japan to keep them informed of opportunities and risks, since for the foreseeable future Japanese firms are going to be the most important competitors and/or collaborators for American firms. American corporations, as a matter of simple prudence, should be well informed about Japanese methods and systems whether or not they are now involved with Japan.

The high premium the Japanese set on personal relations and the difficulty of mastering the language and culture suggest the wisdom of not rotating executives in and out of Japan as though this were an ordinary assignment. Among the American business community in Japan there are today some individuals who have learned the language and, with the cooperation of their firms, made Japan a long-term commitment. Many more of these are needed—not least because of the substantially greater profits which foreign investors earn on the average in Japan.

A growing cadre of professionals—journalists, lawyers, economists, accountants—knowledgeable about Japan would also be a national asset. The creation by the Congress in 1975 of the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, a federal foundation devoted to expanding educational and cultural contacts between the two countries, gives recognition to this, and the Commission has provided substantial encouragement to the training of Japan specialists who are also professionally skilled.

Private, nonprofit organizations operating in both countries can also contribute to the task of helping these two nations work together more effectively. In 1980, in a unique experiment, a special group of private citizens from both countries, the so-called "Wise Men," was asked by the two governments to review U.S.-Japan economic relations. Their report particularly urged both governments "to support the efforts of private sector and parliamentary groups willing to give close attention to the United States-Japan economic issues. Such groups can play an important role in educating public and political colleagues."[4]

There are two areas where greater American sensitivity to Japanese concerns deserves special mention—food and energy. In both these areas Japan is critically dependent on imports. Japan imports one-half of its foods by caloric value. Although Japan is more than self-sufficient in rice, so that literal starvation would

[4] *Report of the Japan-United States Economic Relations Group,* prepared for the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan, January 1981, Washington: GPO, 1981, p. 100.

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not be an immediate problem if trade were interrupted, the near-starvation at the close of World War II is still vivid in the nation's memory. The case of energy is, if anything, even more significant. The Wise Men estimated that a substantial disruption in world oil production would have serious consequences for the United States—but would be truly catastrophic for Japan. Japan's vulnerability and consciousness of this vulnerability is almost inconceivable for Americans.

The United States can do more than it has done so far to give Japan the assurance of reasonable access to food and energy in normal times and in crises. The U.S. legislative barrier to the sale of Alaskan oil to Japan, reflecting an American desire to retain full use of this domestic source in the event of a crisis—even though it would be more economical to sell some of this oil to Japan—is a continual reminder that the United States does not recognize the degree of interdependence which already exists. The joint development of coal in the western United States, as well as joint research on energy conservation and on new sources of energy, would also be mutually beneficial. If the United States and Japan together approached the problem of ensuring stable energy supplies, they would improve their security and bring an added element of stability to the world energy picture. Sale of U.S. energy to Japan would also significantly improve the bilateral trade balance in America's favor.

Better assurances that the United States will be a reliable supplier of food are needed. The short-lived controls on soybean exports instituted by the United States in 1973 are still remembered in Japan and pointed to as an example of what happens in the event of shortages in the United States. Long-term commitments on U.S. food supplies, incorporating confidence-creating arrangements, are needed.

Japan must also adjust if this bilateral relationship is to achieve its full potential in the world. The fundamental need is for the leadership *and* the Japanese public to grasp the full implications of Japan's great economic weight in international affairs. The Japanese habit of thinking only of what is good for Japan, on the implicit assumption that the world trade and monetary system will be unaffected by Japanese behavior, must give way to thinking about what needs to be done to preserve that system on which Japanese survival depends.

However, a change in Japanese perception in this direction is coming with increasing speed. In April 1982, the Keidanren, the organized voice of Japanese business, issued a far-reaching call for

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a further opening of the Japanese market to foreign goods. This was followed by the second package of measures in six months to reduce Japanese barriers to trade and a special statement by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki on May 28, 1982, in which he called on responsible officials and private individuals to welcome foreign goods and investment. Together, these constitute a significant forward movement.

The practical effects of a thorough Japanese recognition of its leadership position would be profound and not fully predictable. The remaining obstacles which still inhibit imports into Japan would presumably be further reduced, although no nation has ever opened its borders completely to imports. Japanese overseas investment, which is itself a powerful force toward greater internationalization of Japanese society, would continue at an accelerated pace. Japanese foreign aid would continue to rise and the terms on which that aid is extended would continue to be liberalized. The yen would steadily move toward key currency status with all that this implies for further opening of the Japanese capital market to foreign borrowers and greater freedom for foreign holders of yen to transfer in and out of the currency.

Substantially increased Japanese leadership in this area would also mean a heightened cooperation between Japan and the United States in the affairs of international institutions. Japan is already the third largest contributor to the U.N. budget, but its role in the international institutions is still too modest.

The United States and Japan, in cooperation with other like-minded nations, can offer the world badly needed leadership. Ironically, war created the basis for a much closer collaboration between these two Pacific powers than might otherwise have been possible. Some of the elements of a joint agenda which will make this collaboration most fruitful have already been suggested. That agenda will require more extensive and continuous consultation between the many relevant government departments on both sides, including a resumption of periodic, cabinet-level meetings of all these departments. These and the many other steps which will benefit both nations are likely to develop naturally once the United States fully accepts the exceptional role Japan will play in its future and once the Japanese recognize fully the major influence they inevitably exert—and will exert—in world affairs.

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Amaury de Riencourt

INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE SHADOW OF AFGHANISTAN

Just over 35 years ago, on August 15, 1947, India and Pakistan became independent states. What should have been a joyful occasion was marred by the ghastly slaughter of half a million people and the uprooting of about 15 million men, women and children. Only a few months before, few people had ever heard of the word "Pakistan," a concept invented by a few Muslim intellectuals in 1933 who claimed that there were two distinct nations in India; this idea was then adopted by the Muslim League at its historic meeting in Lahore in 1940 as implying an independent sovereign "homeland" for those Indian Muslims who would choose to opt out of a Hindu-dominated India. This concept, so reminiscent of the idea of a Jewish "homeland" in Palestine (Gunnar Myrdal called it a form of Muslim Zionism), resulted from the primacy of the twentieth century's dominant political "form"—the nation-state within definite geographical boundaries—into whose Procrustean bed the world's diverse populations had to be fitted willy-nilly.

The two-nation theory of the Muslim League was never accepted by the Hindu-dominated Congress Party, whose leaders were all for the creation of a united and strictly secular India with full protection for all religious minorities and impoverished outcastes. Born in fire and blood, Pakistan became a reality in the summer of 1947 and tested its mettle almost immediately in the first Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. Thus, in a very short while, the main benefit of British colonialism in the subcontinent—its political unity—was destroyed.

The Western world paid scant attention, at the time, to the long-range geopolitical implications of this development. Now, well over three decades later, it might have to pay a heavy price for this negligence, in the light of the recent events in Afghanistan.

This article traces the conflict-laden relationship between India

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and Pakistan to the present, and then moves to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which in all likelihood has permanently transformed the geopolitical situation, both to the west and south, and introduced a direct Soviet threat to South Asia. It is the thesis of this article that the most crucial step now required to stabilize the area is a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, involving an end to the hostility of the past 35 years and the beginnings of a cooperative relationship that would both defend South Asia and enable its people to get on with the business of improving their lot. Such a rapprochement would have to be primarily the work of the two countries involved, but since the United States has played no small part in the India-Pakistan relationship from an early stage, the article also considers how America and other nations might assist a reconciliation, or at least not obstruct it.

II

From the start, Pakistan attracted greater Western sympathy than India. Part of it was due to the greater ease in personal contact with Muslim Pakistanis than with predominantly Hindu Indians whose sometimes complex mental framework and remnants of bitter anticolonialist feelings created obstacles to a better understanding. But a great deal of it was due to the rapidly growing distrust of India's political leadership for the policies of the United States. Again, fear and distrust of colonialism pervaded and still pervades India, which is not the case in Pakistan; and, in this context, many Indians viewed the United States as the neocolonialist successor of the British, operating under the guise of a worldwide anti-communist crusade. Whatever the Pakistanis did, New Delhi always suspected that the United States had put them up to it. No wonder that the mere fact that the United States did not support the Indian position at the Security Council after Pakistani tribesmen had blatantly invaded Kashmir in 1947, while persuading the United Nations to convict the North Koreans as aggressors after they had crossed the 38th parallel in 1950, seemed to imply the adoption of a double, anti-Indian standard on the part of Washington.

This distrust was reinforced throughout the 1950s by John Foster Dulles' anti-communist approach to foreign affairs, according to which there could be no true neutrality in the cold war—indeed, that neutrality between "good" and "evil" was downright immoral. The first practical consequence of this attitude was the American decision to grant military assistance to Pakistan in

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February 1954, compelling India to devote increasing amounts of its scarce resources to its armed forces. Moscow wasted no time and exploited this unexpected opportunity by sending Nikita Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin to India and Kashmir toward the end of 1955, and expressing full support of the Indian position on the complex Kashmir issue. Not only that: the Soviets followed this up by taking sides with Afghanistan in its dispute with Pakistan over the issue of the creation of "Pushtunistan," a state made up of Pathans to be carved out of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. Bulganin made this plain during his subsequent visit to Kabul.

It was about this time that then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru set the course of India's economic development on a definite socialistic path. Unlike his mentor, Mahatma Gandhi, and his conservative colleague, Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru was an emotional socialist. Big landlords and major industrialists had already felt the sting of his left-wing views; now, it was private enterprise as a whole which found itself at the mercy of an increasingly powerful, and largely inefficient, bureaucracy. For the next two decades, India tried to march on the path of socialistic development, with conspicuous lack of economic success. It is only in the past few years that, under the leadership of his daughter Indira Gandhi, India has gradually retreated from the stifling and oppressive bureaucratic socialism of the first decades following independence.

For all its faults, the Indian economic system has averaged a 3.5 percent growth rate, which Indian economist Raj Krishna has called the "Hindu growth rate."[1] However, taking into account population growth, India's real growth rate per capita has slipped further and further behind that of most other Asian nations, including Pakistan. The result is that India today happens to be both the ninth largest industrial power in the world and the fifteenth poorest country—500 million people who depend on subsistence farming, 200 million who live on modernized farming, industrial work and middle-class urbanized services—the poorest living as they did in the days of the Buddha, the more affluent living in the twentieth century. Three major problems have been wholly or partly solved: there are plenty of savings for investment; the Green Revolution, which is still spreading from the Punjab and Haryana to other states, has put an end to endemic famine and vital dependence on imported food; and, in spite of the oil

[1] *The Economist*, March 28, 1981, special section on India.

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crisis, there is a reasonable amount of foreign exchange.

India also manufactures virtually all of its consumer goods, therefore imports as little as possible—a wise policy in view of the potentially gigantic size of its home market; the drawback is that it encourages a strangling bureaucratization of industry since bureaucrats, not consumers or producers, determine economic policy. Furthermore, under a predominantly state capitalism such as prevails now, India's nationalized companies possess three-quarters of its industrial assets while running at a loss and contributing only a third of its industrial output. In this protected home market, foreign competition is virtually eliminated, encouraging waste and inefficiency. The silver lining is that in case of a global economic depression, India is largely insulated from the buffeting of external forces. With all that, it still remains that it produces its own computers, has launched a space rocket and possesses nuclear know-how and power. These facts have to be kept in mind when considering the relationship between India and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has developed along more conservative lines, but without the benefit of the political stability and continuity that Nehru's Caesarian power—virtually inherited by his daughter Indira Gandhi—gave to India. Its founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died on September 11, 1948, barely a year after the creation of Pakistan; his chief disciple and prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was murdered in October 1951, and with a few exceptions since, Pakistan has been ruled by the military. At the time of Partition (August 1947), the two "wings," East and West Pakistan, were predominantly agricultural. What industry there was in the subcontinent was mostly situated in India. Thirty-five years later, despite some modest industrialization, the situation is still largely the same, although on a much larger scale; India remains the predominant industrial power in the subcontinent.

The major change in the relationship between the two countries came in two stages: first, through the outcome of the 1965 war initiated by Pakistan; and then through a second war in 1971, with the result that, with India's help, the east "wing" of Pakistan broke away and became the independent state of Bangladesh. It was a common assumption during the 1950s and 1960s in Pakistan that it was only a matter of time before India, so vast and disparate, would succumb to its centrifugal tendencies and break up into several distinct states. In a conversation with General Ayub Khan, then president of Pakistan, in February 1960, the

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latter made it plain that he did not expect India to survive as a united country and that, sooner or later, some event would occur that would trigger the balkanization of the country, cutting down what was left of India to a size that would be more to the taste of Pakistan.

As it happened, Ayub got his cue two years later when China attacked and humiliated India in the Himalayas. Not only did this do much damage to India's prestige throughout the world; it also gave the Pakistanis the illusion that in a military confrontation India would knuckle under. Nehru having died shortly after, they tried their chance in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. The dramatic defeat of Pakistan's spearhead armored division in that war did not lead to any territorial change or resolve the issue of Kashmir, which was the occasion for the war. But it destroyed the credit of the Ayub regime and drastically weakened Pakistan, while at the same time strengthening and uniting India.

Thus, it soon became evident that it would be Pakistan, rather than India, that would break up. When a new conflict occurred in 1971 over the East Bengali revolt and the savage repression that followed, Pakistani leaders soon had to face the shattering of their dream of a united Muslim nation in the subcontinent. Shorn of its more populated east "wing," Pakistan was left with only its western part, facing a united India of far greater dimension, with ten times its population (including an Indian Muslim population larger than that of Pakistan itself), a vast industrial establishment, far more powerful armed forces and a vital, if chaotic, cultural life.

In that war, the United States, under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, deliberately "tilted" in favor of Pakistan, in large part because of the Pakistani role in helping to initiate the U.S.-China rapprochement of mid-1971 and also for the sake of consolidating its new relationship with China. Because of what it supposed to be an Indian threat to all of Pakistan, the United States went so far as to send an aircraft carrier, the *Enterprise*, into the Bay of Bengal as a warning action. In the event, the result did not strengthen U.S. ties with Pakistan, which had steadily declined from the mid-1960s onward. Simultaneously, the U.S. relationship with India remained strained, while India deepened a relationship with the U.S.S.R. already embodied in a friendship treaty signed just before the war.

Apart from consolidating Indira Gandhi's position as virtual empress of India, the Bangladesh war contributed to the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power in a truncated Pakistan. Scion of a

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wealthy landowning family of the province of Sind, Bhutto was an avowed socialist who attempted to carry out far-reaching social reforms in Pakistan. A demagogue in the style of Argentina's Juan Peron, Bhutto's supreme power eventually went to his head and he overreached himself. His electoral victory of March 7, 1977 was just too sweeping to be believed—his overzealous subordinates had granted only 37 seats to the nine-party opposition in the 216-seat National Assembly. Predictably, the opposition cried fraud and refused to take its seats. Even the labor unions declared a nationwide strike against him and rioted in the streets of Karachi and other large cities. In the meantime, searching for a new head of the army, Bhutto was persuaded to select General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq over several senior generals as being the least likely to mount a military coup against him, and declared martial law in three of the largest cities. In July 1977 General Zia overthrew Bhutto, had him arrested and charged with murder. Convicted, he was sentenced to death and, in spite of worldwide appeals for clemency, was duly hanged in 1979.

At almost the same time, Indira Gandhi was also overthrown in a stunning electoral defeat on March 20, 1977, a consequence of the excesses of the "Emergency" she had imposed upon India in 1975. The next two years proved conclusively that India could not do without her. The Janata government, based on a disparate alliance ranging from socialists to Hindu reactionaries, and run by tired old men—Prime Minister Morarji Desai was 81—was nothing but a reaction to Indira Gandhi's Emergency rule; by the middle of 1979, Desai was eased out by his coalition partners and disintegration set in. Cleverly using her parliamentary leverage against the coalition in power, Indira Gandhi forced the president to call for new elections, which she won as spectacularly as she had lost in 1977. In January 1980, she came back to power.

Thus, at the end of the 1970s, the subcontinent was not divided into two nation-states but into three, with India the largest and most powerful. Pakistan had reverted to its familiar military rule along with martial law and ideological Islamization, and a chastened India had recalled to power the one personality best able to lead and hold together that enormous and disparate country. The Emergency was forgotten, but not the threat of a milder form of it; 19 months after her return to power, in mid-1982, Indira Gandhi cracked down again and her government put through an ordinance giving it the authority to ban all strikes in any services that may be deemed essential, in order to revitalize India's economy.

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As for Pakistan, the perpetuation of martial law introduced a much needed discipline into its economic life, although the enforcement of Islamization irritates the more Westernized part of the population. Few traces are now left of Bhutto's corrupt rule, except for a favorable memory of his attempts at social reform, which one might call Bhuttoism and which is as likely to endure as Peronism in Argentina. As Pakistani farmers like to say, when reminiscing about those heady days, "Bhutto may have had his faults, but he allowed us to sit on the cot"—traditionally, when a landlord meets his farmer tenants, they sit on the ground and only he sits on the cot.

Taking into account their respective courses of development in the past 35 years, it is understandable that Pakistan would fear the might of India—not just its undoubted military superiority due to sheer numbers, but also the potential for economic and cultural absorption if it comes too close to its giant neighbor. Right now, trade and economic relations between them are negligible, even though India could supply virtually all the consumer requirements of Pakistan; but that is precisely what the leaders of Pakistan do not want. Over the longer term, they fear that a close economic and cultural relationship would gradually lead to a de facto absorption of Pakistan or at least reduction to the status of a satellite and, in effect, partly nullify the costly Partition of 1947.

It is a fact that the overwhelming majority of Indians have accepted Partition and have no desire to conquer and absorb Pakistan—although few Pakistanis, obsessed as they are by their Indian neighbor, are willing to believe it. They seem to feel that an attitude of constant belligerence is the only way they can affirm their separate existence and specific identity. The trend toward "Islamization" is the latest attempt to recover some form of national and cultural specificity. But, in practice, what does it mean? A thief is sentenced to have his right hand cut off; but no surgeon can be found to perform the operation and sever that hand. Asked what the Islamization of the banking sector means, a banker replies that he and his colleagues still don't know.

The atmosphere between India and Pakistan is emotionally highly charged—and more so on the Pakistani than on the Indian side. This love-hate relationship has all the earmarks of a deep family quarrel. Urdu-speaking Pakistanis understand perfectly Hindi-speaking Indians, share the same culinary taste, enjoy the same music, laugh at the same jokes. Yet most Indians traveling to Pakistan on some errand or other are warned never to stress the profound similarities between their respective ways of life, for fear of offending the Pakistanis' determination to be "different"—to

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the point where the wearing of saris by Pakistani women is frowned upon. With its greater, if chaotic, vitality, India contrasts sharply with the far more orderly and better-run Pakistan with its lower vitality.

III

For over three decades, neither Pakistan nor India participated directly in the global cold war, although Pakistan's nominal alignment with the United States and regional partners in the now-defunct Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliances—and particularly its military aid relationship with the United States—surely played a significant part in the 1950s and 1960s in the continued alienation of the two countries (as well as in stimulating India's initial ties to the Soviet Union). Yet the three Indo-Pakistani wars and the Sino-Indian war of 1962 were regional conflicts that had little, if anything, to do with the state of global tension between the Soviet Union and the United States at those particular times.

This relative aloofness came abruptly to an end when the Soviet Russian army marched into Afghanistan in the last days of 1979 and militarily took over a small landlocked country that had been nominally neutral since the nineteenth century—a move that brought them 500 miles closer to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

Were the Russians sucked into this military adventure, as most Indians, including Indira Gandhi, claim, or had they planned it deliberately? Undoubtedly, it was a bit of both. It must be kept in mind that, for the past 200 years, Russian military might has been coming down into Central Asia as irresistibly as a massive glacier. The British in India were justifiably alarmed and sought to turn Afghanistan into a friendly bastion against the expected encroachments of the Russians. This led to several disastrous wars with the Afghans, who often seemed to view the Russians with greater equanimity than the British.

Nevertheless, from the middle 1880s to 1919, Afghanistan was recognized as belonging to a de facto British sphere of influence, and the Russians officially admitted in 1907 that it was beyond their own. Formal independence came in 1919; in 1933, King Mohammed Zahir ascended the throne, leaving it to his uncles to rule the country for the next 20 years.

Two fateful events occurred in 1953: the extension of the cold war to western Asia when John Foster Dulles organized the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) that linked Turkey, Iraq, Iran and

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Pakistan, while totally ignoring Afghanistan; and, in the latter country, the elimination of the King's uncles by his headstrong cousin Mohammed Daoud. It was Daoud's shrewd but highly dangerous gamble to invite Soviet-American competition inside Afghanistan in order to modernize the country as cheaply and rapidly as possible, and build up a true nation-state that his largely tribal country had not yet become.

Yet the U.S. role was deliberately limited, principally by Washington's concern over an adverse reaction by Pakistan, whose leaders strongly objected to Kabul's claims to the Northwest Frontier on the basis of a "Pushtunistan" that would regroup all Pathans on both sides of the "Durand Line"—the military boundary traced by the British in the nineteenth century for security reasons and which cuts in half most of the big Pathan tribes. Largely for this reason, Dulles declined in 1954 to extend military aid to Kabul, and the United States limited itself to an economic aid program directed essentially at the southern half of Afghanistan.

The Soviet response was more positive, especially in terms of military aid. Early in 1955, Daoud began to negotiate in earnest with the Russians on their long-standing offer of military and economic assistance. Shortly after, the very same year, the Afghans and the Pakistanis almost went to war over the Pushtunistan issue. Fed up, Daoud persuaded the Loyah Jirgah (Grand Tribal Council) to formally accept Soviet military and economic aid. In December 1955, as mentioned previously, Bulganin and Khrushchev came to Kabul to affirm their support for Afghanistan's claims against Pakistan and confirm their offer to provide arms and training for the Afghan armed forces. The die was cast.

Soviet assistance soon started. Roads and bridges were built or enlarged, and the Salang tunnel across the impenetrable mountain range that had hitherto protected Afghanistan against invaders from the north was put through; all this logistical infrastructure was used two decades later by the invading Soviet army. Simultaneously, thousands of Afghan officers spent years training in Soviet Russia, gradually coalescing into a network of pro-Soviet Marxist officers in the Afghan armed forces.

Daoud was forced out in 1963, but after a decade of turbulent government changes, he returned to seize complete power in a 1973 coup, deposing his cousin King Zahir, abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming Afghanistan a republic with himself as president. Daoud thought that he was clever enough to outwit the great Soviet bear from the north; as it happened, the bear crushed

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him by proxy. Sometime in late 1977, Daoud confessed his growing misgivings to President Zia of Pakistan. It may be that Moscow was aware of these misgivings and distrusted Daoud's belated attempt at a rapprochement with Pakistan, as well as his growing ties with the Shah in Iran—although neither these regional relationships nor any other activity in Afghanistan, then or later, conceivably justified any sense of an Afghanistan-based threat to the Soviet Union.

At any rate, a coup was staged by communist Afghan army officers in the spring of 1978; the royal palace was surrounded and battered by tanks and planes; Daoud and his whole family along with his assistants and their families were slaughtered, and the long rule of the royal Mohammed Zahir family came to an end. President Zia warned Washington that the balance of power had seriously tilted in Moscow's favor, but his warning had little or no effect.

The new Afghan ruler, Noor Mohammed Taraki, denied strenuously that his revolution was communist-inspired, and for a while Marx and Allah subsisted in uneasy coexistence while the relatively indifferent West was slow to realize the full implications of what had happened. Had Daoud been allowed to live and rule, it is highly probable, according to those Pakistanis who saw him a few months before he was overthrown and killed, that he would have pulled Afghanistan away from Soviet Russia; now, however, Moscow's influence increased steadily through economic aid and trade, as well as a large number of Soviet military advisers and constant advice to Taraki from the Soviet ambassador.

The only trouble, at first, was the ceaseless power struggle within the ranks of the Afghan Marxists. The broadly based radical and slightly Maoist Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), to which Taraki belonged, fought against the more moderate, pro-Moscow Parcham, led by one Babrak Karmal, who was eventually sent into semi-exile as ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Meanwhile, a swelling tide of revolt among traditional tribesmen egged on by their fanatical mullahs began to seriously threaten the regime. The Mujahedeen (holy warriors) began their rebellion with antiquated weaponry which seemed no match for the relatively well-equipped Afghan army of 80,000 men; but the army itself began to melt like butter under the sun through desertions and surrender to the Mujahedeen. By the spring of 1979, some 12,000 political prisoners had been rounded up while the number of Soviet "advisers" increased steadily. A full-fledged

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revolt in the western city of Herat was brutally crushed, with a reported loss of thousands of lives.

By this time, the real strongman of the new regime was Hafizullah Amin, originally foreign minister and now prime minister. Already the architect of Taraki's brutally repressive policy, with thousands of political opponents killed or in jail, Amin decided to move fast to extend his revolution, although a great majority of the population was by now in full rebellion.

In September 1979, the Soviet Union was obviously displeased and worried by Amin's unnecessary brutality and his show of independence à la Ceauşescu, Romanian-style, and also by his repeated refusal of offers of Soviet troops to help him put down the expanding revolt. Accordingly, Soviet officials on the spot worked with Taraki to remove Amin by a coup, but in the resulting confrontation a forewarned Amin turned the tables and it was Taraki who was killed, so that Amin was even more strongly in control.

All these goings on, one must keep in mind, were taking place just as the fundamentalist revolution was sweeping Iran and transforming that vast country into an enemy of the United States, whose whole policy in the Persian Gulf now lay in ruins. Both the unfriendly and shaky regime of Amin, which had to be eliminated, and the opportunity presented by the Iranian revolution next door, finally prompted the Russians to make their most decisive move—one which they had dreamed of for decades, if not centuries, but had never yet dared implement. In the last days of December, Moscow engineered a new coup in Kabul during which Amin was overthrown and killed, to be replaced by Babrak Karmal, conveniently summoned back from Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously, thousands of Soviet troops were airlifted or poured across the Oxus into Afghanistan, moving along a network of communications which Moscow had cannily put in place during the last two decades.

The amount and virulence of popular resistance must have astonished Moscow, and Soviet losses were, and still are, by no means negligible. The trickle of refugees into Pakistan became a flood and has now reached over two and a half million, without counting another half million or more in Iran.

Moscow quickly came to the conclusion that this was a long-term affair and that it would be futile to attempt to crush quickly the innumerable groups of Mujahedeen, even with the help of their powerful Mi-24 helicopter gunships. Once in a while, Soviet forces go on large-scale punitive expeditions but, by and large,

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they give emphasis to establishing an increasingly powerful and secure grid based on the large urban agglomerations and their fortress-like airports, with widened and improved roads, cleared on both sides of trees and buildings so as to afford clear fields of fire and eliminate the threat of ambushes, connecting massive and impregnable military bases. For the most part, they let what is left of the Afghan police and military personnel run the show during the day, but take over from them the patrolling at night in Kabul and other large cities. They rushed the construction of the first rail and road bridge across the wide Amu Darya river (Oxus) which separates the two countries for about 600 miles, completing it in May 1982, a full year ahead of schedule. This now enables them to avoid the difficult and time-consuming process of ferrying supplies across the treacherous waters of the river. It not only improves the military supply lines but also helps the flow of Soviet-Afghan trade which has almost tripled since the Marxist coup of April 1978.

Meanwhile, with the apparent acquiescence of "President" Babrak Karmal, it seems that Soviet Russia has moved to annex outright the strategic Wakhan Valley, a 150-mile strip of land connecting Afghanistan with China, given to Kabul in the nineteenth century in order to separate the expanding Russian Empire from the British Empire in India. Soviet Tadjiks are apparently being sent in as settlers to replace the departed Afghan population. This move could be, as General Fazli-i-Haq, Governor of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, points out, the forerunner of an eventual breakup of Afghanistan by Moscow; some parts of it would be absorbed into the Soviet Central Asian republics, and the Pathan and Baluchi populations left over would then claim their cousins across the border in Pakistan so as to constitute so many satellite states.

Let us keep in mind that where Westerners think in terms of years, the Russians think in terms of decades. They are in no hurry and play their game of geopolitical chess with no time limit on their moves. While there is no doubt that Moscow would have liked to avoid such a blatant military takeover—and, to that extent at least, were indeed sucked in—this invasion was the almost inevitable outcome of decades of past Russian policies and Soviet efforts at Marxist indoctrination.

In any event, the Soviet Union is in Afghanistan to stay, and any negotiations will only be aimed at providing a plausible political facade for Soviet control—there can be no serious question of the Soviet Union ever accepting the kind of government

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

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that would surely result if the Soviet Army pulled out or the Afghan people were left free to choose. Those who would like to believe that the Soviet armed forces will eventually leave Afghanistan of their own free will should study the bloody war of the *basmachis* (rebels) which devastated Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s, during which the Soviet Russians mercilessly slaughtered their native opponents.

IV

In this age of Muslim "revival," what about the reactions of the Islamic world to this brutal invasion and subjugation of a fellow Muslim country? While the first reaction in January 1980 of the 39-nation Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Islamabad was one of outrage, the next one in May of the same year ended with only a slight tap on the Soviet wrist. The Iranians were, at first, as outraged as the others, but for the past two years they have been heavily preoccupied with their war with Iraq, although their rhetoric remains strongly critical and they are not inclined to any compromise. They refused to take part in the July 1982 conference that took place in Geneva, under U.N. auspices, between Pakistan and the puppet representatives of Afghanistan—arguing that they could not do so unless the Mujahedeen were also represented.

The Muslim world, torn apart by multitudes of local conflicts, now has little time or attention to spare for the plight of the Afghans, leaving the Soviet Russians free to pursue their relentless process of absorption of that wild country into the Soviet Union's sphere of control. This is not to say that the other Muslim nations will ever accept this fait accompli but, apart from financial assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, there seems to be little that they are willing to do to shake the Soviet grip on Afghanistan.

One of the striking features of the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation is the inability of the various groups of Mujahedeen to unite. One of the more noteworthy defectors, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan diplomat and president of the U.N. General Assembly in 1967, fled Kabul in early 1982 and declared that he was going to devote himself to fostering unity among them, leading eventually to the possible creation of a government-in-exile. He will have a hard time of it.

While it is impossible to give an overall figure for the total number of fighters involved in the active military resistance movement, it seems clear that the most powerful movement, the Hizbe-Islami, can count on about 40,000 fighting men in the Pathan tribal areas along the Pakistani border, reaching beyond

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it to Herat in the west and the central provinces of Bamiyan and Wardak. The 20,000 fighters of the Jamiat-Islami movement operate mainly between Herat and Kunduz, in the north, with considerable influence in the area that lies close to the Soviet border; and, according to Pakistan's information services, there is some traffic between them and restless Muslims in Soviet Central Asia, across the border. They and other smaller groups operate effectively in the famed Panjshir Valley, where spring and fall Soviet offensives in 1982 have largely fizzled out. Several groups in the Badakshan and Kunar Mountains, and the Harkat-i-Islami north of Kabul, keep stinging the Russians and, the Mujahedeen appear to exercise greater control over the Kandahar urban area than any other group over a large city.

In early 1982, the six principal groups managed to consolidate at least into two. Fighters in the field have reached a degree of coordination in their operations that was unknown two years ago, but are sometimes at odds with the emigré groups in Peshawar. Most important for the future, visits to some of the hundreds of refugee camps, and conversations with Afghan freedom fighters who come there to rest and gather supplies, appear to indicate the growth and development of a true and new sense of Afghan nationhood resting partly on common Islamic ties and increasingly on their common fierce opposition to the Soviet occupation.

As of now, however, the only link between them all is a virulent hatred of the Russians and of their Afghan stooges. Even that feeling is not always sufficient to unite them; some freedom movements in such areas as Logar and Nooristan seem to be more interested in fighting for the complete autonomy of their areas than in the common struggle against the Russian invaders—a vivid illustration of the fact that, up to now, Afghanistan never was a homogeneous nation-state.

In fact, divisiveness is still the hallmark of Afghans of all persuasions. Even the ruling communist PDPA remains, to this day, bitterly split between the Parcham faction of Babrak Karmal and the Khalqis of his predecessors, Taraki and Amin; so far, all Moscow's efforts to end this internal conflict seem to have failed. This fundamental cleavage, which dates back to 1967, is not only ideological, but also the result of deep tribal rivalries: Khalq, the majority group, finds its main support among the Pathans, whereas the Parcham faction has ties in several urban and rural areas, including the Hazaras of central Afghanistan. And all together, the two factions number barely 50,000, or 0.3 percent of the population. No wonder that the overwhelming majority of the

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Afghan people consider the PDPA to be nothing more than the mouthpiece of Moscow.

While the military occupation of Afghanistan is an expensive proposition, the country does provide some economic rewards. Ninety-five percent of the present production of Afghan natural gas is exported to the Soviet Union at advantageous prices to the Russians—the meters are on the Soviet side of the border, and production is expected to double between now and the end of 1983.

It seems that, to date, the greatest failure of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is its inability to rebuild a loyal Afghan army, now shrunk from 80,000 to barely 30,000 unreliable men. Desertions, purges and casualties have not been compensated by recalls of reservists to active duty, nor by the extension of service of those who are now in uniform to a full three years. This is counterbalanced by the unfortunate fact that the West and the Islamic countries extend insufficient assistance to the Mujahedeen in terms of weapons and supplies, partly because the Pakistani authorities appear to lean over backward to avoid provoking Moscow. They fear that the United States would not come to their assistance in case of Soviet aggression against them—and worse, that they would be caught in a pincer between such aggression and what they mistakenly view as unremitting Indian hostility. Clearly, something must be done to change the Pakistani perception of Indian intentions.

V

What is the West to do to repair the damage done by decades of neglect of Afghanistan and misunderstandings with India? First, it seems, have a clear perception of what the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan entails in geopolitical terms. The Russian venture is one further step in a long-term process which aims at reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The prospects are even more tantalizing in the latter part of the twentieth century than they were in the nineteenth, in the days of Kipling's "Great Game." The presence of massive sources of energy in the Persian Gulf on which the industrial West and Japan depend presents a great and twofold temptation—the possibility for Moscow to deny access to them and thereby create massive economic disruptions in the non-communist world; and the added possibility of appropriating these resources for the benefit of the Soviet Union in case of forthcoming shortages at home.

As Hassan Gailani, one of the leaders of the National Islamic

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Front, points out, the huge air base which is in the process of being expanded at Shindand in western Afghanistan is a bare 600 miles from the Strait of Hormuz and the entrance of the Gulf where 60 percent of the world's oil reserves lie. In fact, it is becoming clearer by the day that many of the bases being built or expanded by the Russians in Afghanistan are meant just as much for aggressive strategic purposes of eventual operations in the Gulf and beyond as for fighting the rebellion within the country; Pakistani military authorities who have access to full information on this point are firmly of the opinion that this is the long-term purpose of the impressive Soviet military buildup. This illustrates the danger implicit in Western policy, affected to some extent by Pakistani pusillanimity, in not massively helping the Afghan freedom fighters with adequate supplies and weaponry in order to keep this protracted war as a festering sore for Moscow.

The obvious next step for the Soviet Union is to reach the open seas by taking over Baluchistan, which is mostly underpopulated desert. For decades, the Russians have tried to nurse a nationalist movement among the anti-Pakistani Baluchis and attempts to foment grave disturbances in that part of Pakistan can be expected in the future, aided and abetted by the powerful Soviet military presence in nearby Afghanistan. There is no love lost between the Baluchi tribes, who make up half of the population of the province, and the Punjabis who dominate Pakistan's bureaucracy. Discontent today is not as great as it was during the 1973–77 revolt that was crushed with the loss of thousands of lives. The more realistic and humane rule of President Zia ul-Haq is keeping things apparently more peaceful among the roughly 60 tribes who populate Baluchistan and great attention is being paid to the economic development of the province; in fact, this has priority in Pakistan's internal policy, and foreign help for this specific purpose is being sought. President Zia minces no words about it: "We are going flat out for its [Baluchistan's] progress and development: agriculture, minerals, the social and educational aspects, electrification of villages, construction of roads and development of the rural areas."[2] Right now, Pakistani authorities plan to develop fishing ports at Pasni and at Gwadar, 40 miles from the Iranian border. A feasibility study by a Japanese agency for the development of Gwadar has led Pakistan to look for external assistance, the cautious Japanese having withdrawn from the project.

However, the opportunity is there for Moscow to exploit—not

[2] "Pakistan: An Economic Profile," *International Herald Tribune*, August 9, 1982.

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only among the Baluchis of Pakistan but also among the one million who live next door in Iran—and discontent is still simmering; as recently as early 1982, serious disturbances were reported in the Marri and Bugti areas of Pakistan's Baluchistan, although it is not known whether Soviet agents had a hand in them. At any rate, the eventual prize is remarkably attractive: a 200-mile coastline along the Indian Ocean, naval and air bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, from which Soviet fleets could operate at the mouth of the Gulf and link up with their existing bases in Aden, Socotra and Ethiopia at the entrance to the Red Sea—in effect, the Soviets would have the potential to interdict entrance or exit from both the Gulf and the Red Sea.

VI

This is the longer-term threat: what to do about it? If anything has become clear in the decades since independence in the Indian subcontinent, it is that India is the local superpower in every sense of the word and that *nothing* effective can be done against its will and without its cooperation. It is in the power of India—so far, Soviet Russia's only genuine non-communist friend in the world—to nullify any arrangements made by the West with any other country in the subcontinent—Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh or Nepal—by sheer force of gravity.

Pakistan, right now, benefits from a five-year program of American economic and military aid to the tune of $3.2 billion, with no strings attached except to refrain from developing nuclear weaponry. This is supposed to help bolster Pakistan's defenses against potential Soviet aggression—yet the amazing fact is that, in the world's present geopolitical context, the great majority of Pakistani troops are on the Indian border, facing a nonexistent threat of Indian aggression instead of a much more plausible one coming from Soviet-occupied Afghanistan—disguised at first, as it has already been in the past two years, as the right of "hot pursuit" of Mujahedeen across the border of Pakistan.

The first priority, it would seem, should be to ensure the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity against both external aggression *and* internal subversion. It is bad enough to have Soviet military power extended all the way to southern Afghanistan, that much closer to Arabia and the Gulf. It would be truly catastrophic if this power were allowed to reach the Indian Ocean's coastline. This preservation can only be achieved by altering New Delhi's perception of the geopolitical situation so as

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to face up to the danger threatening India itself because of the relative weakness of Pakistan vis-à-vis potential Soviet aggression. In a recent interview with *Time* magazine, Prime Minister Gandhi stated that "We want our neighbors to be stable and strong. Nothing is so dangerous as a weak neighbor."[3] Now is the time to take this up and start reorienting India's policy in regard to Pakistan.

This reorientation implies that India must see that its own first line of defense is the territorial integrity of Pakistan against Soviet potential designs—no mean feat considering the fact that the official view of the Indian government, and that of Mrs. Gandhi personally, is that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is a defensive, and not an offensive, move, that it is motivated by Soviet fears as to the loyalty of their Central Asian populations of Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Kazaks. In this, the Indians unconsciously project onto the Russians their fear of their own enduring communal troubles, due to the presence in India of a large Muslim minority, and attribute to them the same fears—forgetting that the Russians have largely de-Islamized their minorities and, from all accounts, seem to face no such danger.

So long as the Indian political leadership will not perceive the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan as an aggression and as a threat to India itself, there is little that the West can do to strengthen Pakistan and thereby thwart Soviet expansionism. While Indian public opinion does not condone the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the present Indian government acts as if there is nothing amiss and, in the spring of 1982, even went so far as to revive the Indian-Afghan Joint Economic Commission that had been put on the shelf after the Marxist takeover in 1978.

The second priority should be to put an end to India's underlying dread of the Islamic revival. New Delhi sees Mideast money flowing to Indian Muslims in the guise of financial assistance to Islamic institutions and indirectly fanning communal trouble. Dispelling such fears is essential, since India has to deal not only with the relatively or potentially hostile military reality of Pakistan but also with the feelings and emotions of about 100 million Muslims within its own borders. The wealthy Arab countries of the Gulf should be persuaded to do nothing that can possibly disturb communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims—if they want, as they should, Indian support and cooperation against the Soviet threat from Afghanistan.

[3] *Time*, August 2, 1982.

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In the same vein, something should be done to help undo decades of ideological propaganda and misinformation concerning India among the Pakistanis. In this matter, it is Pakistan that needs a complete overhauling of its educational program and of its media's message concerning its giant neighbor. The average Pakistani's misconceptions about India are truly appalling, fed as they have been since Partition by propaganda designed to create a sense of Pakistani identity and nationhood, if only in a negative sense. There is no such problem in India, where the perception of Pakistan is, on the whole, fair and realistic. Where Indian perception conflicts with reality is in the broader context of the Soviet threat to India itself.

It would therefore seem that the present situation requires a complete reevaluation of the Western policy toward the subcontinent aimed at eventually detaching India from its virtual alliance with Soviet Russia and steering New Delhi toward a true neutrality whose centerpiece would be a complete reconciliation with Pakistan along with guarantees as to its territorial integrity—the prickly issue of Kashmir being shelved temporarily and left to the next generation to sort out. Such reconciliation is possible if lessons from elsewhere are heeded: who would have thought at the end of World War II that two such hereditary enemies as France and Germany would, within a few years of bitterly hating and fighting one another, become faithful allies against a common enemy? Today, even if NATO did not exist, the French are fully aware that France's first line of defense lies on the eastern border of West Germany. Such psychological mutations, provoked by new circumstances, are by no means rare; history is full of them. It should therefore become the permanent policy of the West to work relentlessly toward full reconciliation in the Indian subcontinent.

One way to work toward this goal would be to approach military and economic assistance to the subcontinent on a unitary basis in the style of the postwar Marshall Plan for Europe when, refusing to deal with each nation separately, the United States enforced on the Europeans a grudging cooperation, a true pooling of needs and requirements. Prime Minister Gandhi's July visit to Washington shows that some such form of assistance is possible and that the United States has some leverage in this regard: regardless of the great progress made in the past few years, India is still vulnerable to drought and needs wheat; its oil imports are greater than originally estimated and deplete its reserves of foreign currency; power shortages plague both manufacturing and irri-

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gation, and so on. All assistance should be extended on a subcontinental basis which would include both India and Pakistan; and would, one hopes, lead to a greater economic integration of India and Pakistan, at a time when economic relations between these two neighbors are minimal.

Another potential ally in this endeavor could be China. While border problems still exist between India and China—mostly due to the fact that China would like to achieve a package deal and India insists on piecemeal negotiations—there is evidence that China has been quietly encouraging Pakistan to mend its fences with India. The present rocky negotiations between the two countries over a "No War" pact show that this will be no easy task; but there is no doubt that China would like, not only to put an end to its border quarrel with India—if only to free its hands in its confrontation with Soviet expansionism—but also to help establish friendly relations between India and Pakistan. It can therefore be assumed that the overall Chinese aim coincides with what should become the major Western goal: a complete reconciliation in the Indian subcontinent.

The present political leaderships in India and Pakistan appear to be ready to straighten out and solve outstanding problems. Mrs. Gandhi is firmly in the saddle. She would undoubtedly have the gratitude and support of a great majority of the population of India on her side if good relations could be established with both China and Pakistan. President Zia of Pakistan has proved over the past few years to be a statesman of considerable stature; while martial law prevails at present and Pakistan is in fact ruled by a military dictatorship, political conditions are not harsh and a great deal of the harm done by the demagogic rule of Bhutto up to 1977 has been repaired. Even a modicum of democracy has been cautiously reinstated; the first local council elections in 20 years took place in September 1979 and over 4,000 rural and urban councils elected representatives on a nonparty basis. The five-year plan that is due to go into effect in 1983 provides for handing over ten percent of the development budget to the local councils to use as they please.

But, for better or worse, there is little likelihood that military rule will soon come to an end. Probably the best thing that could happen, at this stage, would be renewed and growing friendly contacts between the Indian and Pakistani military aiming for peace and good relations between the two countries. Many of their now senior officers were once part of the same army, were trained together and sometimes even fought together in World

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War II. Their renewed contacts could usefully supplement the efforts made by statesmen and politicians on both sides.

Such a permanent settlement would represent a grave geopolitical setback for Soviet expansionism, and Moscow is aware of it. The pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) has abandoned its parliamentary alliance with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party (I) and gone into opposition. However, the Soviet-Indian tie remains strong, and Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow this summer was marked by several new Soviet offers of assistance, which India has so far treated with reserve.

At any rate, if some permanent settlement were achieved, as a quid pro quo the United States could well offer some form of progressive demilitarization of the northern part of the Indian Ocean—matched, of course, by a similar withdrawal of Soviet guardians of freedom of navigation in that part of the world on behalf of the international community.

Failure on the part of India and Pakistan to achieve the required settlements of their outstanding differences might ruin both of them. Sooner or later, if mutual hostility were ever renewed, leading to a fourth Indo-Pakistani war, the possibility of its becoming nuclear would have to be faced. India's capability, in this respect, is well known; and Pakistan appears to be within a couple of years of the same capability. It seems clear, therefore, that every effort should be made to achieve a final and historic reconciliation between the two countries.

VII

To conclude, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the most serious and dangerous demonstration of Soviet Marxist imperialism since the end of the Second World War. Compared with it, such events as the Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia pale into insignificance. It is essential that the West, and the United States in particular, realize that India holds the key to successful resistance to further Soviet encroachments and that all their efforts should tend toward the reestablishment of a unified foreign policy on the Indian subcontinental level. We are dealing here with a subcontinent populated by 900 million people whose economic welfare, political stability and mutual cooperation are essential to a successful defense of the non-communist world.

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Karen Dawisha

THE U.S.S.R. IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SUPERPOWER IN ECLIPSE?

What has happened to the Soviet threat to the Middle East? Surely if Moscow remains committed to seeking advantage from the region's conflicts, one would expect the Soviet leaders to have been far more vociferous in their denunciation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and far more active in their support of the Palestinians, after heralding them for years as the foremost national liberation movement.

And yet, Moscow's level of activity during this conflict was lower than in any of the previous Arab-Israeli wars. In fact, Soviet inaction in the Lebanese crisis cast serious doubt on the capability of the U.S.S.R. to influence events in Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole. The U.S.S.R. was reduced to a series of near-empty and peripheral efforts during the crisis—including the exchange of less than threatening letters with President Reagan, support for the Arabs in a United Nations paralyzed by the conflict, and a telegram to Yasir Arafat in besieged Beirut assuring the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chief that Moscow was behind him the proverbial "one thousand percent."[1]

Concerned and angry Palestinian and Arab leaders appealed for the U.S.S.R. to back words with deeds. When this had no effect, Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Palestinian Democratic Front, finally exclaimed in exasperation: "The Soviet Union cannot secure its solidarity with us and with the people of Lebanon by confining its support to political and diplomatic pressure," the effect of which, he complained, "is limited if not zero."[2] At the same time, Libya's leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, normally identified in the West as a staunch defender of Soviet interests, summoned the Soviet and East European ambassadors to his office for an official reprimand: "The friendship between the Arab progressive forces and the community of socialist states was passing through a danger similar to the danger that was surrounding the Palestine Resistance, and was about to burn, as Beirut was burning."[3]

[1] *Pravda*, August 6, 1982. Given this telegram, and the one from Qaddafi advising Arafat "to commit suicide rather than accept disgrace," it is perhaps not altogether surprising that Arafat should have agreed to leave Beirut under American, and not Soviet, auspices, with Greece, a NATO country, his first port of call! Qaddafi continued: "Your suicide will immortalize the cause of Palestine for future generations . . . . Let suicide be the priority. It is the road to victory . . . . There is a decision which, if taken by you, no one can prevent. It is the decision to die. Let this be." (Tripoli Voice of the Arab Homeland, July 3, 1982.)

[2] *The Sunday Times* (London), July 4, 1982.

[3] Tripoli Radio, June 26, 1982.

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

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

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The meeting lasted only minutes and then Qaddafi ordered the ambassadors to "get out."

II

What then lies behind the Soviet response to the crisis, and what impact is that response likely to have on Moscow's prestige and influence in the Middle East as a whole? Were Soviet actions during the Lebanese crisis conditioned by immobilism resulting from Brezhnev's declining health or were they the outcome of a clear policy of measured neglect which might therefore affect Moscow's future strategy in the area after the transition to the post-Brezhnev era? Turning first to the Soviet Union's feeble response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, one must ask exactly what Moscow did do, what it did not do, and what it could have done.

At the military level, Western analysts have become used to a much more aggressive Soviet posture in the Middle East in the past decade than they witnessed during the war in Lebanon. Soviet pilots and missile crews were sent to Egypt to deter Israeli deep penetration raids in the 1970 War of Attrition; Moscow resupplied the Arab armies and engaged in a number of escalatory steps in 1973; Soviet generals orchestrated the Ethiopian offensive in the Ogaden in 1977–78. To be sure, in the early days of the Lebanon war, Moscow signaled Washington, in a number of ways, that should the crisis escalate beyond the borders of Lebanon, Moscow would be in a position to aid its Arab clients, particularly those in Damascus. Thus, two Soviet airborne divisions were placed on alert, and the U.S.S.R. requested flight rights over Turkey should Soviet planes wish to transport additional arms to Damascus. Indeed, following the catastrophic performance of the Syrian armed forces, and particularly the Syrian Air Force and air defense forces, Moscow did resupply Syria with a number of weapons (Israel reported in mid-June that between three and five Il-76s were landing in Damascus daily), even upgrading the quality of the SAM missile batteries.

Even this limited resupply, however, was accompanied by acrimony. Moscow dispatched the First Deputy Commander in Chief of its Air Defense Forces, General Ye. S. Yurasov, to Damascus on June 13, when the extensive losses on the SAM sites in the Beka'a valley became known. This was reportedly followed in mid-July by an on-site inspection of Syrian positions in the Beka'a by Soviet experts; and this inspection preceded the arrival in Damascus on July 19 of "a Soviet official"[4]—said by State Department sources to have been Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, himself—to assess the situation and discuss the reasons for Syria's poor showing. The Syrians are reliably reported to have complained about the poor quality of Soviet equipment compared to the American weapons supplied to Israel. In response, the Russians claimed that Syrian pilots were ejecting from their aircraft rather than engaging Israeli fighters, and pointed to the efficiency of their weapons in the hands of the North Vietnamese, who had engaged American forces with great effect.

But, if the Soviets were content to let the matter rest, the Syrians were not. The Syrian Minister of Information stated, in an interview with Western journalists in October 1982, that although Moscow was resupplying planes and equipment lost in the fighting, the quality of Soviet equipment was

[4] Voice of Lebanon, July 18, 1982.

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inferior to U.S. weaponry.[5] This dispute over responsibility for losses seems to have led Damascus to subtly downgrade its relations with Moscow. Thus the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation went almost unnoticed in Damascus, and the reception organized in Moscow to mark the event was not even attended by the Syrian Ambassador, who sent his chargé d'affaires instead.[6] The Soviets responded to this rebuff by sending only the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Syrian Friendship Society.

The dispute between Moscow and Damascus may also have been due to differing interpretations of the Soviet commitment under the Friendship Treaty, which states in Article 6 that, in the event of a crisis, the two sides not only would consult each other but would also cooperate "in order to remove the threat that has arisen and to restore peace." Syrian action during the crisis seemed to indicate a desire for far greater Soviet involvement, including—as stated both by the official Ba'athist newspaper *Tishrin* and by the Syrian Minister of Information, Ahmad Iskendar Ahmad—the need for a "strategic union" between the U.S.S.R. and Syria.[7] Diplomatic sources in Moscow even speculated at the beginning of July that President Hafiz Al-Assad had paid a secret visit to the Soviet capital in the course of which the broad lines of precisely such an agreement were drawn up. The same sources stated that in the two letters Brezhnev sent Assad during the crisis, the Soviet leader elliptically assured Damascus that, in the event of a direct Israeli attack on Syrian territory, the Syrians "would not fight alone."[8]

At the same time, however, Moscow, in its public statements, declined to mention any commitments under the Soviet-Syrian Treaty and left the issue of further support for Damascus open-ended. The Soviets no doubt hoped to achieve the best of both worlds, by giving the impression of sufficient support so as to deter any Israeli strike on Syria and to limit the damage to long-term cooperation with Damascus, while at the same time not giving Assad the green light for any further escalation of the conflict.

Whatever gestures Moscow was willing to make to protect and reassure its Syrian client, one of the most notable features of the crisis was the Soviet Union's nearly total failure to make any comparable efforts on behalf of the Palestinians. Indeed, it seemed almost as if, once the Soviet leaders were assured that Beirut, and not Damascus, was the final destination of the Israeli Defense Forces, they relaxed their stand. Notable, for example, was the absence of the sort of minatory statements threatening Soviet military involvement which up until Lebanon had characterized Soviet responses to other Middle East crises. Nothing like Khrushchev's thinly veiled threat to let missiles rain down on those capitals responsible for the Tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, or Brezhnev's promise, during the October 1973 war, of sending Soviet troops to help lift the Israeli encirclement of Egypt's Third Army, was forthcoming to deter Israeli pressure on besieged Beirut. In this crisis the most threatening statement which Brezhnev could bring himself to

[5] *International Herald Tribune*, October 12, 1982.

[6] Moscow in Arabic, October 6, 1982.

[7] Ahmad Iskendar Ahmad gave an interview to *Pravda* on June 20, 1982, calling for a "strategicheskiy soyuz" (strategic union) and he renewed the call again in Damascus on September 23. Damascus Home Service, September 23, 1982.

[8] Confirmation that these two letters were received, without, however, any elaboration of their content, appeared on Damascus Home Service, June 23, 1982 and August 7, 1982.

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make was that if the United States sent troops into Lebanon, the Soviet Union would "build its policy with due consideration of this fact."[9]

An even more important and intriguing characteristic of Soviet official pronouncements during the crisis was the almost total lack of official support for the Palestinian *fighters* themselves. The key point in President Brezhnev's letter to President Reagan on July 9 (missed by virtually all Western analysts) was that despite his call on Washington "to halt the barbarous extermination by the Israeli troops of Lebanese and Palestinian women, children and old people," nowhere did Brezhnev mention the heavy losses being inflicted on the PLO and Lebanese leftist combatants.[10] This was also the case with Brezhnev's second letter to Reagan at the beginning of August and the Soviet government statement issued at the onset of the crisis.[11] To be sure, the Soviet press published protestations of Moscow's support for the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—most notably in an interview Brezhnev gave to *Pravda* on July 21 and in an unsigned editorial following the Brezhnev lead on August 4—but the fact remains that, on the diplomatic level, the Soviets were subdued in their support for the PLO, as such, during the actual crisis, and reserved most of their venom for American plans to deploy marines in Beirut as part of the multilateral peacekeeping force.

The Soviet refusal to offer any tangible support to the PLO certainly was not due to Palestinian reluctance to elicit it. Hawatmeh stated that, when the Israelis invaded, he went time and time again to the Soviet Embassy in West Beirut to plead for help from the Soviet Ambassador, Alexander Soldatov. But each time Soldatov would only say "I'll cable Moscow."[12] Abu Iyad, Fatah's deputy leader, also confirmed that from "the first hour, we wanted the Soviet position to be more radical, but our Soviet brothers have their own way of acting."[13] And at the beginning of July, Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO's foreign affairs spokesman, flew to Moscow as part of an Arab League delegation for negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Prior to his departure, Kaddoumi declared in Kuwait that he would call on the Soviet Union for drastic action to demonstrate its backing for the PLO. Some sections of the PLO hoped that Moscow would make a show of force by sending warships or flying troops into Syria. But Gromyko, according to Arab sources in Moscow, "made it clear that this was out of the question." Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union would not go beyond its current diplomatic efforts and "would not budge one inch from its present Middle Eastern policy." The communiqué issued at the end of these talks indicated less than a meeting of minds in its formulation that the talks had taken place in a "businesslike and friendly atmosphere." As confirmed by sources in Moscow, the Soviet side put the onus for resolute action squarely on the Arab leaders themselves, and clearly expressed Soviet disappointment at the lack of that unity and solidarity among the Arab states which, in the words of the Gromyko-Kaddoumi communiqué, "the situation demands."[14]

The level at which the negotiations with Arab leaders were handled by the Soviet leadership further indicates Moscow's interest in distancing itself from

[9] *Pravda*, July 9, 1982.
[10] *Pravda*, July 9, 1982.
[11] *Pravda*, June 15, 1982; *Pravda*, August 3, 1982.
[12] *The Sunday Times* (London), July 4, 1982.
[13] Radio Monte Carlo, June 11, 1982.
[14] *Pravda*, July 6, 1982.

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the crisis. Thus, although the letters to President Reagan and Assad and the telegrams to Arafat went out under Brezhnev's name, it was notable that the visit to the U.S.S.R. by Jordan's King Hussein in June, originally scheduled as a holiday, was not upgraded to a state visit allowing a meeting with Brezhnev, despite persistent rumors from Amman that the Jordanian monarch had sought such a meeting.

Furthermore, in talks held between members of the PLO executive and the Soviet leadership in mid-August, the Soviet side was represented only by V.V. Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee, and R.A. Ul'yanovskiy, Boris Ponomarev's deputy in that Department. (This should be compared to the Syrian-Soviet talks in mid-July when the Syrian Communist Party Chief Khalid Bagdash held talks with the then Permanent Secretary of the Communist Party Yuri V. Andropov and Chief of the International Department Ponomarev.) What is particularly remarkable about Soviet actions is their contrast with the diplomatic frenzy in Washington, where both moderate Arab leaders and representatives of states allied to Moscow, namely Syria, vied for access. The conclusion one is left with is that the Soviet Union, while concerned to protect Syria, took few other effective actions either to end the crisis or to promote the Palestinian cause.

III

The Soviets themselves have advanced many reasons for their failure to offer more resolute assistance to the Arabs, the main one being that Israel, backed by the United States, was responsible for the outbreak of crisis, and those two states should have stopped it. Moscow estimated, correctly, that the Arabs did not have the capability to win the war militarily in Lebanon. Nor did the Soviet Union want the war to spill over into neighboring countries, thereby further risking the stability of the Assad regime and possibly triggering a cycle of escalation which might lead to superpower confrontation. Thus the U.S.S.R. sought to limit the crisis, hoping that the specter of Israeli troops using American arms might produce a backlash against the United States from which it would be able to benefit. It was argued in Moscow that blame should be directed not at the Soviet Union, which throughout the crisis played a low-key role, but rather at the United States, which not only supplied Israel with weapons to devastate Lebanon but also, through Secretary of State Haig, time and time again in the first six months of 1982, gave the green light for an operation in Lebanon.

Nonetheless, it was clearly not the Soviets whose influence increased in the Arab world, but the Americans, who provided the mediator, the troops and then the initiative for comprehensive peace—all of which further excluded the Soviet Union from the area. Given the obvious threat to their interests in the Arab world, it was little wonder that the Russians were only narrowly left at the post by the Israelis in their race to condemn the Reagan initiative.

A second reason for Moscow's inaction was that the Arab leaders and masses alike had stood mute in the face of the Israeli invasion. "Why," officials constantly asked, "should the Soviet Union be more royal than the king in its support for the Palestinians?" If the Arabs themselves could not agree on a common strategy to meet the aggressor, if the Arabs themselves could not even be bothered to meet in the midst of the crisis in order to find some united

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stand in support of the Palestinians, why should Moscow involve itself? As an official of the Central Committee's International Information Department, V.I. Kobysh, rhetorically asked in a program shown on Soviet television on September 22, "Who else but the Arab countries should have been active primarily at this time? [There was] no obstacle for any of the Arab countries to assist . . . the Palestinians actively, rather than passively biding their time in fruitless debates . . . ." For once, Soviet rhetoric did not conceal Moscow's contempt for the less than steadfast stand of the Arab leaders. As one Soviet commentator demanded:

> Where are you, Arabs? What have you done for your Palestinian brothers? How could you allow torture, humiliation and death to be the fate of the Palestinian Arab people, whom you left to die in exile . . . ? Arab countries watch this massacre in feebleness and apathy.[15]

Another analysis, issued by Tass on June 25, presented a particularly scathing picture of Arab immobility by stating that the three "No's" of the 1967 Rabat conference—"No to recognition of the aggressor, No to talks with the aggressor, No to the conclusion of peace with the aggressor"—had been replaced by three other No's. These were: "No single Arab strategy . . . No decision on the convocation of an urgent summit conference . . . [and] No practical steps along the road of using against the patrons of the aggressors the powerful oil weapon."

Soviet officials and analysts ascribed the paralysis in the Arab world to deep-rooted differences in the domestic structures of the various Arab states, and also to the negative effects on Arab unity of the Camp David process and the Iran-Iraq war, which in the words of Yevgeny M. Primakov, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, generally distracted progressive forces from confronting the common dangers of Zionism and U.S. imperialism.[16]

Despite these explanations, Soviet analysts were still clearly surprised and dismayed by the failure of Arab states to come to the aid of the Palestinians, whose cause after all had been universally espoused throughout the Arab world for years. As stated by Boris Shiburin, the deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near Eastern Department, in an interview with the author: "Although the Soviet Union expressed its concern about the lack of unity in talks with Arab leaders in Moscow and New York City [Gromyko met a number of Arab delegates while in New York to address the General Assembly session on disarmament], we still do not fully understand why there has been such a lack of unity among the Arab states."

This picture of Soviet mystification and passivity is in marked contrast to the one painted by the Soviets themselves when they supported radical Arab causes in the 1960s, and took the world to the brink of disaster in the 1973 war. On these occasions, they did not wait for the Arab consensus to emerge—they took action and worried about the consequences later. So what has changed?

IV

The first thing that has changed is the Arab world itself. Soviet commentators this summer recalled with nostalgia the days when Arab unity and

[15] Radio Peace and Progress, June 15, 1982.
[16] Soviet television, "The World Today," June 11, 1982.

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Arab nationalism, promulgated under the leadership of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser and directed against Western interests in the area, "became an important factor in the balance of power in the Middle East."[17] But gone are the days when all Arabs stood unified and mesmerized by the rhetoric of leaders like Nasser. Gone is the era when any Arab ruler who dared to ally himself with the United States or a Western power risked being toppled by a population steeped in militant nationalist symbolism. And shattered too is the image in the Arab world of the Soviet Union as a disinterested ally, ready to back the Arabs whenever called upon to do so.

Seen from the Soviet point of view, the demise of militant Arab nationalism and the decline in goodwill toward the Soviet Union has meant that those regimes which still remain loyal to the Soviet position must be nurtured much more carefully. In the 1950s and 1960s Moscow could afford to make mistakes (and it made many of them), first of all because if it had troubles with one regime it could concentrate on another, and secondly because it was the only source of economic, military and political support for the anti-Western policies almost universally adopted by Arab leaders at that time.

Now, as Soviet Orientologist Primakov frankly admitted in a June interview with the author, the Middle East is not considered in Moscow a "zero-sum game. A loss for the United States is no longer an automatic gain for the Soviet Union." The tremendous growth in the financial power of the oil-rich states has made countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alternative centers of power in the region (or, in the new Soviet terminology, "subimperialist states"), capable of moderating the stands of otherwise radical leaders like Syria's President Assad or PLO chief Arafat whenever they pull the purse strings.

Also, the emergence of a more pro-Arab and anti-Israeli consensus in Europe, while vexing to the Americans, has further allowed Arab states previously reliant exclusively on Soviet weapons and aid to diversify their sources of supply. Iraq, for example, has received a considerable quantity of weaponry, especially from France, including F-1 Mirages, Frelon helicopters and AM-39 air-to-surface missiles. As a result, Iraq now receives less than two-thirds of its military equipment from Moscow, as compared with 95 percent at the time the Friendship Treaty was signed in 1972. Moscow's concern over its declining share of the market, combined with Soviet displeasure over Iran's thrust into Iraqi territory, may go a long way toward explaining why the U.S.S.R., at the end of August 1982, started to resupply Baghdad with weapons embargoed since the outbreak of the Gulf War in September 1980.

Further, all the oil-rich countries, whether they are radical or moderate, look to the West and not to the Soviet Union for the development of their economies. Iraq's President Saddam Hussein, for example, stated in an interview with *Time* magazine July 1982, "I believe America has three fundamental interests in the region—commercial trade, improved economic relations and keeping countries from being attracted by [the Soviet Union]. These three considerations can be fulfilled. Take technology and expertise. Do these exist in the Soviet Union or in America? I will answer you. The technology we require exists in the United States, or in Europe and Japan."

Hussein's statement is more than borne out by the trade figures, which show that in 1981 Iraq's total trade with the Eastern bloc amounted to only

[17] Moscow in Arabic, July 26, 1982.

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$499 million, as compared to a staggering $19,121 million in trade with the Western industrial countries (and this is down from the 1980 figure of $27,689 million, due to a drop in Iraq's oil exports). A similar picture emerges for Syria, with $503 million in goods traded with Moscow compared with $3,761 million in trade with the industrial West. (Interestingly, the Arab country having the largest trade with Moscow turns out to be Egypt, which in 1981 accounted for two-thirds of all Soviet trade with the Arab Middle East—excluding, presumably, arms trade, which is not normally included in published trade figures.)[18] This massive difference in the volume of Arab trade with the industrial West and the Soviet bloc illustrates more clearly than almost any other indicator the huge impact which oil wealth has had on freeing even the politically radical Arab countries from dependence on the Soviet Union.

The decline of a pro-Soviet Arab nationalism, coupled with the growth of Arab oil wealth, thus has detracted from the ability of the Soviet Union to exercise leverage over the states in the region. There is no better illustration of this diminishing Soviet influence than Iraq. The decline in Soviet fortunes in Iraq can be traced directly to two policies pursued by President Saddam Hussein since at least 1978. The first was Hussein's decision to move against the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which up until that time had been allowed to participate along with the ruling Ba'ath in the National Front. Although the Soviets remained totally mute over the widespread arrests and executions of communists in Iraq, Baghdad complained that Moscow was withholding military supplies in order to obtain various concessions, including better treatment for the ICP. The Iraqi Ba'ath party paper *Al-Thawra* claimed that Soviet interference in the domestic politics of Arab states was a direct result of dependency on Soviet weapons: "The Arabs have recently become aware of the need to recognize the link between the possession of sophisticated weapons and the requisites for using such weapons on the one hand and cultural developments on the other."[19] In accordance with this finding, the Iraqi Minister of Information stated in an interview with *Al-Nahar* on June 21, 1980 that Iraq henceforth would no longer seek weapons exclusively from the U.S.S.R.

Second, a central component of Iraqi strategy for expanding its regional role, as set out in the Pan-Arab Charter promulgated by Saddam Hussein in February 1980, was to distance Iraq equally from both superpowers. Thus, as elucidated by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, while Iraq still considered the United States to be "enemy number one" by virtue of its alliance with Israel, nevertheless "if the Soviet Union occupies any part of the Arab homeland, I shall look upon this just as I look upon a British, American, French or any other occupier."[20]

The Iraqi bid for regional leadership created almost insurmountable difficulties for the Soviet Union. Not only did the shift in Baghdad policy militate against Iraq's support for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but it also challenged the previously predominant positions of Syria and Iran in the

[18] For a further discussion of trade between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, see the article by Alan H. Smith in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds, *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives*, New York: Holmes and Meier (London: Heinemann, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1982.

[19] *Al-Thawra*, January 3, 1980.

[20] *The Middle East* (London), August 1980, p. 29.

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area. The renewal of rivalry between Baghdad, on the one hand, and Syria and Iran, on the other, thrust Moscow into the center of another inter-Levantine struggle and set back long-standing Soviet hopes of forming a progressive front among these regimes.

The outbreak of the Gulf war in September 1980 exacerbated these strains. Moscow's desire for good relations with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led the Soviet leaders to adopt a neutral stand—declaring that the continuation of the war benefitted only American interests—and led them to cut off arms supplies to the Iraqis. In Baghdad, the Soviet stance was regarded as an unfriendly act, with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Saadoon Hammadi, declaring that the Soviet refusal to supply weapons would not quickly or easily be forgotten.[21] Even Saddam Hussein, normally reticent about attacking the Soviets in public, found it difficult to differentiate between Soviet and American attitudes toward the war, claiming that both of them were apparently indifferent to its outcome: "it is strange that the superpowers kept maintaining the position of onlooker toward the bloody conflict between Iraq and Iran . . . . the present era has not witnessed a state such as that in which a conflict has been left raging for two years without any serious attempt to stop it . . . ."[22]

Only when the tide turned and Iran launched its own invasion of Iraq in July 1982 did the Soviets reconsider their policy and renew the supply of weapons. Soviet commentators, responding to Khomeini's pledge to topple Hussein, stated that "no one, except the people of the country concerned, has the right to say that the regime in another country is to his liking or not."[23] It seemed that the Soviet leaders had decided that their interest would not be served by the establishment of yet another militant Islamic republic, this time in Iraq—for in Islamic Iran, Moscow's once high hopes were gradually turning into bitter disappointment.

V

Whereas the radical Arab nationalism which prevailed in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s found much common ground with Soviet ideology, the militant Islam which has rocked the Middle East since the fall of the Shah is antithetic to the very fundamentals of Marxism. True, after initial hesitation, Moscow did welcome the downfall of the Shah and encourage the rabid anti-American excesses of the early Khomeini period. Euphoria over this massive reverse for American fortunes in the Gulf even prompted Brezhnev, in his speech to the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in February 1981, to decree that Islam under certain circumstances could be harnessed to serve progressive ends and *inter alia*, therefore, Soviet ambitions. But Khomeini's brand of Islam is not like the Nile, whose energies can be harnessed by Soviet engineers and translated into a symbol of Soviet power like another Aswan Dam. Its direction of flow changes without warning, flooding to wipe out American influence and surging next to overwhelm Soviet hopes.

To be sure, the U.S.S.R. still evaluates many aspects of Iran's policies positively. As stated by Pavel Demchenko, in a major *Pravda* article on March

[21] Press Conference of Saadoon Hammadi in London, March 11, 1981, Arabic transcript issued by Iraqi Embassy, pp. 7–8.
[22] Baghdad Home Service, June 20, 1982.
[23] Moscow in Persian, October 15, 1982.

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9, 1982, "the Soviet Union continues to support the Iranian revolution and the legitimate rights of the Iranian people to decide their own fate . . . ." In the field of Soviet-Iranian relations, the *Pravda* article pointed to the growth of trade between the two countries (totally 800 million rubles, or more than $1 billion, in 1981) as a particularly clear example of the extent to which "the existing potential for cooperation between the two countries is being realized."

But most notable in the Demchenko article was the litany which it presented of anti-Soviet steps currently being taken by the Iranian authorities. These included the reduction in the size of the diplomatic staff of the Soviet embassy in Tehran; the complete closure of the consulate in Resht, the Russian-Iranian Bank, and the Soviet Insurance Society and Transport Agency; the suspension of the Iranian Society for Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R.; and the denial of entrance visas to Soviet journalists. In addition to these specific acts, Demchenko condemned the increased pitch of anti-Soviet statements issuing from the Shi'ite clergy, including "conservative elements on the extreme Right operating around Khomeini," whose aim is "to slow the development of Iranian-Soviet relations, even if this would harm their country's economy and Iran's ability to resist imperialist pressure."

Since this article appeared in March, Soviet-Iranian relations have sunk to an even lower level. The crackdown on the leftist Mujahedeen-al-Khalq forces was followed in July by the arrest of Tudeh Party officials, the banning of their publication *Ittihad al-Mardom* and the purge of some Tudeh members from positions within the central bureaucracy.

The Soviet Union has not responded publicly to the moves against the Tudeh. Nor did they initially say much about the persecution of the Mujahedeen. But the situation had changed by October 1982, when detailed reports began to appear in the Soviet media. One of Moscow's most senior analysts, Valentin Zorin, was quoted on Soviet television on October 13 as saying that the Mujahedeen had taken "an active part in the struggle against the Shah's regime" and played a key part after the revolution in supporting Khomeini. However, he went on, there were now "bloody and internecine signs of warfare and mass persecution of the organization, and this is now having a most serious effect on the internal situation in Iran." Zorin attributed the Iranian decision to launch an offensive against Iraq to a desire of the clergy to shift the public focus away from domestic turmoil, thereby staking their credibility on military success.

The crux of the issue is the Soviet view that Iran's previously stated adherence to a "neither East nor West" policy is in fact changing to one of open anti-Sovietism. Clearly, Moscow would like to prevent such a shift, but in the words of one commentator, "it takes two hands to clap." Among the litany of punitive measures taken by Khomeini to further diminish Soviet influence is the total banning of all Russian language teaching, although as the Russians point out, English, French and German are still being taught. Exhortations by the ruling clergy to fight the influence not only of the Americans but also of the Mujahedeen and the Russians are greeted by orchestrated chanting from the crowds: "Death to the Americans! Death to the Russians! Death to the Hypocrites (the Mujahedeen)!"

Even on the economic front, where initial Soviet hope for expanded cooperation had met with early success, particularly as a result of the signature of the transit agreements allowing the passage of Iranian goods otherwise trapped in the country after the outbreak of the Gulf war, things looked bleak.

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The Iranians held out for higher prices for the gas which they were contracted to supply through the first Iranian gas transit pipeline (IGAT I) connecting the two countries, thus causing gas shortfalls in the Soviet Central Asian Republics. And the announcement in September 1982 by its energy minister that Iran had decided to route IGAT II, the materials for which had already been supplied by Moscow, through Turkey rather than the U.S.S.R., only angered the Soviets further, leading them to declare that "it should be stated very frankly that there are some people in Iran who have acquired a pro-West inclination and who are artificially preventing the expansion of this economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R."[24]

The continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan creates further enormous difficulties in Moscow's efforts to convince Iran of its desire for normal "good-neighborly" relations. Tehran has always opposed the Soviet presence in Kabul and has allowed Afghan rebels to operate from its territory. But recently the Iranian stance has become more overtly hostile. In the early spring of 1982, according to U.S. State Department officials, Iran fired on Soviet helicopters in hot pursuit of Afghan rebels inside Iranian territory. This act was followed in August by a declaration from Iran's Ambassador in Geneva that Iran resolutely condemned "the imposition of a puppet government" in Kabul and that Tehran was ready to recognize an Afghan government-in-exile.[25]

Soviet commentators reacted by accusing these "dignitaries" of seeking to use the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a cover for attempts to diminish Soviet prestige in Iran and simultaneously increase the regime's pro-Western orientation: "odd though it may seem, in its approach to this issue Iran placed itself in the same camp of forces that opposed both the Afghan rule and the Iranian revolution. What resulted was that the Afghan so-called Mujahedeen are supported both by the U.S.A. and by some Iranian dignitaries . . . the raising of an anti-Afghanistan commotion is at the same time one of the phenomena of anti-Sovietism and an attempt to make the Iranian people pessimistic in their attitude to the Soviet Union."[26]

It is certainly true that the Soviet Union would very much like to see an improvement of its relations with Iran. Its very great interest in doing so is manifest. The arrival in Tehran in June of a new Soviet Ambassador, V. K. Boldyrev, an Iranian expert and the former head of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, and the simultaneous "upward demotion" of former Ambassador Vinogradov to the totally powerless post of Foreign Minister of the regional Russian Republic (RSFSR) perhaps signified Moscow's awareness that diplomatic relations between the two countries had not in the past two years always been handled as adroitly as the situation demanded. Certainly Soviet commentaries have become much more guarded in their assessment of the Iranian Revolution, and as one senior analyst told this author, "there must come a point at which we can no longer support a regime which hurls its people back into the sixteenth century." Therefore, while the objective of influencing events in Iran remains a feature of Soviet policy, their capability of doing so, given the increased hostility of the current regime and the widespread prosecution of pro-Soviet elements, is increasingly limited.

[24] Moscow in Persian, October 22, 1982.
[25] Observer News Service, August 12, 1982.
[26] Moscow in Persian, October 8, 1982.

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VI

But if the Arab and Islamic worlds have changed in a way which makes them less amenable to the exercise of Soviet influence, so too has the Soviet Union changed. Thus, Soviet immobilism over Lebanon can be attributed not only to the lack of opportunities provided by the Arab states for greater Soviet participation, it can also be put down to a marked Soviet disinclination to get involved. And this disinclination extends beyond the confines of the Lebanese conflict to encompass a more general malaise in Soviet policy toward the region.

The reasons for this are many. As regards the PLO, the Soviet Union has long upheld the need for a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian problem, and has been less than forthcoming in its support either for the PLO's terrorist campaign or for the creation of a state within a state in Lebanon. Indeed, among the PLO documents captured by the Israelis in Lebanon was the transcript of talks between Gromyko, Ponomarev and Arafat in 1979. In these talks the Soviets pressed Arafat on recognition of Israel and also cautioned him not to overplay his hand in Lebanon, with Ponomarev saying explicitly at one point that "You . . . must take care that your relations with the Lebanese state should not worsen because then your situation would be difficult."[27]

The view one got in Moscow this summer was clearly that the Palestinians had indeed overplayed their hand in establishing a state within a state in Lebanon. For that reason the Soviets were not wholly against a resolution which weakened the PLO militarily, thereby making them perhaps more amenable to a diplomatic solution. Brezhnev's second telegram to Yasir Arafat, on September 14, 1982, stating that "the world at large highly appreciated the humane decision of the PLO leadership to withdraw the Palestinian detachments from Beirut,"[28] should be interpreted in this light.

Turning to Lebanon, the Soviets have confirmed their support for its sovereignty and independence. They would obviously like to see the withdrawal of Israeli troops, but they are also far from averse to the removal of Syrian forces. They have never fully supported the Syrian presence in Lebanon, believing not only that Syria's presence there might invoke Israeli retaliation but also that the burden of the Syrian occupation might additionally strain Assad's already weak hold both on the populace and, more importantly, on the military. As we have seen, Assad's stability is a matter of real concern in Moscow (one very senior analyst with long experience in the Middle East even went so far as to say that he did not think that the Assad regime would survive the next six months), as Syria is one of the few remaining Soviet allies in the Middle East.

Beyond fears for the survivability of the Assad regime, there is also considerable indication that the Soviets no longer see their interests served by conflict in the Middle East. First of all, the dismal performance of successive Arab forces against Israel has tended to rebound on the Soviets, giving them an image in the Arab world as an ally who supplies inferior weaponry and even that with some reluctance.

[27] "Excerpts of minutes of a meeting between Palestinian and Soviet delegations, the Kremlin, November 13, 1979." *PLO documents: Samples of Certificates and Documents Found in PLO Terrorist Headquarters in Southern Lebanon during Operation Peace For Gallilee*, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 7–11.

[28] Tass in English, September 14, 1982.

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Moreover, the Soviet Union's foreign policy apparatus is already under considerable stress from the crisis in Poland, the continuing occupation of Afghanistan, the attempt to normalize ties with China and, of course, the management of East-West relations in a whole range of issue areas of more importance to them than the Middle East. Among these areas is the domestic front—and certainly anyone who has been to the U.S.S.R. recently will have seen the devastating effect on the whole population of the failure of their fourth successive harvest. The focus of Soviet decision-making is now noticeably more introverted than it has been for a decade and, rhetoric aside, the Kremlin is anxious not to rock the boat in its relations with Washington. Grain sales, pipeline issues and disarmament negotiations are far higher on the Soviet agenda than opportunities to be found in continued instability in the Middle East—which might, in addition, necessitate Soviet involvement and sour relations even further with the Reagan Administration.

The introversion of Soviet concerns, with the emphasis in foreign policy very much on security and stability, has also been conditioned by the gradual transition of the leadership into the post-Brezhnev era. The careful manner in which leadership changes have taken place in the Politburo in the last two years, including the changeover from Brezhnev to Andropov, has shown the efforts being made to avoid a "succession crisis," and it would certainly appear, from Soviet behavior in the Middle East and elsewhere, that Moscow is keen to avoid unnecessary shocks and traumas to the system at this juncture. This is not to argue that Soviet immobility in the face of the Lebanese crisis was the result of paralysis of the decision-making process stemming from the inability of the top leadership to agree on an appropriate course of action. Rather, the extent of Soviet action and inaction would suggest the conscious decision by the Soviet leadership to undertake a policy of "measured neglect," once they assessed that the conflict could be contained within Lebanese borders.

VII

What then does the future hold for Soviet policy in the Middle East? In the short-term, Moscow is likely to continue a low-risk and low-cost policy aimed both at supporting existing pro-Soviet regimes and at discouraging any further Arab support for the Reagan plan.

The linchpin in the aspirations of both superpowers is Jordan, for any commitment to negotiate by King Hussein would provide the necessary momentum for keeping the Reagan proposals alive. Of course, ever since former President Carter launched his Camp David initiative, Jordan has been under pressure to join the process. And Moscow, seeing the failure of this process as its primary objective in the region, has put increasing effort into its relationship with Jordan.

As a result, despite fundamental differences in the social systems of the two countries, the Jordanians have been able to maneuver themselves into a position of unusual influence in Moscow. For example, their embassy personnel have access upon demand to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at the highest levels. And although King Hussein did not meet Brezhnev during his recent visit, unusually heavy coverage has been given to Jordan's repeated refusals to accede to any American-sponsored step-by-step process which ignores the Palestinians. Soviet officials, however, are aware that, without backing from other Arab states, Jordan may be unable to resist internal and external

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pressures to support the American initiative. Boris Shiburin, the deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, was thus unable to be overly optimistic when he told the author, in July 1982, that he "*hoped* Hussein would continue to support the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and that at least "Hussein's position had not changed *yet*."

There must have been great relief, therefore, in Kremlin circles with the "better late than never" display of unity among the Arab leaders at the Fez summit from September 6 to 9. The proposals adopted there were very much in line with those espoused by President Brezhnev in the course of a speech, on September 15, honoring the visit by South Yemen's ruler, Ali Nasser Muhammed.[29] The two proposals share the demand for a Palestinian state, the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the desire to negotiate through an appropriate international forum (which in Russian parlance would necessarily include Soviet participation).

The Arab leaders at Fez did not mention the Soviet Union specifically, and certainly did not make Soviet participation a sine qua non of a solution to the conflict. But it was King Hussein's previous call for precisely such Soviet participation, during the course of an interview with the Soviet newspaper *Literaturnaya gazeta*,[30] which assured Moscow's full support for the Fez proposals. This relationship with Jordan, however, is at most a short-term one.

After Fez, however, the October meeting between Arafat and Hussein in Amman, to discuss the possibility of a joint approach to the solution of the Palestinian problem, raised the specter that Arafat himself might seek a federated state with Jordan, within the framework of the Reagan proposal, as the best possible way forward. If Arafat and Hussein were to agree, and provided that the PLO chiefs were able to gain support from the Palestine National Council for such a move, Moscow could once again find itself outmaneuvered.

Beyond attempts to torpedo the Reagan initiative in favor of the Fez proposals and wait for better opportunities in Iran and Iraq, is there any other Soviet objective which represents a basic threat to Western interests? The answer to this is a qualified yes: all the public indications suggest that Moscow has rekindled its hopes of gaining influence in post-Sadat Egypt. The "wait and see" stance of the Soviet press following Sadat's assassination has been replaced by a cautious but distinct optimism in Moscow, with a whole series of articles suggesting that Russians and Egyptians alike are nostalgic for "the good old days" when the two countries were united in a bond of friendship.

The Soviet press and officialdom alike do not discount the obstacles—in particular Camp David—preventing a return to the heyday of relations between the two countries. But they are heartened by continuing indications, as expressed for example in an *Izvestia* interview with Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Boutros Ghali, on July 10, 1982, that the Egyptian government wants to improve its relations with Moscow. Moscow was also heartened by Egypt's firm denunciation of Israel's behavior in Lebanon and Cairo's recall of its ambassador from Tel Aviv.

On the other hand, renewed Soviet hopes in Egypt seem very far from

[29] Tass, September 15, 1982.
[30] Tass in Russian for Abroad, August 31, 1982.

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being realized. Certainly President Mubarak has a different conception of Egypt's role in the Arab world than did his predecessor. But at the same time, while Cairo may opt to play the Russian card in an effort to signal its displeasure over Washington's policy, there is little likelihood that the Egyptians would ever seek, or allow, the reestablishment of the overwhelming Soviet influence over internal and external Egyptian policy which existed during Nasser's time.

In sum, the undoubted growth in Soviet military power in the past two decades has brought enormous benefits to the U.S.S.R. in terms of strategic parity and a capability to project force in both contiguous and peripheral areas from Afghanistan to Angola. But in the Middle East, certainly since the loss of Egypt, which roughly coincided with the rise both of anti-Soviet oil producers and anti-communist Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet Union has been far from successful in translating its global military stature into regional political influence. Except for the continued, but apparently diminishing, reliance of the radical Arab states on Soviet weapons, Moscow lacks any substantial diplomatic or economic leverage in the Middle East. Its main hope for influence at the moment lies in the possibility of Arab disenchantment with the Reagan proposals.

Yet, while the failure of these proposals might indeed afford some marginal Soviet gains, without both a radical shift away from the current Soviet posture of "measured neglect" and a fundamental political reorientation within the Arab and Islamic worlds, there is little prospect of major Soviet advances. And there is no indication that either of these necessary conditions will be met in the foreseeable future.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

MARITIME STRATEGIES

To the Editor:

In their article published in your fall issue, "Preparing for the Unexpected: the Need for a New Military Strategy," Admiral Stansfield Turner and Captain George Thibault make a lot of sensible recommendations for reorienting the U.S. Navy toward its traditional sea control mission. Just as they acknowledge the validity of the criticism expressed in my own article in your summer issue—"Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense"—of "the direction in which the U.S. Navy is moving under the Administration's defense program," I in turn believe that their suggestions for the kind of navy we should build would go far to provide the indispensable maritime superiority component of any sound coalition defense (though, like Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, I would also proliferate cruise missiles for sea control/land attack).

When they delve into the realm of strategy, however, they seem to be arguing for just another variant of maritime supremacy. They say let the Europeans and others in Eurasia defend themselves, while the United States concentrates on dominating the seas and posturing to "intervene with forces in unexpected and remote areas" (unspecified, but presumably in the Third World). Here Admiral Turner falls prey to what I called the "likelihood fallacy"—designing primarily against more likely threats at the expense of more critical ones.

The logical objective of any strategy should be to protect one's vital interests. As Lord Palmerston said, there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Look how Japan and Germany, the two powers against whom we fought World War II, have become our strongest allies, while our erstwhile Russian allies are now our main adversary. Since the U.S.S.R.'s growing military power creates the chief threat to our interests, it stands to reason that the principal (though not only) aim of our strategy must still be to prevent the U.S.S.R. from decisively altering the world balance of power by achieving dominant influence over the world's other two major industrial complexes—Western Europe and Japan—or their economic lifeblood, oil from the Persian Gulf.

Unfortunately, all three of these vital overseas interests lie on the fringes of the Eurasian heartland, hence vulnerable to Soviet pressure even if the United States controlled all the seven seas. Though sea control is essential to help defend these interests, it alone cannot suffice. We need balanced air and ground as well as maritime capabilities—a fact the U.S. Navy (which insists on its own army and its own air force) ought not to find difficult to grasp.

Nor does my focus on these three widely separated areas seem to merit the pejorative term "Atlanticist"; perhaps "Eurasianist" would be more accurate. If Admiral Turner also finds my article a "strong argument against change," so be it. Actually, I called for a major change in strategy, but it was away from that overreliance on nuclear deterrence which Secretary James Schlesinger called the "fatal flaw in our Western alliance system." This is the real issue we must confront.

Nor can the United States realistically expect to cope alone with Soviet

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conventional military power. Democratic societies are simply not going to spend 15 to 18 percent of their GNP on defense in peacetime, as can the U.S.S.R. Fortunately, we don't even have to try. Instead we can exploit our greatest strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R., which is that we have many rich allies and friends, while they have only a few poor ones. This is why a coalition approach makes such sense for the United States and its allies.

It is also putting words in my mouth to allege that I showed "concern" lest shifting "toward sea control, amphibious projection and more mobile follow-on ground and air forces will decrease our readiness in Europe." I have long favored all three as essential to coalition defense. My concern was rather, in the words of their own fair summary of my view on the point, that the type of Navy required for a maritime strategy built around a few supercarriers "would in time starve the other Services." Even they admit my concern is valid, since this *is* the kind of Navy we are building. And funding it is starving even the three capabilities they cite as needed.

I prefer Admiral Turner's Navy to the one at which the Reagan Administration is aiming. But his vague call for "a new military strategy" based on willingness to look at U.S. security needs "with an open mind" smacks instead of the same old unilateralist naval parochialism which is again in the ascendant.

ROBERT W. KOMER
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Komer was formerly Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs.

Admiral Turner and Captain Thibault reply:

Mr. Komer labors under the impression that a maritime strategy is intended only to dominate the seas and to intervene in the Third World. Instead, a properly defined maritime strategy is one of being able to move forces and goods over the seas, by ship or by aircraft, *wherever* needed. That includes Europe. Twice in this century the United States has come to the rescue of Europe by sending an expeditionary force across the seas. We may need to do that again and we may also need to go elsewhere. What we are suggesting today is not total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, but a new emphasis on building U.S. ground and air forces that can move quickly either to Europe *or* to other areas, and the sea power and airlift to ensure that they can get there.

Mr. Komer stresses that in addition to Europe, our strategy must include Japan and the Persian Gulf. It is difficult to understand how he believes we are going to cover these other two areas within the strategy that he advocates. Surely we are not adequately prepared to use force today in these areas precisely because the type of forces we have built with Europe in mind cannot be moved rapidly enough over such distances.

The shift in emphasis which we are advocating is one of being capable of moving to any of the Mr. Komer's three areas or to any others that might come to be of importance to U.S. interests.

In fact, it seems, Mr. Komer makes the case for this by pointing out that ". . . there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests." Our plea is not to build a U.S. military structure that is utterly dependent on a continuation of the same type of alliance relationship with the Europeans that we've known since World War II. Yes, the United States must be aware that there are no

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permanent allies, because we can clearly see that the Alliance is evolving into something quite different than we've known. Let us see if we can't build some flexibility into our military posture so that we can still play a significant role in Europe, but at the same time be ready for other contingencies as well.

To the Editor:

Readers of your summer and fall issues must have been entertained by the back-to-back critiques of U.S. strategy and naval plans by Mr. Komer and Admiral Turner. If these gentlemen are to be believed, the Reagan defense program is undermining the NATO alliance by concentrating on a maritime strategy and, to compound the error, the Navy is building the wrong type of ship for the wrong type of naval mission.

Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that both authors rely on defective rhetorical devices at variance with fact. Mr. Komer sets up the straw man of coalition defense versus maritime strategy. Yet he admits that control of the seas is a prerequisite to the successful coalition defense of NATO that he and so many of us advocate—including President Reagan. Mr. Komer's thesis that giving priority to the long overdue strengthening of the Navy will somehow weaken our ties with NATO can make sense only if we do so at the expense of NATO land forces—his implication. But this is bizarre. I am perplexed that he ignores the fact that President Reagan is providing a much higher resource level for NATO as a whole than did the Carter Administration. It is therefore difficult to see what is bothering Mr. Komer, unless he really believes that the new emphasis on the Navy indicates some sort of isolationist revival predicated on the United States going it alone. I can assure him that the nature of the Navy's business simply does not permit such isolationism.

This charge, however, might be better leveled at Admiral Turner and his colleague, who are in pursuit of that Holy Grail, a "new" military strategy. They do reject the coalition approach, but on the singularly odd ground that over the years it has not left us with adequate forces—either in Europe or in other areas. This may or may not be true; but even if one acknowledges shortfalls in our defenses, this does not discredit coalition strategy—it only discredits policies that have failed to provide the *means* for the strategy, notably policies of the Administration in which Admiral Turner was a senior official. President Reagan's defense budget certainly aims to correct this deficiency, which is now widely recognized in the Congress and by the American people.

Speaking of the means, Admiral Turner devotes most of his space to an attack on the *Nimitz*-type carrier as too large, destined for the wrong mission and out-of-step with technological advances, which decree simpler warplanes, with more sophisticated missiles, hence smaller decks. The misuse of the Falklands War in support of this argument has already become a kind of cottage industry but I think it suffices to cite Admiral Turner's own larger judgments: that (1) the smaller carriers themselves will not necessarily cost less and, (2) the larger carriers will be the backbone of the fleet for the next 20 years anyway.

If these judgments are accurate, then one can ask what the entire fuss is about. Surely one of the most desirable aspects of the current naval program is the rapidity with which it gives the Navy what it needs to control the seas—within a few years. Are we to postpone this buildup, so that a new generation of technology (the smaller carriers and the more sophisticated missiles to be fired by the less-sophisticated planes) is perfected? This is the discredited

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technique of the Carter Administration: to satisfy the budget cutters and the defense reductionists with small "in-year" expenditures and to satisfy the strategists and our nervous allies with promises of technology to come in big "out-year" expenditures. Somehow in that process the out years never came and the Navy continued to shrink, which led ultimately to a redefinition of mission, whereby control of the seas was dropped and convoying was to be established as the naval mission.

Such a passive defense will not work and it has never worked. Militarily, we simply do not have the merchant fleet to sustain the war of attrition that would result. Success in the maritime theaters, without which there can be no success in the land theaters, is impossible without a forward strategy of maneuver, initiative and offense.

I must conclude, then, that Admiral Turner wants it both ways: both the safety of the big ships and the applause of the salons as he advocates the smaller ships and newer technology. His fear, shared by Mr. Komer, that today's Navy program will somehow weaken NATO, is baseless. His alternative strategy for "sea control" would work only to diminish both our security and the security of our allies. Only a balanced strategy of maritime superiority, and a well-postured forward defense consisting of air, ground and sea forces in concert with our allies, can provide for the peace and stability which must be our objective.

JOHN LEHMAN
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Komer replies:

Secretary Lehman clearly wins the prize for rhetoric. The only trouble is that he ignores the facts. I'd certainly agree with his call for a "balanced strategy . . . in concert with our allies." But spending over $50 billion on three new nuclear carrier battle groups will still be at the expense of that balance, even if President Reagan gets all the defense spending he asks. And what do these big carriers really buy us, as compared with investing those constrained defense dollars more wisely?

It's a pity that both Admiral Turner and Secretary Lehman construe the issue as only involving NATO. A maritime supremacy strategy based on costly big carriers does not suffice to protect our vital interests in the Persian Gulf or Northeast Asia either—even though, as both have pointed out, it is great for sideshows like the Falkland Islands.

Let's not lose sight of the real issue. We all three agree that the United States and its allies must have maritime superiority; our argument is over how much of what kind of Navy, at what cost, is essential for this purpose. Admiral Turner's and Secretary Lehman's comments only reinforce my concern lest, given all the pressures to cut the Reagan defense program, its main achievement will end up being the wrong kind of costly 600-ship Navy—at the expense of our larger strategic needs.

Admiral Turner replies:

Secretary Lehman attacks both Mr. Komer and myself in terms of Carterites versus Reaganites. The last thing that we need in this discussion of basic military strategies is partisan political polemics.

When the Secretary gets specific in his criticisms he sets forth the Catch-22

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that has bedeviled the Navy for at least 20 years:

—We need a rapid buildup of our sea power.

—Therefore we must continue building what is familiar, i.e., large aircraft carriers.

—Then, there is no rush to develop alternative, new technologies—e.g., vertical-take off aircraft—because they are not needed on the traditional large ships that we are building.

The new large carriers which the Secretary wants to build quickly will be with us into the 2020s. This haste today will almost ensure that we'll enter a future war with the weapons of the last one.

Surprisingly, Secretary Lehman expresses concern that the Navy is going to continue to shrink. He himself is encouraging that by concentrating more and more of the value of the Navy in fewer and fewer ships. I doubt that even he can any longer take his much vaunted plan for a 600-ship Navy seriously. There are a wide range of studies, even by such pro-defense organizations as the American Enterprise Institute, that demonstrate that the Navy is going to continue to decline toward 400 ships rather than increase. The reason is that the type of ships that are being purchased are so expensive.

The Navy's present shipbuilding plan is just like almost all the plans that have gone before it: it is heavily dependent on a substantial increase in congressional funding for shipbuilding a few years down the track. For instance, the Navy's present plan calls for 2.4 times as many dollars for ships in the fiscal 1988 budget as in the 1984 budget. With this kind of wishful optimism, the Navy's record over many years has been one of actually building less than half of the ships it has planned. Mr. Lehman can hardly pretend that he feels congressional and public opinion today are likely to support an increase in Navy funding by a factor like 2.4.

Finally, the Secretary advocates a strategy for the Navy of ". . . maneuver, initiative and offense." Presumably he is reaffirming his many public statements that our Navy is going to be capable of carrying the war right to the Soviets' home bases and airfields. That sounds stirring and patriotic. The only problem is that I have yet to find one Admiral who believes that the U.S. Navy would even attempt it.

DIVISION OF LEBANON

To the Editor:

Some two centuries ago, when the European powers divided Poland among themselves, Frederick the Great is reported to have said of Maria Theresa, "She cried, but she took her share."

In his article on Israeli policy in your fall issue, "Begin's Rhetoric and Sharon's Tactics," Amos Perlmutter has no time for tears in predicting, and seemingly recommending, the division of Lebanon between Syria and Israel. Moreover, he views such a development as good for both the region and the United States. This is dangerous whimsy trying to pass for hardheaded analysis.

We no longer live in the eighteenth century. Even in that bygone age, well before romanticism and nationalism had changed the rules of politics, the partition of Poland shocked Europe. Today's world is much more politicized. Public opinion does exist and statesmen ignore it at their peril, in the Middle East just as elsewhere. True, many Middle Eastern governments are shaky,

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but this situation only strengthens the hold of visceral public opinion over rulers.

Surely, the last government to consider a "public be damned" division of other states should be that of Syria, a minority regime in a country of minorities.

Mr. Perlmutter's argument is especially quixotic in excoriating the Begin/Sharon strategy and then largely accepting what they apparently set out to achieve. Perhaps it sounds hopelessly idealistic to say that we must be very careful not to reward aggression or other unilateral military strikes designed to present the world with a fait accompli, but how else do we restrain the Sharons of this globe?

Mr. Perlmutter implies that Lebanon fell apart as a result of internal weakness and the inability of Lebanese to develop a sense of political community. Such a conclusion brushes aside hard facts available, ironically, even in Mr. Perlmutter's own article, which would suggest just the opposite: Lebanon's not unpromising earlier moves toward political community based on democratic pluralism were upset by outside forces.

In predicting and proposing a de facto division of Lebanon between Syria and Israel, Mr. Perlmutter fails to learn from the de facto division Lebanon has already suffered. What, pray, was the situation before June 1982 with a Syrian presence, an autonomous PLO, an Israeli client, Major Haddad, in South Lebanon and a tacit alliance between Israel and the Phalangists?

Mr. Perlmutter falls prey to the old illusion of amateur diplomats and armchair strategists: complex, multilateral diplomatic problems can be resolved to the satisfaction of all who really matter, provided one or perhaps two victims are chosen to pay the full price. Mr. Perlmutter's chosen victims are to be Lebanon and the Palestinians.

Morality aside, "odd man out" diplomacy usually doesn't work. Remember the partition of Poland.

Fortunately, in the same issue Ghassan Tueni's proposals for Lebanon are both practical and promising.

L. Carl Brown
Program in Near Eastern Studies
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey

Mr. Perlmutter replies:

I don't see why Mr. Brown is so agitated about my article. All the recommendations I made implied that a golden opportunity exists after the Lebanon war for an Israeli-Syrian conflict resolution.

I strongly feel that my analysis of Lebanon's society and political system was cogent and accurate and, if anything, understated. I am neither alone nor prejudiced in my analysis of Lebanon. A distinguished professor of the American University of Beirut and Arab scholar, Dr. Samir Khalaf, who has no love for Israel and who lives in Beirut and knows Lebanon better than I, analyzes Lebanese society and politics in harsher terms than I did. In the Spring 1982 issue of *Studies in Comparative International Development* he writes:

> The barbarism and immoralism which are being experienced by Lebanon are more pathological than therapeutic. They have little to do with the rebirth and recovery

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of virtue and justice. As such, this barbarism is unlikely to rescue Lebanon from its deepening crisis and transform it into a more civil and edifying social order. Nor is this barbarism to be dismissed as a transient post-war phase which will eventually be shaken off when impassioned and aroused masses return to their sensibilities. The vulgarization and impoverishment of public life, widespread mediocrity, and mass culture are only manifestations of a more menacing moral crisis.

Indeed, what Lebanon has been experiencing is not only the fragmentation of a political system, but the dismemberment of a society. The most elementary social ties which normally hold a society together—ties of trust, loyalty, confidence, compassion, and decency—have been in many respects fatally eroded. And it is relatively easier to recreate a state than to rebuild a society. A state can be reconstituted by legislation, contract, pacts, or covenants—as Lebanon has seen several times in its political history—but how does one reconstruct a society?

I sympathize with Mr. Brown's expressed idealism. However, it should be obvious even to him, in the light of the recent assassination and massacre, that there is unfortunately little room for his sort of well-meant idealism in Lebanon.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

DIPLOMACY. By Adam Watson. New York: McGraw-Hill New Press, 1982, 239 pp. $19.95.

With this book Adam Watson achieves the status of a latter-day Nicolson, giving a thorough explanation of the character of diplomacy, as a means of dialogue between sovereign states, as it has evolved since the 18th century. In showing how diplomatic dialogue limits the international anarchy and the clash of ideologies, Watson is not only the analyst but also the subtle advocate of a system which survives because there is no alternative.

FORCE AND STATECRAFT: DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME. By Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George. New York: Oxford, 1982, 288 pp. $19.95.

This is a combined historical and contemporary look at international relations by two distinguished scholars. They deal first with the changing nature of the international system, from the Peace of Westphalia to the present day, then those factors—negotiation, deterrence, crisis management, détente—on which the maintenance of balanced power and world peace have depended. The book's great value is in raising the vital questions, without claiming to have all the answers, and in providing apt historical examples of the points under study.

STUDIES ON A JUST WORLD ORDER. VOL. I: TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER. Edited by Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. Mendlovitz. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 652 pp. $35.00 (paper, $16.50).

Where others may seek such goals as security, stability, balance or dialogue, Richard Falk and his associates stress global human values and the need for radical, though not necessarily instant, change. They mean a change in the nature of most governments and of the international system, although they are not advocating "world government" and reject the charge of lack of realism. This is a book of readings by authors from the First and Third Worlds—none from the Second nor even from Yugoslavia, which straddles all three. While differing in their points of view, all tend to fortify the basic purposes of the editors.

LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By James Fawcett. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1982, 144 pp. $23.95.

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Professor Fawcett, who has served as legal adviser to the British Foreign Office and director of studies at Chatham House, is learned in the law but makes no extravagant claims for its role in international relations. In this short book, he explores several specific areas such as "power frontiers" (including a close look at Sino-Soviet border questions), non-intervention and human rights.

UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER. By Edward Keynes. University Park: Penn State Press, 1982, 236 pp. $17.95.

A fresh examination of the 200-year old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War, but because of the nature of the Constitution itself, necessarily inconclusive.

PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. Edited by Peter Willetts. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 225 pp. $25.00.

An addition to the growing literature on transnational actors in world politics, in this case non-governmental interest or pressure groups. The case studies are mainly of organizations centered in the West but aimed at the whole world, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Amnesty International, Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, and each is written by an active believer in the cause.

A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA. By Philip W. Quigg. New York: McGraw-Hill New Press, 1982, 299 pp. $19.95. A Twentieth Century Fund Report.

A former managing editor of *Foreign Affairs* and specialist in environmental matters reviews the status of Antarctica, now a gigantic world science laboratory under the treaty of 1959, as pressures for change may be building up in connection with territorial claims, military use, or exploitation of the continent's resources of shellfish or oil and gas. It is a thorough, objective and critical study, necessary background for all who may be involved in making national or international decisions as the time for reviewing the treaty (1991) approaches.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

RETHINKING THE U.S. STRATEGIC POSTURE. Edited by Barry M. Blechman. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982, 308 pp.

This is an outstanding roundup of the principal issues concerning strategic nuclear forces and arms control in the early 1980s. The product of the Aspen Institute's Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues meetings in the summers of 1980 and 1981, its contributors include many of the persons most knowledgable on these questions. That new approaches are needed is well recognized; yet the policy prescriptions are, on the whole, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Those who support the nuclear freeze in its more simplistic forms would do well to study this volume carefully, for it demonstrates the

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unavoidable complexity of the problem. Especially valuable is the concluding chapter, which states fairly the differing assumptions about the nuclear balance and specifies alternative outcomes.

THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE: NEW POLICIES FOR AMERICAN SECURITY. Edited by Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge: Ballinger (for the Harvard Center for International Affairs), 1982, 360 pp. $27.50.

This product of Harvard's new Program in National Security Studies is an interesting collection of essays which, in contrast to the Blechman volume (above), places comparatively greater emphasis on the need to strengthen U.S. defense capabilities and less on arms control. Although the book contains some good contributions, it suffers from the lack of a central organizing principle.

SURPRISE ATTACK. By Richard K. Betts. Washington: Brookings, 1982, 318 pp. $24.95 (paper, $9.95).

A true original, this impressive work deals with a subject that is central to military strategy yet has been little studied in itself. Betts initially examines a number of instances of surprise attack—the German blitzkriegs, Pearl Harbor, Korea, Czechoslovakia and some of the Middle East wars; he then applies that analysis to the central front in Europe and suggests how NATO might prepare to deal with sudden attack. Betts suggests that military surprise at the start of a war usually succeeds, not because of intelligence failures but because political leaders are reluctant to respond and thus possibly escalate the crisis. To hedge against surprise attack, he says, worry less about how to prevent it and more about what to do once surprise has occurred. An outstanding piece of scholarship.

ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR. By Harry G. Summers, Jr. Novato (Cal.): Presidio Press, 1982, 210 pp. $12.95.

The author, a colonel on the staff of the Army War College, has reexamined military strategy and tactics in the light of our experience in the Vietnam War. His analysis extends well beyond the battlefield to Congress, the political leadership and the people. Among his many messages: Success in war requires clarity in political and military objectives.

BEYOND THE COLD WAR: A NEW APPROACH TO THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION. By E. P. Thompson. New York: Pantheon, 1982, 196 pp. $15.00 (paper, $5.95).

The collected essays of one of Europe's leading advocates of nuclear disarmament make for intriguing yet ultimately depressing reading. A social historian, E. P. Thompson for the past several years has been at the barricades of the anti-nuclear, anti-defense debate in the United Kingdom. He has found receptive audiences in continental Europe and America. His satirical blasts at Ronald Reagan, the defense intellectuals and deterrence theory are witty and crowd-pleasing. Yet set side-by-side in this volume, they are surprisingly shallow, unanalytical, often ill-informed and full of ad hominem attacks. A typical remark: "What is needed is less 'arms control' than control of the political and military leaders who deploy these arms."

ETHICS AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Edited by Geoffrey Goodwin. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 199 pp. $20.00.

The ethics of nuclear weapons and of the doctrine of deterrence have risen

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to become issues of public prominence and individual introspection. This short and elegant work, written for the British Council on Christian Approaches to Defense and Disarmament, makes a calm and reasoned contribution to the discussion. The authors are a mix of churchmen, senior government officials, parliamentarians and international affairs scholars. A civilized book in which the authors listen to each other as they grapple with the difficult moral and political dilemmas of the nuclear age.

INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS. By Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk. New York: Basic Books, 1982, 301 pp. $15.50 (paper, $6.95).

"Nuclearism" is a disease, these two respected authors claim. Nuclearism is defined as the psychological, political and military dependence on nuclear weapons, the "embrace of the weapons as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, most ironically, that of security." There is much akin here to Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth.* Those drawn to Schell will find a deeper level of thought and analysis in this work.

THE NUCLEAR DELUSION: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC AGE. By George F. Kennan. New York: Pantheon, 1982, 208 pp. $13.95.

Bringing together essays covering 30 years of writing on the nuclear issue, this volume is elegant testimony to the efforts of George Kennan toward making mankind aware of the danger and limited political utility of these weapons. Kennan has obviously been deeply troubled by the nuclear arms race, not least because of the way in which it has skewed relations with the East, and he of course believes that our vision of the Soviet Union has often been in error.

SOVIET STYLE IN WAR. By Nathan Leites. New York: Crane, Russak, 1982, 400 pp. $22.50.

Nathan Leites has produced an exhaustive study on how the Soviets prefer to wage protracted conventional war, based upon an extensive survey of Soviet military writings, especially writings on the performance of Soviet troops on the Eastern front in 1941–1945. Discussed in detail are such themes as the Soviet attitude toward tactical surprise, the infantry "hugging" of (i.e., sticking close to) their own artillery barrage, and the doctrine of the inevitability of escalation.

EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: THE WARSAW PACT NORTHERN TIER. By A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev. New York: Crane, Russak, 1982, 182 pp. A Rand Corporation Study.

This Rand study consists mainly of in-depth chapters on the military establishments of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. Addressing the central question of the "reliability" of these forces, the authors suggest that it might be quite high in a "lightning war" that left little time for consultation and preparation; "coalition warfare," on the other hand, would be difficult and could expose the many vulnerabilities within the Warsaw Pact.

BLACKS AND THE MILITARY. By Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg. Washington: Brookings, 1982, 190 pp. $18.95 (paper, $7.95).

Since the end of conscription ten years ago, the proportion of black

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volunteers in the U.S. armed forces has increased to the point where blacks now represent 20 percent of all military personnel (double their proportion in the national population) and an even larger proportion of ground combat forces; perhaps one half of the combat casualties in the initial phases of a war would be blacks. This raises serious questions: do blacks carry an unfair share of the burden of defense or is their increased participation in the military service a good thing in terms of the educational and career opportunities it offers? Should the armed forces be more broadly representative of American society as a whole? Sensitive and controversial questions are raised more often than answered, but in such a way as to facilitate an informed public debate.

WAR IN SPACE. By James Canan. New York: Harper, 1982, 186 pp. $13.95.

The title is somewhat misleading, for this lively book deals as much with the MX, Stealth, Trident and precision-guided munitions as with the space shuttle and laser. Yet this is a book one can learn much from, the author having followed the Defense Department's research and engineering program closely through several Administrations as *Business Week*'s Pentagon correspondent. Canan is convinced that the Pentagon seeks to develop space-laser battle stations capable of shooting down Soviet ASAT (antisatellite) weapons, and perhaps even ballistic missiles, by the middle of the next decade.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES. By Mancur Olson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 287 pp. $14.95.

This major book builds on the author's very original analyses of public goods and the damage done to societies by the power of special interest groups. Nine implications of his earlier work, when applied to the history of several major countries and the large issues mentioned in the subtitle, produce any number of striking insights and fruitful chains of reasoning. Whether all the explanations will stand up is a matter for scholars to determine as time passes, but they, as well as laymen, can benefit from this stimulating and clearly written exploration. It makes a powerful case for the virtues of competition and the open society.

OIL STRATEGY AND POLITICS, 1941–1981. By Walter J. Levy, edited by Melvin A. Conant. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 345 pp. $23.95.

In 1941 and 1942, Walter Levy wrote about the effect of oil on Nazi and Japanese strategy. In 1981, he wrote in this journal about the oil agenda of the next decade. In between, he wrote much about the critical significance of oil in our time. This selection of papers, each skillfully introduced and set in place by Melvin Conant, shows how regularly Mr. Levy forecast the importance of international cooperation, the inadequacies of U.S. policy, the consequences of reliance on the Middle East, and the unsolved problems of finding the right relation between governments and oil companies in the pursuit of the public interest. Without wishing Mr. Levy to stop looking ahead, one hopes that the publication of this body of work will lead him to look back as well, to explain more fully the developments to which he was so close.

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A DESIRABLE ENERGY FUTURE. By Robert S. Livingston and others. Philadelphia: Franklin Institute Press, 1982, 255 pp. $24.50.
U.S. ENERGY POLICY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s: REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S ENERGY POLICY COMMITTEE. By John E. Gray, Henry H. Fowler and Joseph W. Harned. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1981, 336 pp. $25.00.
AFTER THE SECOND OIL CRISIS: ENERGY POLICIES IN EUROPE, AMERICA, AND JAPAN. Edited by Wilfrid L. Kohl. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1982, 297 pp. $29.95.

Will the glut of oil lead to a shortage of books on energy? Although the Oak Ridge authors in the volume edited by Livingston were "not completely confident that anyone could benefit from another energy study," they persevered. So did the other collectives, and all managed to produce good, solid additions to the literature.

AN IMMODEST AGENDA: REBUILDING AMERICA BEFORE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. By Amitai Etzioni. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982, 432 pp. $19.95.

This interesting book by a sociologist who spent some time in the Carter Administration is at its best in discussing how "mutuality" and "civility" can be restored to American society, and why they are essential. Its prescription for economic rebuilding, though rooted in an interesting historical analysis, is fairly conventional and conservative.

TOWARD A NEW U.S. INDUSTRIAL POLICY? Edited by Michael L. Wachter and Susan M. Wachter. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982, 536 pp. $30.00.
INDUSTRY VITALIZATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY. Edited by Margaret E. Dewar. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1982, 252 pp. $25.00.

The growth of concern about the structural weaknesses of the American economy are reflected in the choice of "industrial policy" as the focus of conferences at Penn's Wharton School and at the Hubert Humphrey Institute at the University of Minnesota. Scholars with government experience provide some of the best contributions to both these valuable books.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Ian M. D. Little. New York: Basic Books, 1982, 452 pp. $20.00. A Twentieth Century Fund Book.

The field of development economics is old enough to have a history and contradictory enough to need a guide. Both are provided in an almost encyclopedic but readable way in this excellent book by one of the leading British authorities in the field. Not all the mistakes have been made by the developing countries and Mr. Little is blunt about who said what and clear as to why he rejects conventional wisdom.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Robert H. Ballance, Javed A. Ansari and Hans Singer. Totowa (N.J.): Allanheld, Osmun, 1982, 326 pp. $29.50.

How much is growth a do-it-yourself job and how much is it better to beg, borrow or earn from the rest of the world? The best part of this book deals with this question in often original ways. The authors lean toward playing

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down trade and aid, but definitive answers elude them and there will be debate about some of their methods. Other chapters deal with a number of key issues but do not pull the interesting parts together.

DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT AID. By Melvyn B. Krauss. New York: McGraw-Hill New Press, 1982, 208 pp. $17.95.

Aid is a secondary subject of this book, which is mostly about the damage to development resulting from the policies of most governments. These are traced to the devotion to the welfare state in both rich and poor countries. The strength of this Manhattan Institute volume is in the vigor and clarity of its arguments for private enterprise. Its weaknesses are exaggeration and simplification, which lead to such conclusions as, "Just one course on free markets and the competitive economy from Milton Friedman, and the Shah might have died in peace on the Peacock Throne."

PRIVATE FOREIGN AID: U.S. PHILANTHROPY IN RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT. By Landrum R. Bolling with Craig Smith. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 330 pp. $25.00.

This is a friendly survey, not a close critique. It has useful accounts of what a variety of private agencies—some quite small—have done, but it is most interesting when it deals with the relations between private and public aid, and how the private philanthropists would like to influence official policies.

THE COLLABORATION OF NATIONS: A STUDY OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICY. Edited by Douglas Dosser, David Gowland and Keith Hartley. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 252 pp. $25.00.

The aims, methods and difficulties of international cooperation are set forth in a highly systematic manner in this collaborative work by British economists. Illustrations, some in great detail, from the European Community elicit opinions on certain issues, but there are no broad policy conclusions.

U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL TRADE RELATIONS. Edited by Emery N. Castle and Kenzo Hemmi. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982, 436 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.95). A Resources for the Future Book.

The product of a substantial cooperative effort, these essays are well tied together to describe not only production and consumption but agricultural policymaking and trade negotiations. Some ingenious—if rather optimistic—suggestions are made, and Western readers can learn much about Japan.

THE RE-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR IMPROVING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS. By David A. Heenan. Reading (Mass.): Addison-Wesley, 1983, 286 pp. $13.95.

The centerpiece of this book is a survey of the ideas of 1500 businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians and labor leaders about how to get the United States out of its economic difficulties. Rejecting the creation of "U.S., Inc.", or increased government control, most of them want to make the current mix work better. The author, a consultant with much business school experience, has some suggestions for improving matters but also quite a few doubts about what can be accomplished without substantial changes in the attitudes of business, government and labor.

THE REAL WORLD WAR. By Hunter Lewis and Donald Allison. New York: Coward, 1982, 276 pp. $14.95.

This popular survey ascribes the decline of American competitiveness to

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bad business practices, poor government policies and astute foreigners. It prescribes better business strategy, keeping management's eye on global market shares, repealing antitrust laws and undoing some other government measures (including those of the early Reagan years). One is not entirely persuaded that this will suffice.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT. By Jimmy Carter. New York: Bantam Books, 1982, 622 pp. $22.50.

In the tradition of recent presidential memoirs, this has no great literary distinction, but it is short, sincere and straightforward. Mr. Carter uses quotations from his diary to hold together a narrative devoted almost entirely to foreign affairs. He was clearly happiest when attending to the myriad details necessary for the achievement of specific immediate objectives: Senate ratification of the Panama Treaties, normalization of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the agreement on SALT II with the Soviets (never ratified), and the Camp David Accords. The chapters on these subjects are the best. Needless to say, the hostage crisis darkens the book as it did the Administration.

CRISIS: THE LAST YEAR OF THE CARTER PRESIDENCY. By Hamilton Jordan. New York: Putnam, 1982, 431 pp. $16.95.

The author, as staff chief to President Carter, was "point man" (his phrase) for secret negotiations with the Shah of Iran and with Iranian contacts over the American hostages. This account is valuable not so much for precise events recounted as for what it reveals of the frustrations endured and the incapacity displayed by the Administration in dealing with an intractable situation. No one, the author least of all, emerges in a favorable light in this candid book.

LEADERS. By Richard Nixon. New York: Warner Books, 1982, 371 pp. $17.50.

These sketches of major figures—Churchill, de Gaulle, Khrushchev, Chou En-lai and others—reveal Mr. Nixon's admiration for ruthless dedication. The principal interest of the book lies in the author's account of his own exchanges with the subjects and in his sometimes angry digressions—for example, against liberal bureaucrats who thwart conservative Presidents.

NEITHER COLD WAR NOR DÉTENTE? SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s. Edited by Richard A. Melanson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1982, 243 pp. $14.95 (paper, $4.95).

Solid, thoughtful essays by well-known international affairs scholars. The prevailing though not exclusive message is one of prudence: the United States should eschew apocalyptic confrontation in favor of "a policy of containment similar to George Kennan's prescriptions for strengthening the economic and political fiber of societies, in contrast to a reliance primarily on a military balance of power." Allen Whiting's essay warning against the simplistic concept of a Sino-Soviet-American triangle is especially good.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE LOST CONSENSUS. By George H. Quester. New York: Praeger, 1982, 277 pp. $27.95 (paper, $12.95).

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The author argues that the old pre-Vietnam consensus assumed that the United States was better than other countries and that the rest of the world would be happier if we succeeded in encouraging the growth of democracy. This liberal view was challenged both by power-politics realists, who said the United States was no different from other nations (all pursue power), and by radical critics who saw the United States as worse than other nations, indeed, as the principal source of what is wrong in the world. After analyzing events and public opinion from these three perspectives, Quester ends on a note of nostalgia for the old consensus.

THE DOCTRINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, 446 pp.

A comprehensive survey of the meaning, role and future of doctrines from Monroe to Reagan. Crabb, who has read widely in the literature, observes that often the doctrines of American foreign policy have been "imprecise, ambiguous, and mystifying" and yet, as the equivalent of military strategic plans, they are better to have than not. The United States should not try to eliminate doctrines, but see that they are soundly based. Easier advised than done.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS: A MODERN PRIMER. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Englewood (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1982, 236 pp.

A veteran observer of the foreign policy scene combines description and critique in reviewing how the process has worked. The "primer" part of the book illustrates its elementary lessons by using unorthodox devices (including an improbable one-act play), but much of it is keen analysis of such subjects as executive-legislative relations, policy planning and diplomacy, drawing on the experience of other governments as well as Washington.

J. C. C.

EUROPE AFTER STALIN: EISENHOWER'S THREE DECISIONS OF MARCH 11, 1953. By W. W. Rostow. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 206 pp. $25.00 (paper, $8.95).

President Eisenhower's instincts, and those of some of his advisers (including the author), called for an immediate positive overture to the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, with particular reference to the reunification of Germany. The Secretary of State and his department were unenthusiastic. The result was delay and compromise, which nevertheless produced the President's conciliatory and moving speech of April 16, 1953. This is the third in the author's continuing series of short case studies, with documents.

TUMULTOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1949–53. By Robert J. Donovan. New York: Norton, 1982, 444 pp. $19.95.

This completes a superb two-volume study of the Truman presidency. The focus of the book, as was Truman's at the time, is overwhelmingly on foreign affairs. Donovan reaches the sound conclusion that "the deepest, most lasting troubles that had beset Truman were those in the Far East . . . . If there were a better course the United States could have followed in the face of the historic upheaval in Asia, the Truman administration never found it."

THOMAS E. DEWEY AND HIS TIMES. By Richard Norton Smith. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982, 703 pp. $22.50.

A deeply researched and readable biography of this century's closest might-

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have-been President. The material on Dewey's career as a crime fighter is fascinating, the account of his governorship admiring, and the analysis of his defeat in 1948 by Truman and by his own reticence is clear. The overall portrait shows a man of integrity, almost compulsive competence, and considerable insight into himself and others. He would have been a good President.

A MARGIN OF HOPE: AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Irving Howe. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982, 353 pp. $14.95.

A compelling account of the author's youth, education, and decades of warfare in the anti-Stalinist Left. The core of the story concerns the support of the New York intellectuals of this persuasion for the American side in the cold war, and the author's rather poignant encounters with, and observation of, the New Left in the 1960s.

DONOVAN AND THE CIA: A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. By Thomas F. Troy. Frederick (Md.): University Publications of America, 1981, 589 pp. $29.50.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947, largely on foundations laid during World War II by the Office of Strategic Services, whose directing genius was, of course, Colonel William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan. Troy's official history, originally published in a limited edition by the CIA in 1975, is a worshipful and yet important contribution. Much of the book deals with Donovan's struggles with the government bureaucracy over the role of the O.S.S.

MARSHALL: HERO FOR OUR TIMES. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Hearst Books, 1982, 608 pp. $18.50.

General George C. Marshall deliberately maintained a cold and formal manner. Observers in his lifetime, and historians since, have had difficulty describing him as a personality or explaining his greatness. Mosley, a prolific biographer, succeeds. Although the book contains little new on matters of high policy, it brings the General alive. Here is a portrait of courage, patience. controlled but powerful emotion, and sharp analytical intelligence.

THE HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. By Grace Person Hayes. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, 928 pp. $31.95.

Originally a classified internal history, this carefully documented and detailed study will be welcomed by those with a specialized interest in World War II. A helpful bibliographic essay by Dean C. Allard points the reader to the present location of the documents and discusses related publications.

AWAKENING AMERICAN EDUCATION TO THE WORLD: THE ROLE OF ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE, 1866–1928. By Robert F. Byrnes. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, 302 pp. $21.95.

Coolidge of Harvard, father of Slavic studies in this country and founder and first editor of *Foreign Affairs*, was an unspectacular man who had an extraordinary influence in expanding the horizons of American higher education and of the public in the field of world affairs. Professor Byrnes has done a real service in re-creating Coolidge's life and career, making good use of his voluminous correspondence with Hamilton Fish Armstrong, his assistant and successor at *Foreign Affairs*.

J. C. C.

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The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CANADA AND THE REAGAN CHALLENGE. By Stephen Clarkson. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1982, 383 pp.

This detailed analysis by a Canadian economist should be required reading for all American officials and business leaders whose decisions affect Canadian-American relations. Clarkson sees the two countries at a moment of serious instability and crisis as two "nationalisms" collide. His chapters deal specifically with investment, energy, the automobile industry, fisheries, mass communications, defense, acid rain and other issues.

G.S.

OIL AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA. By George Philip. New York: Cambridge, 1982, 579 pp. $49.50.

Very long and detailed, but blessedly free of ambiguity and jargon, this clearly written work is indeed professional. The world oil environment is sketched, as are the major expropriations and the characteristics and performances of state oil companies in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela. Increasing state control is foreseen, and also a growing role for private Latin American capital.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSENSUS. Edited by Alfred Hennelly and John Langan. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1982, 291 pp. $20.00 (paper, $8.95).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC NEEDS IN THE AMERICAS. Edited by Margaret E. Crahan. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1982, 343 pp. $20.00 (paper, $8.95).

Reflecting a strong philosophical and theological orientation, the contributors to these two volumes, some from North America and others from Latin countries, analyze the definition of human rights and their relationship to other social, political and economic desiderata. They also attempt to extend the relationship of human rights to basic human needs beyond the political realm.

BRAZIL AND MEXICO: PATTERNS IN LATE DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982, 349 pp. $30.00.

Eight essays devoted to foreign investment and dependency, government intervention in the economy, labor, income distribution and poverty, among other issues. The first essay, serving as a useful introduction, summarizes their characteristics and consequences in Brazil and Mexico, noting that foreign capital and technology have induced rapid development, but with painful social consequences, including increasing inequality and, often, political repression.

EL SALVADOR: THE FACE OF REVOLUTION. By Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk. Boston: South End Press, 1982, 283 pp. $7.50 (paper).
EL SALVADOR: A REVOLUTION CONFRONTS THE UNITED STATES. By Cynthia Arnson. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982, 118 pp.

These two books cover the same general ground; both rely on extensive interviews with the principal actors in the current conflict, and both appraise

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the negative consequences of present tendencies in U.S. policy. The Armstrong/Shenk volume appears under the auspices of the North American Congress on Latin America and is much the longer of the two, providing a full history of the country; it is also written in a partisan spirit, with emotional commitment. The Arnson book is more sharply focussed, with less background detail but no lack of policy orientation; the author advocates reaching an accommodation with the Left.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE WHEAT AND THE CHAFF. By François Mitterrand. New York: Seaver/Lattes, 1982, 300 pp. $16.95.

A miscellany of thoughts, impressions and reveries, excerpts from notes written down in the 1970s. The master politician dwells not on politics but on books and nature, on leaders and on his passion for justice. There is the recurrent horror of political violence, and the hope, expressed in 1974, that for Giscard "the presidency is a point of arrival; [while] for me it is a point of departure." Fascinating in parts, but a baffling book; revelatory to a degree, but expressive of a deliberate remoteness.

SOCIALISM OF A DIFFERENT KIND: RESHAPING THE LEFT IN FRANCE. By Bernard E. Brown. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1982, 201 pp. $29.95.

A book with several themes: the ideological changes in the Socialist and Communist parties in the 1970s, the rivalry and intermittent, hostile cooperation between them, and the place of "autogestion," or workers'-citizens' control, as a principal idea of the French Left. "The great virtue of autogestion is its ambiguity," the author suggests. The idea was born again in the anarchist-surrealist drama of 1968, as was its American analogue, participatory democracy. In this ponderous but useful account, Brown, an American specialist on French politics, reconstructs part of the background to Mitterrand's victory and reminds us that Mitterrand's rule marks a potentially profound change in French society.

THE FRENCH PARADOX. By F. Roy Willis. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 151 pp. $9.95 (paper).

A packed survey of America's defiantly independent ally, her economic strength, her Gaullist aims and policies, her military assertiveness in Africa, and her indubitable services to the Western alliance. A readable and informative work, by a Francophile American historian.

LEON BLUM. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982, 571 pp. $39.50 (paper, $24.50).

A retelling of an endlessly fascinating and ultimately pathetic story: a well-known French journalist provides a sympathetic but not uncritical account of one of the most hated but well-intentioned leaders of modern France. It is also the story of a particular brand of social democracy caught in the crossfire of communism and fascism. Readable and replete with aptly chosen excerpts from contemporary records.

VON KISSINGER ZU CARTER. By Gebhart Schweigler. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982, 514 pp. DM. 88.

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A major work on American foreign policy in the Nixon-Carter years, written by a German political scientist with a Harvard doctorate. The focus is on détente and the domestic determinants of American foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger lost domestic support and Carter, the inexperienced outsider, could not regain it. The book offers a serious account of American policies and, incidentally, affords a glimpse of European apprehensions regarding America's capacity for leadership.

THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN OPPOSITION, 1949–1960: THE CASE AGAINST REARMAMENT. By Gordon D. Drummond. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982, 383 pp. $27.50.

A reconstruction of the SPD struggle against Adenauer's policy of Western integration and West German rearmament at the expense of what SPD leaders thought should be the principal goal, reunification. For reasons of politics and principle, the SPD distrusted all efforts at rearmament and was in the forefront of opposition to nuclear weapons. Historically the SPD had been an opposition party and had always been anti-militarist. This sober and detailed monograph appears at a moment of extraordinary timeliness.

THE WEIMAR ÉTUDES. By Henry Pachter. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 360 pp. $19.95.

A pleasing mixture of autobiography and historical musings, in the form of several memoirs and essays, all on the theme of Weimar and exile. Pachter was a left-wing intellectual—homeless, versatile, interestingly unscholarly. The essays, here posthumously assembled, mirror his interests in philosophy, literature and all things German.

REPORTING U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. Edited by Michael Rice. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1982, 168 pp. $18.50 (paper, $8.50). An Aspen Institute Book.

A study of how four leading newspapers, including *The New York Times* and *Le Monde*, reported transatlantic and international relations from April to October 1980, this is also an introduction to the differences in national styles and prejudices that govern journalism in the United States, France, Britain and Germany. A useful and informative volume written by several well-known journalists: Jonathan Carr, Henri Pierre, Jan Reifenberg and Pierre Salinger.

NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES OF THE LATIN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. By Lawrence L. Whetten. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1982, 262 pp. $26.95.

A study of the differing views of the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese communist parties on specific international issues at a time when much-touted Eurocommunism has formally disappeared. "What is to be done?" is still the principal item on the post-Leninist agenda.

THE OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION IN NORDIC EUROPE. By Barry Turner. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 307 pp. $25.00.

A breezy and suggestive account of recent developments in the five Nordic countries, tying together particular political events with general trends in the entire area. The book emphasizes the long history of social democracy and the recent retreat from it, and stresses elements of cooperation among the five, as

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well as the beginnings of new goals—here called "cultural democracy." There is the strong hope that the North, with its resources—human and material—and its traditions, will remain a social laboratory—the more desirable as "a long period of recession seems to have stultified the Western political imagination."

URHO KEKKONEN: A PRESIDENT'S VIEW. By Urho Kekkonen. London: Heinemann, 1982, 195 pp. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, distributor, $16.50).

The former President of Finland presents a common-sensical exposition on how to transform necessity into virtue. Finland's neutrality and her close relations with the U.S.S.R. are givens—and the acceptable price for a cherished freedom in some areas of domestic policy and in dealings with other countries, especially the Nordic neighbors. He bristles at the term "Finlandization" and is far from recommending the Finnish solution as a prescription for countries more fortunately located.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS: BUILDING AUTHORITY IN SOVIET POLITICS. By George W. Breslauer. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1982, 318 pp. $28.50 (paper, $12.95).

The key word in George Breslauer's approach to the problems of leadership in the U.S.S.R. is "authority," which includes elements of power and patronage, but also those of policy preference and the building of consensus in the political elite. His main method is analysis of the public statements of the two leaders, concentrating on the critical domestic issues (no attention is given to foreign policy). This is careful and intelligent Kremlinology, leading to conclusions different from many held by other scholars and Kremlin watchers.

POLITICAL LEGITIMATION IN COMMUNIST STATES. Edited by T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 177 pp. $22.50.

Further discussion, at a high level of theory and observed practice, of how the ruling elites in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe try to achieve legitimacy and the right combination of force, fear and popular acceptance. The book attests to the quality of research in political science and sociology now being devoted to the nature of politics in communist societies. Most of the contributors developed their skills in postwar Eastern Europe (above all, in Hungary), and their emigration has been a positive gain for Western scholarship and for knowledge of these societies.

USSR: THE CORRUPT SOCIETY. By Konstantin Simis. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982, 316 pp. $14.95.

A Soviet lawyer's exposé, with numerous examples, of some aspects of the dark side of Soviet life: corruption, perversion of justice, bribery, protected crime, black markets and so on. He wrote the book while still in the U.S.S.R., intending to publish it anonymously in the West. When the manuscript was discovered by the KGB, he faced prison or exile, and chose the latter. Now resident in the United States, he is able to bring it out in his own name.

INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Ron-

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ald Amann and Julian Cooper. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 526 pp. $60.00

Continuing earlier work in this field, a talented research team at the University of Birmingham completes a massive study of research and development in Soviet industry, sector by sector, industry by industry, institution by institution, reform by reform. The problems are not all at the top but travel through the entire system. The book is a mine of information, a great help to the understanding of the Soviet economy.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. New York: Praeger, 1982, 364 pp. $31.95 (paper, $13.95).

A comprehensive survey of Soviet foreign relations, starting with domestic factors and economic and military considerations, then boxing the compass of all the world's regions, thus illustrating the fact that the U.S.S.R. is a global power; but there is no extended specific treatment of relations with the United States. The coverage of the 1970s is good and up-to-date; for the 1980s, despite the title, the authors are wise enough not to indulge in much prediction. Roger Kanet, a veteran editor, has done a good job of organizing the book.

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha. London: Heinemann (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1982, 172 pp. $13.50.

This collaborative work based on a Chatham House study group, wisely avoiding overconcentration on the Arab-Israeli conflict, offers fresh analyses of some less familiar aspects, such as the role of Eastern Europe and Cuba in Soviet strategy in the Middle East, the links with Soviet energy policy, and the relation between short- and long-term factors in Moscow's policy in the region.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD TURKEY, IRAN, AND AFGHANISTAN. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Praeger, 1982, 200 pp. $22.95 (paper, $11.95).

Straightforward historical accounts of Soviet relations with three border countries from the 19th century to the present day. The author, a recognized authority in this field, uses generally familiar material and offers little that is new, except in the coverage of Afghanistan. He reaches conclusions about the success of Soviet policies that other observers may find too sweeping.

A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE USSR. VOL. I: THE LEGACY OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION. By David Rousset. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 333 pp. $27.50.

A translation of Part I of Rousset's *La société eclatée.* It is not standard history, but a wide-ranging description of the evolution of classes, institutions and the instruments of power in the Soviet state since the Revolution, as workers' power gave way to "Thermidor" and then to the rule of Stalin and the upper bureaucracy. Written with many Marxist assumptions and interpretations, and with few references, the book makes demands on the reader, but it is a book to be read, pondered and measured against others.

REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COMMUNIST YOUTH INTERNATIONAL, 1914–1924. By Richard Cornell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, 288 pp. $35.00.

These were the years in which the Communist youth movement, like the

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Comintern, was torn by ideological and organizational disputes and national differences. By the time of Lenin's death, however, the Russian comrades had made Soviet state interests the effective definition of proletarian internationalism. The author works his way through a wealth of source material to tell us how it happened.

THE EAST EUROPEAN PREDICAMENT. By Peter Summerscale. New York: St. Martin's (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1982, 147 pp. $20.00.

A British diplomat, making good use of a year's leave spent at Chatham House, takes stock of Eastern Europe's "predicament." He keeps his eye on the main trends and the dilemmas, internal and external, which the rulers of these countries cannot evade. The analysis is generally sound, contains no surprises, and seems somewhat incomplete, in that it is restricted to three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

CANDLE FOR POLAND: 469 DAYS OF SOLIDARITY. By Leszek Szymański. San Bernadino (Cal.): Borgo Press, 1982, 128 pp. $4.95 (paper).

A brief but pithy account of Solidarity's days of glory from August 1980 to December 1981. The author sees Solidarity as a national opposition, not just a union, but has some harsh words for the ignorance and bad judgment of its leaders (including Walesa) in not being able to make a bargain to become a junior partner of the Communist Party and thus save the country. But even had they tried, it takes two to tango. As a bonus, there is a useful appendix of pertinent documents.

COURIER FROM WARSAW. By Jan Nowak. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982, 480 pp. $24.95.

The story of one man's dangerous and heroic service in the Polish Underground during World War II, told in fascinating detail. Moving between Nazi-occupied Poland and London, Nowak was in the middle of both Home Army action and the difficult dealings with the British on "the Polish question." This is first-rate, as dramatic narrative and as a contribution to history. Nowak was head of the Polish desk of Radio Free Europe from its inception until 1976, and is now a consultant to the National Security Council.

BITTER LEGACY: POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II. By Richard C. Lukas. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982, 191 pp. $16.00.

The "bitter legacy," the author argues, was the consequence of America's having habituated Russia to dealing with political issues in Eastern Europe without the United States. Yet his history of the early postwar years (1945–47) fails to show how, in practical terms, the United States could have prevented the Communist takeover in Poland. The study, however, is a solid and informative history of what happened in those years, especially on the lesser known questions of relief and rehabilitation, repatriation of Polish nationals, and economic aid.

POLAND: COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM, ANTI-SEMITISM. By Michael Checinski. New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982, 270 pp. $22.95.

Despite the triple billing in the subtitle, this book is primarily about the Jewish community and anti-Semitism, their place in Communist Party politics and in Soviet policy toward Poland, following the theme developed by Paul

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Lendvai in his *Anti-Semitism Without Jews*. In the process, the author provides some interesting revelations and interpretations of his own in discussing the "Polish October" of 1956 and the "March events" of 1968, and particularly the roles played by Gomulka and by Mieczyslaw Moczar.

RAOUL WALLENBERG: ANGEL OF RESCUE. By Harvey Rosenfeld. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1982, 261 pp. $19.95.

The story of the courageous Swede who, with the benefit of diplomatic status in Hungary during World War II, saved many Jews from deportation and death. Wallenberg was arrested by the Russians in 1945, and the Soviet government has claimed that he died in 1947. The author cites the statements of several persons who believe that they saw him in one or another prison or labor camp in later years, but is unable to solve the mystery of whether Wallenberg is still alive.

SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD. By Hans Dieter Seibel and Ukandi G. Damachi. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 316 pp. $30.00.

The Yugoslav experiment in socialist self-management continues to interest and even dazzle many who are looking for alternatives to the social order they see in the capitalist West or Soviet bloc. This relatively uncritical study by a German and a Nigerian scholar gives Yugoslavia's system high marks for combining democracy, egalitarianism and efficiency. They find it a promising model for the Third World, even though the attempts certain countries have made in that direction, which they examine in the latter part of the book, have had scant success.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS. By Chaim Herzog. New York: Random House, 1982, 392 pp. $20.00.

A military history—condensed, popular, but highly professional—of Israel's wars from 1948 to 1982. The author counts seven of them, including the War of Attrition of 1969–70 and the war against terrorism, of which the high point was the raid at Entebbe. General (also Ambassador) Herzog is a man of many parts, and he writes from the experience of serving in a variety of capacities in all of these wars.

SHIMON PERES: A BIOGRAPHY. By Matti Golan. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 275 pp. $22.50.

An authorized biography, by a prominent Israeli journalist, full of praise for Peres and less than complimentary to those who were his opponents in political battles. Parts of the book are of considerable interest, however, as evidence bearing on critical periods in Israel's history (e.g., the arms deal with France in the 1950s, the successive wars, the Kissinger negotiations in the 1970s) and on the feats and foibles of the leading personalities.

THE POLITICS OF PRESSURE: AMERICAN ARMS AND ISRAELI POLICY SINCE THE SIX DAY WAR. By David Pollock. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1982, 328 pp. $35.00.

On a subject about which much nonsense has been written—what America

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has done or can do to influence Israel through the supply or denial of arms—this heavily documented study provides a close look at and intelligent analysis of the record, year by year. Pressure there has been, especially in the period just after the war of 1973, but on the whole not very much; and U.S. decisions contrary to Israel's wishes have been motivated more by concern with third-party (Arab or Soviet) reactions than by the aim of changing Israeli policy.

I SPEAK FOR LEBANON. By Kamal Joumblatt. London: Zed Press, 1982, 122 pp. (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, distributor, $25.00; paper, $8.50).

A delayed publication of some extensive conversations between the leader of Lebanon's Druse community and French journalist Philippe Lapousterie in 1976–1977, at the end of the first phase of the civil struggle in Lebanon. Joumblatt speaks of his country's past and future, of the hated Maronites, of Palestinians and Syrians, and of much else, throwing light on the events of those days and of the present as well. He was assassinated in 1977.

FAITH AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF ISLAM. By Edward Mortimer. New York: Random House, 1982, 432 pp. $19.95 (paper, $6.95).

A British journalist accomplishes a tour de force in covering the rise and spread of Islam, its various forms and sects, its political role in a dozen countries, and the so-called Islamic resurgence of the present day—all in a general volume that provides a fine introduction for the non-specialist reader; and the specialists will not easily poke holes in it. The variety and complexity of Islam as a political phenomenon make sweeping generalizations virtually impossible, and Mortimer wisely does not try.

THE IMAM AND HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. By Robin Woodsworth Carlsen. Victoria (B.C.): Snow Man Press, 1982, 191 pp.

A difficult book to judge, unless one undertakes it on the author's own terms, his own spiritual convictions, and his interpretation of Khomeini and his regime as the purest expression of Islam and the proposition that man must live according to the laws of God. In form, the book is a series of episodes and personal experiences, including a meeting with the Imam during a recent visit to Iran.

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. By Robert E. Looney. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1982, 302 pp. $32.50.

Essentially this is a history of Iran's successive development plans over 30 years, how well (or badly) they worked, and how such factors as maldistribution of income, inflation and neglect of agriculture contributed to the mass discontent of the late 1970s. A book for economists, often mired in theory and statistics, it is nevertheless a real contribution to our understanding of how an apparently stable and confident regime in a rich oil-producing country dissolved in chaos.

LAND AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN, 1960–1980. By Eric J. Hooglund. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 188 pp. $19.95.

The best study yet to appear on the Shah's "white revolution," showing how the land reform transferred authority in the countryside from landlords to government but did little to benefit the peasants, many of whom flocked to the cities and stoked the fires of revolution. The author, an American scholar, did field work in Iran for several years in the 1970s, including the revolutionary year 1978–79.

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EGYPT: POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1945–1981. By Derek Hopwood. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1982, 194 pp. $28.50 (paper, $9.95).

The Dean of St. Antony's College, Oxford, well acquainted with Egypt through scholarship and many visits, writes an introductory, broad-brush survey of the reigns of Nasser and Sadat. A good replacement for earlier general volumes by Tom Little and others, which are now out of date, it is sympathetic, balanced, broad in coverage, bland in presentation.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF EGYPT. By Mark N. Cooper. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982, 278 pp.

The decade from the June war of 1967 to the January riots of 1977 brought sea changes in the society and polity of Egypt, as Nasser's "Arab socialism" gave way to the liberalization carried out under Sadat. Cooper describes a continuing record of frustration and failure, for, regardless of doctrine and policy, the charisma of leaders, or the extent of foreign aid, the underlying structural problems were too great for government to overcome. He argues persuasively that even the major decisions on foreign policy grew out of these intractable internal problems.

LIBYAN SANDSTORM: THE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF QADDAFI'S REVOLUTION. By John K. Cooley. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982, 320 pp. $16.50.

Maybe not the complete account, but a most informative one. John Cooley, an American correspondent steeped in the lore of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, tells the Qaddafi story with his usual combination of thoroughness and dramatic flair. He seems to enjoy himself most when unravelling the mysteries of the innumerable plots and counterplots involving Qaddafi, and penetrating the murky recesses of the Wilson-Terpil affair.

OIL AND TURMOIL: AMERICA FACES OPEC AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Dankwart A. Rustow. New York: Norton, 1982, 320 pp. $14.95.

Professor Rustow, with an earlier book on OPEC and a long list of publications on the Middle East to his credit, is an ideal author for such a book as this, which explores and explains both the politics of oil and the oil factor in politics. In view of the vast amount of writing on these matters in the past decade, much of his story is familiar, but he tells it in historical perspective, with a sense of proportion, a healthy skepticism toward the self-serving statements of governments and oil companies, and a refreshing candor and style.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS, PART I. Selected Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, 610 pp.
ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE PRC. Edited and translated by George C. Wang. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 155 pp. $17.00 (paper, $8.95).

Published under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the first volume is the most useful and detailed discussion yet available about the post-Mao economic reforms and the possible scenarios for the future. According to the specialists who contributed to this volume, China's overall

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performance is characterized by strong but erratic growth, and China is one of the few developing nations to have avoided massive foreign debt. On the other hand, agricultural production is barely keeping up with population; oil production peaked in 1979 and is declining; and energy shortfalls will be a brake on growth for the next few years. Finally, inflation, unemployment and industrial bottlenecks have been increasing and they raise the possibility that, as Robert Dernberger suggests, the current emphasis on raising living standards may be only temporary. Thus, there may be continuing shifts in Chinese economic policy rather than the widely predicted stability. The second volume, edited by Wang, will be of interest to specialists. It is a fascinating account by a number of PRC economists of the problems that they see in China's present economic system, and the directions they would like economic reform to take.

CHINA, IRAN, AND THE PERSIAN GULF. By A. H. H. Abidi. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1982, 325 pp.

This is a very sophisticated study of China's relations with Iran. Although there are brief sections on the period since the Iranian revolution, most of the book deals with relations with the Shah. China has taken a special interest in Iran because of its concern that the Gulf region not pass into the Soviet sphere of influence. Its approach in the Gulf has been essentially preemptive—to keep the U.S.S.R. back.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. Edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli. New York: Praeger, 1982, 230 pp. $26.95.

THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: THE EVOLUTION OF AN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP. By Shirin Tahir-Kheli. New York: Praeger, 1982, 167 pp. $21.95 (paper, $10.95).

Two very useful books on the new strategic and political challenges facing American policymakers in Southwest Asia. In the first, Keith Dunn has an interesting analysis of the main constraint on Soviet policy in the region: "It involves a lack of friends and allies; a lack of guaranteed access to facilities; and a general dislike and distrust of not only the Soviet Union but the communist system. Therefore, the primary U.S. response to the Soviet threat must continue to be political . . . ." In the second book, Tahir-Kheli argues that the Soviet treaty with India and occupation of Afghanistan have now brought about a commonality of views in Washington and Islamabad. The regional threat of Soviet-backed moves in Southwest Asia is now a cause for genuine concern in both capitals, and this represents a basic difference from 1954, when Pakistan was focused almost entirely on India.

THE AFGHAN SYNDROME: HOW TO LIVE WITH SOVIET POWER. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. New Delhi: Vikas, 1982, 296 pp. (New York: Advent Books, distributor, $37.50).

Written from an Indian scholar's perspective, this is a timely and thoughtful account of how the United States, India, Pakistan and China reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There is also a provocative chapter on the Soviet Union as an emergent global power.

BANGLADESH: THE FIRST DECADE. By Marcus Franda. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers/Hanover (N.H.): Universities Field Staff International, 1982, 351 pp.

Very little has been written in English about the new (1971) nation of Bangladesh; yet it is the world's eighth most highly populated country, it has

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already had an impact on international power alignments in South Asia, and it faces staggering problems of development which could lead to turmoil in the years ahead. The author, who has been studying the region for 20 years, is the most knowledgeable American analyst of Bangladesh, and this is a collection of the essays he has written for the Universities Field Staff International. Franda places much of the blame for the failure of development in Bangladesh on the "international development establishment."

U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS: MEETING THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE. By Lawrence B. Krause. Washington: Brookings, 1982, 98 pp. $14.95 (paper, $5.95).

This is an important book which argues convincingly that some legislation enacted in the mid-1970s has made it difficult for American firms to compete with the Japanese in Southeast Asia. To meet Japanese competition there, a new relationship between the U.S. government and business is necessary: government should encourage broad-based general trading companies that include banking entities and are capable of packaging complete deals involving services, export of machinery, technical training and finance. U.S. antitrust laws now stand in the way of American trading companies of this sort.

U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS, 1882–1982. Edited by Tae-Hwan Kwak and others. Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1982, 433 pp. $18.00.

This is an unusually strong, coherent and well-edited collection of 19 papers on U.S.-Korean relations in all their historical, cultural, economic and military complexities. Few other volumes treat the subject in such a comprehensive manner.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

CHANGING REALITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY. Edited by Michael Clough. Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1982, 318 pp. $12.50 (paper).

Admirable for the swift publication of timely materials (current through June 1982), this collection depicts a southern Africa in transition as its states (and even, potentially, Namibia) try to sort out the problems they face in their relationship with South Africa over the long haul. Particularly interesting are essays on the history of the Namibia negotiations by Michael Clough, on the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) by Clough and John Ravenhill, and on U.S. assistance policy by Raymond Casson.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, 270 pp. $32.50 (paper, $8.95).

Looking at South Africa in the context of its neighbors, this useful collection breaks down the interests and activities of outside powers in the region as a whole. Interesting new material emerges in Richard Horovitz's essay on donor agencies and Christopher Hill's analysis of European involvement, while Robert Price and Kenneth Grundy contribute sophisticated surveys of more familiar territory—the tension between regional and global approaches in U.S. policy, and South Africa's links with majority-ruled states of the region.

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THE DESTRUCTION OF A CONTINENT: AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL AID. By Karl Borgin and Kathleen Corbett. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982, 216 pp. $14.95.

There are grains of truth in this simplistic diatribe—Western technical assistance and development schemes *have* contributed to a burgeoning African population and wasted significant amounts of human and material resources. While setting out to flay meddlesome aid bureaucrats, however, the authors go much farther, making short work of African society and politics as well, and, eventually, even of the continent's future. Though they abjure prescription, they seem to be advocating the total isolation of the benighted African from the developed world.

OPPRESSION AND RESISTANCE: THE STRUGGLE OF WOMEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Richard E. Lapchick and Stephanie Urdang. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1982, 197 pp. $25.00.

Based on materials prepared for the 1980 Copenhagen Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women, this book gives a telling account of the depredations of apartheid on the domestic existence of South African blacks. In their focus on women and children, often living apart from men and from the modern economy, the authors movingly depict the extreme economic and emotional insecurities that underlie black social life in South Africa. The courage and drive of black and white women in South Africa's labor and women's movements in the 1950s and early 1960s are impressive and dismaying—20 years later a new growth is only now discernible in the ashes of the old movements.

CHIRUNDU. By Es'kia Mphahlele. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1982, 158 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Against a backdrop of village and city life in a country resembling Zambia, the noted South African writer, recently returned to his native land after 20 years of self-imposed exile, sympathetically but sharply dissects a new type of power-hungry African bureaucrat who, in many instances, has replaced the former European governors—and suggests the outlines of a coming struggle between these "big men" and younger progressives.

AKE: THE YEARS OF CHILDHOOD. By Wole Soyinka. New York: Random House, 1982, 230 pp. $14.95.

This autobiography of Nigeria's poet, playwright, and novelist extraordinaire is a classic essay on childhood, as well as a richly rendered reminiscence of Yoruba social life in the pre-independence period. Firmly planted within African culture, but honed in the Western literary tradition, Soyinka perfectly conveys his own youthful synthesis of his family's fervent, literate and disciplined Christianity with the animism of their milieu. For the Western reader his book offers unparalleled insights into Africa conveyed through effortlessly flowing narrative—a real joy!

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Janet Rigney

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
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

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